This House wants a line-item veto amendment

This House wants a line-item veto amendment

The line item veto is a debate that is only really relevant to the United States. The US Constitution gives Congress, as the legislative branch of government the power of the purse. This means that all taxation and spending decisions (appropriations of federal government money for particular purposes) must be authorized by both houses of Congress in legislative bills that are sent to the President for signature or veto. Often appropriations bills are enormously long and complicated, containing thousands of individual items of appropriation, many of which the President has asked for in his budget request, but some of which he disagrees with. In particular, the practice of earmarking, whereby individual Congressmen insert appropriations requests of benefit to some of their constituents into large spending bills, has been criticised as wasteful and an example of "pork barrel" politics, whereby politicians use taxpayers money to buy support back home. Government spending would be lower and more effective if such items were removed from appropriations bills, yet at the moment the President has no means of doing so; he must either sign the bill in its entirety or send it back to Congress for reconsideration. In practice, Presidents since Ronald Reagan have always signed such bills (they can sign it but ask Congress to reconsider some details, but the legislature has no obligation to debate or vote on such rescission requests, and so this has no impact in reality).

Presidents have for decades asked for the power to cancel individual items of appropriations, with Ronald Reagan being particular vigorous in his demands for line-item veto authority. Technically the power is not one of absolute veto but means that when signing a bill a President would be able to notify Congress of his intention not to spend one or more items of appropriation within it. The campaign for a line-item veto was particularly strong in the mid-1990s when federal budget deficits concentrated minds on the need to combat wasteful spending, something that is once again relevant. It was a provision in the Republican's winning 1994 Contract With America manifesto1, and enacted in 1996. Under the Line Item Veto Act President Clinton vetoed 82 items of spending from the 1997 appropriations bills, representing $1.9 billion of savings over five years; in one case Congress overrode his decision by majority votes in each chamber. However, the Act was challenged in federal court by two groups who would have benefited from appropriations that Clinton had vetoed, and in 1998 the Supreme Court found the Line Item Veto Act to be unconstitutional as Congress was not allowed to give up some of its powers to the executive branch.2
Since 1998 there have been several attempts to revisit the issue, with significant proposals in 2006 and 2009 of new bills that attempted to provide the President with line-item veto power in ways that could be considered constitutional. These failed to become law and it is possible that the only way to create such a power is by amending the US Constitution itself (as the Supreme Court decision noted in 1998). As the federal deficit has once again grown and government waste has become a major political issue, there are renewed calls for a line-item veto to be introduced.

This is potentially quite a technical debate but speakers would be well advised to base their case upon the main principles at stake. It is worth noting that the 1996 Act allowed Clinton the power to cancel not only items in appropriations bills but also tax breaks affecting only small numbers of people. And it gave him authority to cancel items directing government expenditure within committee reports accompanying spending bills, which by convention have been accepted by Presidents as binding in the same way as appropriations in Acts are. Whether a proposed Constitutional amendment would have the same scope is a matter for argument among experts. Although the potential for the veto is important most spending is not through appropriations at all, but on entitlements such as Medicare and Social Security that are legislated in different ways and which would not be covered by either the 1996 Act or more recent proposals to enhance Presidential budgeting power.

1 Republican candidates for the House of Representatives, The Contract with America (1994), Manifesto Portal, accessed 5/5/11

2 Clinton, President of the United States, et al. v. City of New York et al. No.97-1374, United States Supreme Court, 1998,accessed 5/5/11

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POINT

We should always be cautious of altering the United States’ Constitution. Once an amendment is passed, it is extremely hard to overturn, even if its consequences are clearly negative (as the experience of constitutionally-mandated prohibition of alcohol should make clear). It would be both difficult and unnecessary. There are problems of wording and interpretation. The 1996 Act covered 22 pages and went into great detail to define the extent and limits of Presidential authority under the legislation, including the exact meanings of “single item of appropriation”, ''direct spending'' and ''limited tax benefit'', as well as the means by which Congress could override his decisions.1 It is hard to believe that a one-paragraph amendment to the Constitution could achieve such precision, opening the budgetary process up to confusion, shifting interpretation and constant legal challenge. It is also unnecessary. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia argues "The short of the matter is this: Had the Line Item Veto Act authorized the president to 'decline to spend' any item of spending ... there is not the slightest doubt that authorization would have been constitutional… What the Line Item Veto Act does instead -- authorizing the president to 'cancel' an item of spending -- is technically different."2 Thus the act could simply have been worded differently in order to make it constitutional. This would not change the substance of the ability of the ‘veto’ to cut spending.

