This house supports the idea of participatory democracy

This house supports the idea of participatory democracy

The ideal of participatory democracy is to give ordinary citizens the possibility of participating in the public decision-making. The very idea of democracy has changed significantly from the ancient Greek direct democracies to the dominant form of liberal representative democracy existing today in most of the modern nation-states.[1] While in the ancient Greek laws and important decisions were debated and voted on by an assembly comprising of every single citizen, the modern liberal democracies are based on the political representation and elites' competition.  Ancient democracies were little city-states like Athens that allowed only a few thousand of their people to be “citizens”, making it possible for the entire voting population to be gathered in one place while leaving the labour in the hands of the slaves and women and even for representatives to be elected on the basis of a lottery.[2] For modern nation-states with universal suffrage this is impractical. Modern democracies with mass electorates are all representative democracies in which elected politicians make decisions on behalf of the people, rather than the people making decisions directly. Although purely direct democracy may be impractical, there are several ways in which representative democracies can become much more participative. In other words, there are several ways in which a more participatory approach of democracy can allow citizens to become direct contributors to the public decisions and improve the political representation in our liberal institutions. Several political participatory formulas already exist today. Some of them are already consolidated in current democracies, for example primary elections in political parties,[3] limitation of mandates and rotation of public positions.[4] Other examples are less common but growing, for figure constitutional or legislative refrenda,[5] popular legislative initiative, or participatory budgeting. California, for example, allows its citizen-initiated referenda: anyone can propose a new law, and if they can get enough signatures on a petition in support of it, the law is put directly to the people in a public vote.[6] Another example is the right of recall: allowing citizens to force early elections if enough of them sign a petition saying they are unhappy with the current government (used in California and British Columbia).[7] There are significant examples regarding participatory budgeting, such as Porto Alegre (Brasil), where citizens are involved directly in the configuration of the public investments throughout territorial and sectorial meetings with experts, politicians, civil society organisations and individual citizens.[8] Much greater participation is also increasingly possible as a result of online voting and discussion that avoids the problem of bringing millions of people to one place to make decisions.[9]

Then, if we imagine a continuum between a complete direct democracy, where all the citizens participate in all public decisions, and a pure representative one, where the government of public affairs lies solely in the hands of political or representative elites, we can see that some kind of intermediate formulas might be discussed and applied in the existing democratic political communities. We should understand democracy as a gradual process instead of a binary concept.[10] This means thinking of government as a phenomena that can be more or less democratic rather than only democratic or nondemocratic. As a result we will see that participatory forms of government can improve both, the efficiency and the sustainability of our political institutions in the era of technological and educational revolution we live today.

[1] See the chapter "Greek Democracy and Modern Democracy" in Sartori, G. (1987). The Theory of Democracy Revisited. New Jersey: Chatam House. p. 278-297.

[2] Mulgan, R.G. (October 1984) “Lot as a Democratic Device of Selection” The Review of Politics, 84(4) http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/1406693?uid=3738032&uid=2&uid=4&sid=21101763140081 p.1

[6] Bowen, D. “How to Qualify an Initiative”, California Secretary of State. http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-measures/how-to-qualify-an-initiative.htm

[8] Baiocchi, G. (2005). Militants And Citizens. The Politics of Participatory Democracy in Porto Alegre. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

[9] Kersting, N. (8 July 2011). “Electronic direct democracy”, International Political Science Association http://rc10.ipsa.org/post/2011/07/08/Electronic-direct-democracy

[10] Dahl, R. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation & Opposition. New Haven; London: Yale University Press.

