This house would develop tactical nuclear weapons

There are a number of technological developments that have made the use of conventional weapons ineffective in combating certain threats. For example, some bunkers are buried so deeply underground that conventional bombs cannot penetrate them. Weapons such as the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP), currently in development in the United States, would be able to penetrate such bunkers, while leaving no more surface damage than a conventional bomb¹. Deployment of a weapon such as the RNEP might prove necessary in order to stop proliferation of nuclear weapons in rogue states, as for example, Iran has built extremely tough bunkers for the purpose of nuclear testing and storage of weapons of mass destruction. Blocking the development of necessary tactical nuclear technologies actually raises the chances of these dangerous states obtaining nuclear weapons. Another instance of tactical nuclear devices proving useful is in the destruction of clandestine biological and chemical weapons factories. Were such facilities destroyed by conventional bombing, some of the materials being manufactured could easily leak into neighbouring population areas, leading to increased casualties. Clearly, in light of these defense innovations, tactical nuclear weapons are an essential addition to a nuclear power's arsenal.
¹ Reynolds, Paul. 2003. "Mini-Nukes on US Agenda". BBC News.

Conventional weapons are perfectly capable of dealing with the issues and conflicts for which tactical nuclear weapons are designed, and are less risky to employ. The predictions by the United States government that the RNEP would produce little fallout, for example, appear unfounded. On the contrary, the weapon would likely scatter deadly nuclear fallout for miles around a target site, causing terrible destruction and collateral damage¹. Furthermore, developments in conventional weapons can serve the same purposes, if with slightly greater difficulty. New super bunker-buster bombs are in development in the United States that do not carry a nuclear payload, and fuel-air bombs can, with their wide incendiary range, destroy factories and incinerate any hazardous materials quite effectively. New nuclear weapons are not necessary for the tactical concerns of the future.
¹ Union of Concerned Scientists. 2005. "Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator".

Research and development into tactical nuclear weapons are essential for countries to maintain their technological edge in the field of nuclear science. The United States has long enjoyed technological dominance in the field of nuclear weaponry. However, in recent years China and Russia have begun to pour effort into developing ever-smaller nuclear weapons for tactical deployment. If the United States and the other nuclear powers wish to maintain their position within the nuclear tech order, they must begin investing further in development of similar miniaturized nuclear devices. Research into the design and construction of mini-nukes provides a number of benefits beyond the tactical flexibility conferred by such weapons. First, developing mini-nukes puts designers and scientists in the West on the same intellectual page as those seeking to devise nuclear weapons suitable for use in terrorist attacks, such as so-called suitcase-nukes¹. By learning how to build such weapons scientists will be able to devise means of counteracting them should an enemy attempt to employ them in an attack. Furthermore, the miniaturization of nuclear weapons has applications in other nuclear technologies such as in the design and manufacture of smaller nuclear power facilities. Military technology always finds an outlet in civilian use. Such was case with Cold War technological endeavors, such as the Space Race, which yielded everything from superior computer processors to ballpoint pens. Clearly, the public will in many ways reap the boons arising from the development of smaller tactical nuclear weapons.
¹ Jervis, Robert. 2001. "Weapons Without Purpose? Nuclear Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era". Foreign Affairs.

Countries can develop their nuclear-related technologies without the need to direct efforts to the construction of extremely dangerous, miniature nuclear weapons. Rather, if superior technology is desired, the resources exist in Western countries to do most research without even touching nuclear materials, being able to do much of the research by means of computer. Dominance in nuclear engineering does not require the creation of such weapons. It is better to direct research toward peaceful applications of nuclear technology.