1One hundred fourth Congress of the United States of America at the second session, “Line Item Veto Act”, 3/1/1996, The Library of Congress, accessed 6/5/11

2Supreme Court Justice Scalia quoted in Michael Kirkland, ‘Under the U.S. Supreme Court: Like the South, will line item veto rise again?’, upi.com, 17/4/11 accessed 6/5/11

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COUNTERPOINT

"I do not take these matters lightly in amending the Constitution. However, I am convinced in this case it is the only way to provide the President with the same authority that 44 Governors already have to influence spending."1It would in general be preferable to make such a change through normal legislation, but that was attempted in 1996 and found unconstitutional. Supreme Court Justice Stevens in his majority opinion for the Supreme Court argued that it was necessary for there to be an amendment to make it constitutional, "If there is to be a new procedure in which the president will play a different role in determining the text of what may "become a law", such change must come not by legislation but through the amendment procedures set forth in Article V of the Constitution."2

1 Item veto constitutional amendment hearing before the subcommittee on the constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 23/3/00, accessed 5/5/11

2 Clinton, President of the United States, et al. v. City of New York et al. No.97-1374, United States Supreme Court, 1998,accessed 5/5/11

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APPENDIX

COUNTERPOINT

We should always be cautious of altering the United States’ Constitution. Once an amendment is passed, it is extremely hard to overturn, even if its consequences are clearly negative (as the experience of constitutionally-mandated prohibition of alcohol should make clear). It would be both difficult and unnecessary. There are problems of wording and interpretation. The 1996 Act covered 22 pages and went into great detail to define the extent and limits of Presidential authority under the legislation, including the exact meanings of “single item of appropriation”, ''direct spending'' and ''limited tax benefit'', as well as the means by which Congress could override his decisions.1 It is hard to believe that a one-paragraph amendment to the Constitution could achieve such precision, opening the budgetary process up to confusion, shifting interpretation and constant legal challenge. It is also unnecessary. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia argues "The short of the matter is this: Had the Line Item Veto Act authorized the president to 'decline to spend' any item of spending ... there is not the slightest doubt that authorization would have been constitutional… What the Line Item Veto Act does instead -- authorizing the president to 'cancel' an item of spending -- is technically different."2 Thus the act could simply have been worded differently in order to make it constitutional. This would not change the substance of the ability of the ‘veto’ to cut spending.

1One hundred fourth Congress of the United States of America at the second session, “Line Item Veto Act”, 3/1/1996, The Library of Congress, accessed 6/5/11

2Supreme Court Justice Scalia quoted in Michael Kirkland, ‘Under the U.S. Supreme Court: Like the South, will line item veto rise again?’, upi.com, 17/4/11 accessed 6/5/11

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COUNTERPOINT

"I do not take these matters lightly in amending the Constitution. However, I am convinced in this case it is the only way to provide the President with the same authority that 44 Governors already have to influence spending."1It would in general be preferable to make such a change through normal legislation, but that was attempted in 1996 and found unconstitutional. Supreme Court Justice Stevens in his majority opinion for the Supreme Court argued that it was necessary for there to be an amendment to make it constitutional, "If there is to be a new procedure in which the president will play a different role in determining the text of what may "become a law", such change must come not by legislation but through the amendment procedures set forth in Article V of the Constitution."2

1 Item veto constitutional amendment hearing before the subcommittee on the constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 23/3/00, accessed 5/5/11

2 Clinton, President of the United States, et al. v. City of New York et al. No.97-1374, United States Supreme Court, 1998,accessed 5/5/11

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APPENDIX

POINT

The precedent of the Line Item Veto Act under President Clinton should warn against a constitutional amendment. The sums saved were laughably small, $355 million, in the context of the entire federal budget, $1.7 trillion, (0.02% of spending)1 but nonetheless provoked considerable friction between elected representatives and the White House. There was unhappiness that the large majority of his cuts were of earmarks requested by Republican members, and an allegation that the Administration had threatened a Congressman with the veto of an item dear to them unless they supported an unrelated piece of legislation.