 

Open all points
Points-for

Points For

POINT

Representative democracy is oppressive because it takes more power away from the people than is strictly necessary. Whilst a completely direct democracy is impractical, we should nevertheless recognise that there is no reason not to have as much direct democracy as possible. In the words of Herbert Marcuse, “Free election of masters does not abolish the masters or the slaves”.[1] The key point is that merely holding an election every four years does not fundamentally alter our state of subservience: at election time, we are given a choice of three or four manifesto programmes on an all-or-nothing basis, manifestos which may never be honoured. The only power over our government we as citizens have is the power to punish politicians retrospectively, by voting them out after years of obeying them. It is quite possible to create an authoritarian system that has regular representative elections, even with several competitive candidates and yet still not be giving power to the people, as is shown by Iran.[2] This is wrong. The presumption should always be that the people keep as much power over their own lives and hand as little to their masters as possible because they never get to consent to the powers that rule them. Given that we are born under governments which exist whether we like it or not, it as an offense to our natural liberty and equality that those governments should hold any more power over us than is absolutely necessary. Besides, when the interests of the state are not the interests of the people, we have the government of the few over the rest.[3]

[1] Marcuse, H. (1991). One Dimensional Man. Boston: Beacon Press

[2] Gedmin, J. (1 March 2013) “Not All Elections Are Worthy of the Name” Foreign Policy. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/01/not_all_elections_are_worthy_of_the_name

[3] Pocock, J.G.A. (1975). The Machiavellian moment: Florentine political thought and the Atlantic republican tradition. Princeton (N.J.): Princeton University Press

COUNTERPOINT

First elections are not just a retrospective vote on how the government did, it is also about what political parties want to do. Yes a few elction promises get dropped but the vast majority stick to their promises because they know that not doing so will result in them losing the next election. It is simply not true that representative democracy is oppressive. If people aren’t happy with the way the government is using its power they can vote for a candidate who promises to undo what the previous government has done, or they can even enter politics themselves. The people can always take back powers that they don’t want the government to have by forming and supporting a party or a lobby specifically for that purpose. The reason why this hasn’t happened yet is that most people are happy with the representative system and do not feel like their liberty is being violated. 

POINT

Representative democracy is less legitimate because it empowers unelected elites. Representative democracy is systematically biased against ordinary people, particularly poor people. Unelected elites like wealthy businessmen, trade union leaders, civil servants, party officials and media proprietors are able to bypass the democratic process and exert direct pressure on elected politicians. This happens because decisions are made behind closed doors by individual politicians who can be easily bullied or bought out. This allows elites to effectively wield public power even when they are not elected themselves. If decisions were made more directly by the people there would be less scope for elites to manipulate the process by simply appealing to a politician’s self-interest. Elite influence is a systematic problem because it is self-reinforcing: elites lobby for laws to preserve their own power and disempower the public. A good example of this is Rupert Murdoch’s behind-the-scenes lobbying for the repeal of regulations preventing him from dominating the media market.[1] Considering that at any past time in the human history the conditions of equality in labour division, education and technological tools were not as favourable as nowadays in terms of allowing citizen political involvement, a more participatory political decision-making must be now taken into account.[2] A clear example is the Iceland's "wiki constitution" (2011).[3] Then, although the classic criticism against direct democracy formulas based on the premise that size creates problrms –referring to the difficulties to shape participatory citizen deliberation in our enormous current nation-states– may still be true, cultural, social and technological conditions for participation have become much more favourable.

[1] Toynbee, P. (8 July 2011). “The game has changed. The emperor has lost his clothes”, The Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jul/08/ed-miliband-broken-omerta-old-monster

[2] Resnick, P. (1997). Twenty-first Century Democracy. Montreal & Kingston; London; Buffalo: McGill-Queen's University Press. p. 84

[3] Siddique, H. (9 June 2011). “Mob rule: Iceland crowdsources its next constitution”, The Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/09/iceland-crowdsourcing-constitution-facebook

COUNTERPOINT

Some forms of elite manipulation will be much worse under direct democracy. Media barons, for example, influence politics primarily by influencing public opinion. Whereas elected politicians can sometimes resist public opinion, this is not possible if the public make political decisions directly. Under direct democracy, owners of newspapers and other media outlets would be much more powerful because their power over the public mind could be translated directly into political decisions. This influence would even be outsized when individuals opinions are sought, as in the wiki constitution model, as people’s opinions are shaped by the media many will simply follow the lead set by the members of the elite who are setting the agenda through their media networks.