For deterrence to function, rogue states and other international actors with nuclear capabilities, such as North Korea, must believe that their would-be target will retaliate in kind if attacked, tactical nuclear weapons provide a middle option. Given that these rogue states would likely only have access to low-yield nuclear weapons, it is unlikely that they would be able to launch a nuclear attack capable of more than damaging a Western city. Furthermore, the relative difficulty of developing deliverable nuclear weapons means that rogue nations are increasingly looking toward the acquisition and development of alternative weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical, biological, and radiological weapons. Were the United States, or another nuclear power, to be attacked by any of these weapons, it is unlikely that it, or the international community would consider the deployment of a strategic nuclear strike in retaliation to be justified. The response would certainly be disproportionately large, as strategic nuclear missiles can easily level cities, even with the smallest possible payload. This means that in order to maintain effective deterrence, nuclear powers must shift from the paradigm laid out by the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction to a "flexible response" doctrine, in which countries deploy arsenals of much smaller, tactical nuclear weapons that their enemies honestly believe they will use if provoked. By equipping themselves with a range of weapons, so as to be able to scale responses appropriately, nuclear-armed countries are far likelier to deter potential aggressors in future ¹. Pakistan's military serves as an example of such tactical nuclear capability ready for action; its army is armed with an arsenal of mini-nukes that can be used to destroy whole tank formations, with little radioactive fallout dispersing beyond the battlefield. These weapons serve to redress the balance between Pakistani and Indian conventional military capacity. As Pakistan is woefully outnumbered and outgunned in conventional weapons, its tactical nuclear arsenal can deliver devastating damage to massed Indian army formations, preventing any potential invasion². Clearly, tactical nuclear weapons are useful weapons in a country arsenal, preparing it to be more flexible in its application of nuclear force.
¹ Reynolds, Paul. 2003. "Mini-Nukes on US Agenda". BBC News.
²The Economist. 2011. "A Rivalry that Threatens the World". The Economist.

All rogue states that might attack the United States or other Western countries would likely be unable to withstand a conventional military attack from one of them. For this reason, any retaliation to a crude nuclear attack from a rogue state would more likely, and more justifiably, incur retaliation by conventional military force. With its massive conventional bombs, air and sea dominance, and tactical superiority, the United States, for example would be better served by responding to nuclear aggression with overwhelming conventional firepower. Rather than validating nuclear retaliation, and thus opening the door to similar responses in the future, it is better to respond to such situations with conventional power.

Development and deployment of tactical nuclear weapons can be viewed as a suitable replacement for the thousands of strategic nuclear missiles and launchers being decommissioned as part of the recently ratified New START between Russia and the United States, which represents a major step toward non-proliferation of strategic nuclear weapons. The treaty exempts tactical nuclear weapons by omitting them from the language of the treaty, including as yet undeveloped miniature warheads, as both the United States and Russia have come to see the possession and deployment of tactical nuclear weapons as key to their national security. Replacing large numbers of strategic nuclear weapons with a smaller quantity of lower capacity tactical weapons marks a major movement away from proliferation of potentially world-destroying weaponry. Furthermore, the movement from proliferation of unusable strategic weapons to tactically viable, smaller nuclear weapons can be used as a means of allaying the fears of citizens in the United States, Russia, and other countries pursuing policies of non-proliferation that their countries nuclear defenses are not only still viable, but more practicable.

The unwillingness of the United States and Russia to give up tactical nuclear weapons shows some of the hypocrisy running through the New START. The treaty should make an effort to eliminate nuclear weapons completely, not just some. Furthermore, tactical nuclear weapons are more dangerous than their larger strategic counterparts because they are much smaller, and thus lend themselves to actually be used, which raises serious risks of escalation.

States, as the building blocks of international society, have an inviolable right to self-defense, and this right extends to the possession of miniature, tactical nuclear weapons. Often states lack the capacity to defend themselves with conventional weapons. This is particularly true of small and poor states. Even wealthy, small states are susceptible to foreign attack, since their wealth cannot make up for their lack of manpower. When armed with tactical nuclear weapons, all states become equal in terms of capacity to do harm to one another. If a large state attempts to intimidate, or even invade a smaller neighbor, it will be unable to effectively cow it, since the small state will have the power to severely damage, or even destroy, the would-be invader's military capacity with a few well-placed miniature nuclear missiles [1]. An example of this is the 2008 invasion of Georgia by Russian troops, which would likely never have occurred had Georgia possessed an arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons, as Russia would have thought twice when considering that its large tank formations could be wiped out by a single well-placed tactical warhead. Clearly, nuclear weapons serve in many ways to equalize states irrespective of size, allowing them to more effectively defend themselves.