1Virginia A. McMurty, 'Enhancing the President's Authority to Eliminate Wasteful Spending and Reduce the Deficit', Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services and International Security Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Committee Hearing 15/3/2011, p.9

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COUNTERPOINT

The use of the line-item veto power by President Clinton in 1997 demonstrates the advantages of such authority. Although the power was declared unconstitutional in 1998 by the Supreme Court, while he held it Clinton demonstrated what could be achieved. He acted cautiously, only cancelling 82 appropriations, but these totalled nearly $2 billion1– a useful contribution in itself to reducing the federal deficit, and one that suggested that much bigger savings could be achieved by a more determined President. The Congressional Budget Office agreed according to the Congressional Budget Office "The 1997 cancellations had a relatively small impact on the budget's bottom line, but that outcome may have resulted in part from temporary factors, such as last year's balanced budget agreement."2 This period also demonstrated that Congress would still retain the power of the purse, as it was able to overrule one of Clinton’s deletions, on the Military Construction bill worth $287billion, by majority vote in both houses.3

1It is time for congress to kill the pig, Center for individual freedom, 11/11/04, accessed 6/5/11

2The line item veto act after one year’, Congressional Budget Office, April 1998,accessed 6/5/11

3Marc Lacey, ‘Senate Votes 1st Override of Clinton Line-Item Vetos, Los Angeles Times, 26/2/1998, accessed 6/5/11

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Bibliography

Primary documents:

McMurty, Virginia A. , 'Enhancing the President's Authority to Eliminate Wasteful Spending and Reduce the Deficit', Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services and International Security Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Committee Hearing 15/3/2011.

Republican candidates for the House of Representatives, The Contract with America (1994), Manifesto Portal, accessed 5/5/11.

Clinton, President of the United States, et al. v. City of New York et al. No.97-1374, United States Supreme Court, 1998,accessed 5/5/11.

Item veto constitutional amendment hearing before the subcommittee on the constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 23/3/00, accessed 5/5/11.

One hundred fourth Congress of the United States of America at the second session, "Line Item Veto Act", 3/1/1996, The Library of Congress.


Secondary:

Antle, W. James, III, Sen. Jim Inhofe: Earmarks Debate "Phony", The American Spectator, 12/3/10, accessed 5/5/10. 

Chaddock, Gail Russell, 'Despite earmark reforms, 'pork' spending rises', Christian Science Monitor, 3/4/08, accessed 5/5/11. 

Ferro, Lucas and De Magalhaes, Leandro M. 'Budgetary Separation of Powers in the American States and the Tax Level: A Regression Discontinuity Design', Bristol University, Oct 2009,accessed 5/5/11. 

Ferro, Lucas and De Magalhaes, Leandro M. 'Budgetary Separation of Powers in the American States: theory and evidence', Stanford University, 5/4/06,accessed 5/5/11. 

Heath, David and Bernton, Hal, $4.5 million fopr a boat that nobody wanted, The Seattle Times, 15/10/07, accessed 5/5/11.

Hounshell, Blake, McCain's bizarre earmark obsession, blog.foreignpolicy.com, 27/9/08, accessed 5/5/11. 

Hugliotta, Guy and Pianin, Eric, 'Line-Item Veto Tips Traditional Balance of Power', Washington Post, 24/10/97,accessed 5/5/11. 

Kirkland, Michael , 'Under the U.S. Supreme Court: Like the South, will line item veto rise again?', upi.com, 17/4/11 accessed 6/5/11. 

Lacey, Marc, 'Senate Votes 1st Override of Clinton Line-Item Vetos, Los Angeles Times, 26/2/1998, accessed 6/5/11. 

Rushing, J. Taylor, 'Senate votes down ban on earmarks 39-56', The Hill, 30/11/10,accessed 5/5/11. 

'An end to earmarks', The economist, 18/11/10, accessed 5/5/10. 

'It is time for congress to kill the pig', Center for individual freedom, 11/11/04,accessed 6/5/11. 

'Omnibus bills', Congressional Quarterly Roll Call,accessed 5/5/11. 

'The line item veto act after one year', Congressional Budget Office, April 1998, accessed 6/5/11.


 

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