POINT

Representative systems struggle to sustain popular trust, which is bad for democracy. Public trust in politics always tends to be dented by three specific features of representative systems. Firstly, the perception of elite influence over the political process is a largely unavoidable feature of electoral democracy because such elites are easily placed to manipulate politics, even if they do not actually do so. Secondly, the spotlight in representative democracy is on individual politicians (rather than on policies) and consequently exposing scandals and smearing the characters of politicians is an essential part of the political game: media coverage of politicians is largely hostile (particularly problematic if it diverts discussion from the merits and demerits of particular policies). A third feature of the system is that, since public opinion has no direct power, unpopular decisions don’t have to be properly justified. Governments often defy public opinion when they think a policy will pay off in the long run, and often they don’t really bother explaining why they are doing so (a good example of this is Gordon Brown’s signing of the Lisbon treaty in 2007). These three factors all tend to undermine trust in politics in representative systems. Trust is essential for democracy because without it people will not bother following politics or voting, leaving the door open for elites and aggressive minorities to wield undue influence. A clear example of this phenomenon is in the United States, where Christian fundamentalists – despite being a minority – wield enormous power. The reason for this is that turnout in American elections is very low, whilst fundamentalist Christians are politically very active and organised, allowing them huge influence.

COUNTERPOINT

The problem of domination by elites and assertive minorities will be exacerbated because they are the only people who will be able or willing to make the time to play politics. Participatory democracy demands much more involvement than representative democracy – indeed that’s the whole point. Every single issue is the subject of its own debate, campaign and even referendum, and most voters will lose track. It’s a simple question of motivation: people with extreme views will tend to be strongly driven to impose their beliefs, whilst people whose special interests are at stake will be prepared to go out and fight for them. Ordinary working people or people without strong political views will not have the time or the inclination to put in the high level of involvement participatory democracy requires.

POINT

Giving people more responsibility for making political decisions is itself a good thing. Participating in political decision-making allows citizens to achieve a higher state of intellectual and moral maturity, letting them lead better and wiser lives. Since the difficult business of government forces them to learn how to make tough choices and compromise they will quickly abandon their simplistic prejudices and assumptions. Representative democracy is the opposite: it treats the public as if they are incapable of making important choices themselves, and thus denies most citizens a chance to meaningfully participate. Representative democracy often implies a mercantile vision of the political performance, where the politicians play the role of the sellers and the voters act as a simple buyers of political options.[1] This means that the vast majority of voters remain ignorant at best, and apathetic at worst. This leaves them vulnerable to manipulation by deceitful politicians and political commentators. Furthermore, since many government decisions involve major moral dilemmas, citizens who participate in such decision-making will develop a more nuanced moral understanding and more thoughtful personal conduct. Thus, all democratic participation is beneficial. Participatory forms of democracy allows people to participate more than they otherwise would. Evidence for the impact of democratic participation is that radical and intolerant views are frequently expressed in young democracies but fade away as participation in democratic politics implants in the people respect for due process and different points of view. A good example of this is that intolerant far-right parties are much more successful in the young democracies of Eastern Europe than the old democracies of Western Europe.[2]

[1] Macpherson, C.B. (1977). The Life and BTimes of Liberal Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press).

[2] The Economist (12 November 2009) “Right on down”, http://www.economist.com/node/14859369

COUNTERPOINT

This point only stands if participatory democracy actually involves more participation. In reality, when taking the example of referendums, for most voters all that changes under a participatory system is that they get to vote more regularly – which given how turned off voting many people are this may simply lead to them ignoring all the new votes. In any referéndum all the electors have to do is decide to vote yes or no. There’s hardly any intellectual stimulation at all. This binary choice is much more basic than choosing which political party to vote for, and encourages even sloppier thinking – just look at the misleading claims the “No to AV” campaign spread in the 2011 UK referendum on electoral reform.[1] Then, participatory democracy is not the be all and end all, we should not ask only for more participation but we must move towards a more deliberative democracy, where the public debate and consequent consensus is an important issue to pass new political decisions.[2]