[1] The Economist. 2011. “A Rivalry that Threatens the World”. The Economist. Available: http://www.economist.com

While states should of course have the right to defend themselves, this does not extend to the possession and use of tactical nuclear weapons. Just as biological and chemical weapons are banned by international treaty, so too has the international community generally acknowledged that nuclear proliferation is negative, which is why so many treaties are dedicated to non-proliferation [1]. It is a tragedy that nuclear weapons exist, even more so that a few countries are still seeking to develop them. It is better to fight this movement, to keep nuclear weapons in as few hands as possible so as to prevent their development, testing, and use by rogue states, terrorists, and other dangers to international security. This is all the more true of tactical nuclear weapons, whose smaller size and destructive capacity make them not only easier for terrorists to acquire, but also to be used, and thus to instigate a rapid escalation to full-scale nuclear war.

[1] Shah, Anup. 2009. “Nuclear Weapons”. Global Issues. Available: http://www.globalissues.org/issue/67/nuclear-weapons

There are a number of technological developments that have made the use of conventional weapons ineffective in combating certain threats. For example, some bunkers are buried so deeply underground that conventional bombs cannot penetrate them. Weapons such as the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP), currently in development in the United States, would be able to penetrate such bunkers, while leaving no more surface damage than a conventional bomb¹. Deployment of a weapon such as the RNEP might prove necessary in order to stop proliferation of nuclear weapons in rogue states, as for example, Iran has built extremely tough bunkers for the purpose of nuclear testing and storage of weapons of mass destruction. Blocking the development of necessary tactical nuclear technologies actually raises the chances of these dangerous states obtaining nuclear weapons. Another instance of tactical nuclear devices proving useful is in the destruction of clandestine biological and chemical weapons factories. Were such facilities destroyed by conventional bombing, some of the materials being manufactured could easily leak into neighbouring population areas, leading to increased casualties. Clearly, in light of these defense innovations, tactical nuclear weapons are an essential addition to a nuclear power's arsenal.
¹ Reynolds, Paul. 2003. "Mini-Nukes on US Agenda". BBC News.

Conventional weapons are perfectly capable of dealing with the issues and conflicts for which tactical nuclear weapons are designed, and are less risky to employ. The predictions by the United States government that the RNEP would produce little fallout, for example, appear unfounded. On the contrary, the weapon would likely scatter deadly nuclear fallout for miles around a target site, causing terrible destruction and collateral damage¹. Furthermore, developments in conventional weapons can serve the same purposes, if with slightly greater difficulty. New super bunker-buster bombs are in development in the United States that do not carry a nuclear payload, and fuel-air bombs can, with their wide incendiary range, destroy factories and incinerate any hazardous materials quite effectively. New nuclear weapons are not necessary for the tactical concerns of the future.
¹ Union of Concerned Scientists. 2005. "Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator".

Research and development into tactical nuclear weapons are essential for countries to maintain their technological edge in the field of nuclear science. The United States has long enjoyed technological dominance in the field of nuclear weaponry. However, in recent years China and Russia have begun to pour effort into developing ever-smaller nuclear weapons for tactical deployment. If the United States and the other nuclear powers wish to maintain their position within the nuclear tech order, they must begin investing further in development of similar miniaturized nuclear devices. Research into the design and construction of mini-nukes provides a number of benefits beyond the tactical flexibility conferred by such weapons. First, developing mini-nukes puts designers and scientists in the West on the same intellectual page as those seeking to devise nuclear weapons suitable for use in terrorist attacks, such as so-called suitcase-nukes¹. By learning how to build such weapons scientists will be able to devise means of counteracting them should an enemy attempt to employ them in an attack. Furthermore, the miniaturization of nuclear weapons has applications in other nuclear technologies such as in the design and manufacture of smaller nuclear power facilities. Military technology always finds an outlet in civilian use. Such was case with Cold War technological endeavors, such as the Space Race, which yielded everything from superior computer processors to ballpoint pens. Clearly, the public will in many ways reap the boons arising from the development of smaller tactical nuclear weapons.
¹ Jervis, Robert. 2001. "Weapons Without Purpose? Nuclear Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era". Foreign Affairs.

Countries can develop their nuclear-related technologies without the need to direct efforts to the construction of extremely dangerous, miniature nuclear weapons. Rather, if superior technology is desired, the resources exist in Western countries to do most research without even touching nuclear materials, being able to do much of the research by means of computer. Dominance in nuclear engineering does not require the creation of such weapons. It is better to direct research toward peaceful applications of nuclear technology.