[1] Newman, C. (25 February 2011) “FactCheck: the AV campaign gets dirty” 4 news. http://blogs.channel4.com/factcheck/factcheck-the-av-campaign-gets-dirty/5789

[2] Elster, J. (Ed.). (1998). Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

POINT

Participatory democracy will lead to better decisions because laws will only be passed if they can be justified to the people. Professional politicians are disproportionately drawn from the privileged classes and are often ignorant of the effects their policies will have on ordinary people – as are the civil servants who advise them. Moreover, professional politicians are susceptible to corruption, lobbying or bullying by powerful vested interests seeking to direct government policy away from the general interest represented by the vast majority of the individual citizens, who generally lack such a determinant influence over the decision-making. Participatory democracy will therefore make sure that the legislation that is passed will help the people as much as possible; for example they will limit unecessary bureaucracy and make sure that policies are fair. Thus for example Switzerland has passed with 68% of the vote in a referendum  a proposal that prevents big payouts for managers known as ‘golden handshakes’ and ‘golden parachutes’ and shareholders will have a veto over saleries.[1]

[1] Willsher, K., and Inman, P. (3 March 2013) “Voters in Swiss referendum backs curbs on executives’ pay and bonuses” The Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/03/swiss-referendum-executive-pay

COUNTERPOINT

Professional politicians know that they will be held accountable if they pass policies that are ineffective or damaging. This gives them a big incentive to carefully research all the options before making an important decision, and they have the time and the resources to do so (making decisions is their only job). Ordinary citizens do not have a big incentive to get a policy right unless they can directly see how it affects them, and even if they had the inclination to make an informed decision, they will lack the time and resources. Participatory democracy is therefore much more likely to lead to a muddle of contradictory legislation as different groups focus on different legislation without an overarching vision that advances the nation’s interests.

Points-against

Points Against

POINT

Representative democracy is oppressive because it takes more power away from the people than is strictly necessary. Whilst a completely direct democracy is impractical, we should nevertheless recognise that there is no reason not to have as much direct democracy as possible. In the words of Herbert Marcuse, “Free election of masters does not abolish the masters or the slaves”.[1] The key point is that merely holding an election every four years does not fundamentally alter our state of subservience: at election time, we are given a choice of three or four manifesto programmes on an all-or-nothing basis, manifestos which may never be honoured. The only power over our government we as citizens have is the power to punish politicians retrospectively, by voting them out after years of obeying them. It is quite possible to create an authoritarian system that has regular representative elections, even with several competitive candidates and yet still not be giving power to the people, as is shown by Iran.[2] This is wrong. The presumption should always be that the people keep as much power over their own lives and hand as little to their masters as possible because they never get to consent to the powers that rule them. Given that we are born under governments which exist whether we like it or not, it as an offense to our natural liberty and equality that those governments should hold any more power over us than is absolutely necessary. Besides, when the interests of the state are not the interests of the people, we have the government of the few over the rest.[3]

[1] Marcuse, H. (1991). One Dimensional Man. Boston: Beacon Press

[2] Gedmin, J. (1 March 2013) “Not All Elections Are Worthy of the Name” Foreign Policy. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/01/not_all_elections_are_worthy_of_the_name

[3] Pocock, J.G.A. (1975). The Machiavellian moment: Florentine political thought and the Atlantic republican tradition. Princeton (N.J.): Princeton University Press

COUNTERPOINT

First elections are not just a retrospective vote on how the government did, it is also about what political parties want to do. Yes a few elction promises get dropped but the vast majority stick to their promises because they know that not doing so will result in them losing the next election. It is simply not true that representative democracy is oppressive. If people aren’t happy with the way the government is using its power they can vote for a candidate who promises to undo what the previous government has done, or they can even enter politics themselves. The people can always take back powers that they don’t want the government to have by forming and supporting a party or a lobby specifically for that purpose. The reason why this hasn’t happened yet is that most people are happy with the representative system and do not feel like their liberty is being violated. 