For deterrence to function, rogue states and other international actors with nuclear capabilities, such as North Korea, must believe that their would-be target will retaliate in kind if attacked, tactical nuclear weapons provide a middle option. Given that these rogue states would likely only have access to low-yield nuclear weapons, it is unlikely that they would be able to launch a nuclear attack capable of more than damaging a Western city. Furthermore, the relative difficulty of developing deliverable nuclear weapons means that rogue nations are increasingly looking toward the acquisition and development of alternative weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical, biological, and radiological weapons. Were the United States, or another nuclear power, to be attacked by any of these weapons, it is unlikely that it, or the international community would consider the deployment of a strategic nuclear strike in retaliation to be justified. The response would certainly be disproportionately large, as strategic nuclear missiles can easily level cities, even with the smallest possible payload. This means that in order to maintain effective deterrence, nuclear powers must shift from the paradigm laid out by the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction to a "flexible response" doctrine, in which countries deploy arsenals of much smaller, tactical nuclear weapons that their enemies honestly believe they will use if provoked. By equipping themselves with a range of weapons, so as to be able to scale responses appropriately, nuclear-armed countries are far likelier to deter potential aggressors in future ¹. Pakistan's military serves as an example of such tactical nuclear capability ready for action; its army is armed with an arsenal of mini-nukes that can be used to destroy whole tank formations, with little radioactive fallout dispersing beyond the battlefield. These weapons serve to redress the balance between Pakistani and Indian conventional military capacity. As Pakistan is woefully outnumbered and outgunned in conventional weapons, its tactical nuclear arsenal can deliver devastating damage to massed Indian army formations, preventing any potential invasion². Clearly, tactical nuclear weapons are useful weapons in a country arsenal, preparing it to be more flexible in its application of nuclear force.
¹ Reynolds, Paul. 2003. "Mini-Nukes on US Agenda". BBC News.
²The Economist. 2011. "A Rivalry that Threatens the World". The Economist.

All rogue states that might attack the United States or other Western countries would likely be unable to withstand a conventional military attack from one of them. For this reason, any retaliation to a crude nuclear attack from a rogue state would more likely, and more justifiably, incur retaliation by conventional military force. With its massive conventional bombs, air and sea dominance, and tactical superiority, the United States, for example would be better served by responding to nuclear aggression with overwhelming conventional firepower. Rather than validating nuclear retaliation, and thus opening the door to similar responses in the future, it is better to respond to such situations with conventional power.

Development and deployment of tactical nuclear weapons can be viewed as a suitable replacement for the thousands of strategic nuclear missiles and launchers being decommissioned as part of the recently ratified New START between Russia and the United States, which represents a major step toward non-proliferation of strategic nuclear weapons. The treaty exempts tactical nuclear weapons by omitting them from the language of the treaty, including as yet undeveloped miniature warheads, as both the United States and Russia have come to see the possession and deployment of tactical nuclear weapons as key to their national security. Replacing large numbers of strategic nuclear weapons with a smaller quantity of lower capacity tactical weapons marks a major movement away from proliferation of potentially world-destroying weaponry. Furthermore, the movement from proliferation of unusable strategic weapons to tactically viable, smaller nuclear weapons can be used as a means of allaying the fears of citizens in the United States, Russia, and other countries pursuing policies of non-proliferation that their countries nuclear defenses are not only still viable, but more practicable.

The unwillingness of the United States and Russia to give up tactical nuclear weapons shows some of the hypocrisy running through the New START. The treaty should make an effort to eliminate nuclear weapons completely, not just some. Furthermore, tactical nuclear weapons are more dangerous than their larger strategic counterparts because they are much smaller, and thus lend themselves to actually be used, which raises serious risks of escalation.

States, as the building blocks of international society, have an inviolable right to self-defense, and this right extends to the possession of miniature, tactical nuclear weapons. Often states lack the capacity to defend themselves with conventional weapons. This is particularly true of small and poor states. Even wealthy, small states are susceptible to foreign attack, since their wealth cannot make up for their lack of manpower. When armed with tactical nuclear weapons, all states become equal in terms of capacity to do harm to one another. If a large state attempts to intimidate, or even invade a smaller neighbor, it will be unable to effectively cow it, since the small state will have the power to severely damage, or even destroy, the would-be invader's military capacity with a few well-placed miniature nuclear missiles [1]. An example of this is the 2008 invasion of Georgia by Russian troops, which would likely never have occurred had Georgia possessed an arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons, as Russia would have thought twice when considering that its large tank formations could be wiped out by a single well-placed tactical warhead. Clearly, nuclear weapons serve in many ways to equalize states irrespective of size, allowing them to more effectively defend themselves.

[1] The Economist. 2011. “A Rivalry that Threatens the World”. The Economist. Available: http://www.economist.com

While states should of course have the right to defend themselves, this does not extend to the possession and use of tactical nuclear weapons. Just as biological and chemical weapons are banned by international treaty, so too has the international community generally acknowledged that nuclear proliferation is negative, which is why so many treaties are dedicated to non-proliferation [1]. It is a tragedy that nuclear weapons exist, even more so that a few countries are still seeking to develop them. It is better to fight this movement, to keep nuclear weapons in as few hands as possible so as to prevent their development, testing, and use by rogue states, terrorists, and other dangers to international security. This is all the more true of tactical nuclear weapons, whose smaller size and destructive capacity make them not only easier for terrorists to acquire, but also to be used, and thus to instigate a rapid escalation to full-scale nuclear war.

[1] Shah, Anup. 2009. “Nuclear Weapons”. Global Issues. Available: http://www.globalissues.org/issue/67/nuclear-weapons

Countries have spent many billions of dollars developing tactical nuclear weapons in recent decades in the hope of maintaining their positions as nuclear powers with access to a whole range of terrifying weapons. However, little real applicability exists for most of these weapons. Weapons such as the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP), being developed in the United States at enormous cost, is designed to burrow deep underground to destroy enemy bunkers, yet it is as yet unusable, since the weapon cannot as yet burrow even a tenth of the distance underground necessary to prevent considerable radioactive fallout in the area surrounding the blast site¹. In fact, many scientists say the weapon is a chimera and will never be capable of doing what it is meant to without risking huge collateral damage. Furthermore, it is unlikely that many states would consider the use of nuclear weapons appropriate, regardless of size. This international taboo should be considered a positive step toward peace, and not be tampered with by overzealous governments seeking strategic advantage. Overall, tactical nuclear weapons will likely prove to be little more than expensive dust-gatherer in most cases.

¹ Union of Concerned Scientists. 2005. "Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator".

Much of the technology of tactical nuclear weapons is still in the early stages of development. While many of the weapons, such as the RNEP, cannot yet be applied in the field, their eventual development could open the door to a broad range of strategic considerations. For that reason, it is imperative that work in this field continue, to guarantee that states can have the best defenses available to them and the greatest tactical flexibility in the event of conflict.

Tactical nuclear weapons undermine the overarching structure of deterrence in nuclear diplomacy. Nuclear weapons create stability, as described in the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Countries with nuclear weapons have no incentive to engage in open military conflict with one another; all recognize that they will suffer destruction if they choose the path of war¹. If countries have nuclear weapons, fighting simply becomes too costly. This serves to defuse conflicts, and reduce the likelihood of the outbreak of war. When states have nuclear weapons they cannot fight, making the world a more peaceful place. Furthermore, armed with a nuclear deterrent, all states become equal in terms of ability to do harm to one another ². If a large state attempts to intimidate or to invade a smaller neighbor, it will be unable to effectively subdue it, since the small state will have the power to seriously injure, or even destroy, the would-be invader with a few well-placed nuclear missiles³. The dynamics created by MAD are entirely lost when miniaturized, tactical nuclear weapons are brought into the equation. By considering nuclear weapons to no longer fit into the rigid framework of MAD, which ensures that they are not used except in response to existential threats, their use becomes more likely and more accepted as a strategic tool. For example, the 2002 United States Nuclear Posture Review recommends the integration of nuclear weapons into the broader strategic framework of the military and defense department. Such reconsideration can only make the use of nuclear weapons more likely⁴. Clearly, the development of tactical nuclear weapons will only destabilize world relations, not offer greater security.
¹ Waltz, Kenneth. 1981. "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better". Adelphi Papers 171. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.
² Jervis, Robert. 2001. "Weapons Without Purpose? Nuclear Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era". Foreign Affairs. 
³ Mearsheimer, John. 1993. "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent". ForeignAffairs. 
⁴ Arkin, William. 2002. "Secret Plan Outlines the Unthinkable". Los Angeles Times.

MAD is not an effective means of maintaining world security. It relies upon states being too afraid to ever attack one another with nuclear weapons, but the risk of one doing so remains, irrespective of the doctrine. It has too many inherent risks and raises the very real chance, as weapons amass and proliferate, of their being used¹. At the same time, should a nuclear weapon be used by a rogue state against another country, that country must have some means of retaliation. The problem is that the weapon likely to be used in such an attack will be crude and incapable of doing the sort of damage that a refined nuclear weapon of the Western nuclear powers could. This makes the question of what constitutes a proportional response difficult to answer. Should North Korea, for example, ever be able to attack the United States or its allies with nuclear weapons, its crude missiles will warrant a response, but quite possibly not a strategic nuclear missile-sized response. For this reason, the development of smaller, more versatile nuclear weapons makes these strategic considerations easier to manage, and allows for a range of responses left unavailable by the current blunt instrument of strategic nuclear missiles.
¹ Sagan, Scott D. 1993. The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Tactical nuclear weapons are much smaller than their strategic counterparts, and are designed to be deployed in higher numbers and nearer the enemy. This reality has a number of very negative consequences when considering the likelihood of nuclear war. First, control over tactical nuclear weapons is necessarily devolved to field commanders, since they control both the warheads and delivery systems for the weapons deployed near the enemy. This necessarily increases the likelihood of trigger-happy commanders using nuclear weapons, and little practical means of stopping them. Second, because of their deployment positions, should an enemy make an incursion into a country's territory, its tactical nuclear weapons batteries could risk capture by the invader. This generates a "use them or lose them" problem, and when coupled with the fact that the weapons are under the direct control of individual field commanders, the weapons might well be used. The result would likely be rapid escalation of hostilities, and possibly full-scale nuclear war. In Pakistan, for example, tactical nuclear weapons have been deployed and war games practiced for the eventuality of an Indian invasion (The Economist, 2011). The risks of war and of nuclear holocaust are only raised by tactical nuclear weapons.
¹ The Economist. 2011. "A Rivalry that Threatens the World". The Economist.

Safeguards can be put in place to ensure that power over nuclear weapons is not devolved too far. Central control of launch codes, for example, can allow dispersed deployment and tactical control, without compromising the overall strategic security of the weapons. Furthermore, in the case of Pakistan, it seems more likely that its deployment of tactical nuclear weapons will simply serve as an additional deterrent to potential Indian incursions into the country. It is Pakistan's right to defend itself by whatever means available to it, tactical nuclear weapons included.

When one state develops a new military technology that could potentially tip the strategic balance in its favor, other countries are quick to take notice and to attempt to develop the technology themselves. During the Cold War, the nuclear arms race between the United States and Soviet Union reached a fever pitch, with both states spending vast quantities of money and resources to build newer, deadlier, and ever more plentiful nuclear arsenals. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, however, the nuclear arms race has been at low ebb. Recent moves by the United States, as well as Russia and China, to develop newer, smaller nuclear weapons, as well as to open discussion of tactical application of such weapons outside the paradigm of MAD, however, threaten to bring the nuclear arms race into the 21st century¹. If nuclear weapons begin to permeate the tactical decisions of states, from use in bunker-busting to destroying armor formations, they will cease to hold the special power of fear that has kept them from ever being employed in combat since World War II. A race to develop easier to use, less accountable weapons, while eroding the taboo against their use, spells a recipe for disaster.
¹ Jervis, Robert. 2001. "Weapons Without Purpose? Nuclear Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era". Foreign Affairs.

There is no real risk of a new global arms race arising from the development of tactical nuclear weapons. No country is suggesting, nor would ever likely suggest, a relaxing of controls on the use of nuclear weapons. Tactical nuclear weapons are simply more advanced, more discriminating nuclear weapons. They would not be used except in the utmost extremity, as with all nuclear weapons. While tactical nuclear weapons may find greater applicability in the field, it does not mean they would result in a new arms race.