POINT

Representative democracy is less legitimate because it empowers unelected elites. Representative democracy is systematically biased against ordinary people, particularly poor people. Unelected elites like wealthy businessmen, trade union leaders, civil servants, party officials and media proprietors are able to bypass the democratic process and exert direct pressure on elected politicians. This happens because decisions are made behind closed doors by individual politicians who can be easily bullied or bought out. This allows elites to effectively wield public power even when they are not elected themselves. If decisions were made more directly by the people there would be less scope for elites to manipulate the process by simply appealing to a politician’s self-interest. Elite influence is a systematic problem because it is self-reinforcing: elites lobby for laws to preserve their own power and disempower the public. A good example of this is Rupert Murdoch’s behind-the-scenes lobbying for the repeal of regulations preventing him from dominating the media market.[1] Considering that at any past time in the human history the conditions of equality in labour division, education and technological tools were not as favourable as nowadays in terms of allowing citizen political involvement, a more participatory political decision-making must be now taken into account.[2] A clear example is the Iceland's "wiki constitution" (2011).[3] Then, although the classic criticism against direct democracy formulas based on the premise that size creates problrms –referring to the difficulties to shape participatory citizen deliberation in our enormous current nation-states– may still be true, cultural, social and technological conditions for participation have become much more favourable.

[1] Toynbee, P. (8 July 2011). “The game has changed. The emperor has lost his clothes”, The Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jul/08/ed-miliband-broken-omerta-old-monster

[2] Resnick, P. (1997). Twenty-first Century Democracy. Montreal & Kingston; London; Buffalo: McGill-Queen's University Press. p. 84

[3] Siddique, H. (9 June 2011). “Mob rule: Iceland crowdsources its next constitution”, The Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/09/iceland-crowdsourcing-constitution-facebook

COUNTERPOINT

Some forms of elite manipulation will be much worse under direct democracy. Media barons, for example, influence politics primarily by influencing public opinion. Whereas elected politicians can sometimes resist public opinion, this is not possible if the public make political decisions directly. Under direct democracy, owners of newspapers and other media outlets would be much more powerful because their power over the public mind could be translated directly into political decisions. This influence would even be outsized when individuals opinions are sought, as in the wiki constitution model, as people’s opinions are shaped by the media many will simply follow the lead set by the members of the elite who are setting the agenda through their media networks.

POINT

Representative systems struggle to sustain popular trust, which is bad for democracy. Public trust in politics always tends to be dented by three specific features of representative systems. Firstly, the perception of elite influence over the political process is a largely unavoidable feature of electoral democracy because such elites are easily placed to manipulate politics, even if they do not actually do so. Secondly, the spotlight in representative democracy is on individual politicians (rather than on policies) and consequently exposing scandals and smearing the characters of politicians is an essential part of the political game: media coverage of politicians is largely hostile (particularly problematic if it diverts discussion from the merits and demerits of particular policies). A third feature of the system is that, since public opinion has no direct power, unpopular decisions don’t have to be properly justified. Governments often defy public opinion when they think a policy will pay off in the long run, and often they don’t really bother explaining why they are doing so (a good example of this is Gordon Brown’s signing of the Lisbon treaty in 2007). These three factors all tend to undermine trust in politics in representative systems. Trust is essential for democracy because without it people will not bother following politics or voting, leaving the door open for elites and aggressive minorities to wield undue influence. A clear example of this phenomenon is in the United States, where Christian fundamentalists – despite being a minority – wield enormous power. The reason for this is that turnout in American elections is very low, whilst fundamentalist Christians are politically very active and organised, allowing them huge influence.

COUNTERPOINT

The problem of domination by elites and assertive minorities will be exacerbated because they are the only people who will be able or willing to make the time to play politics. Participatory democracy demands much more involvement than representative democracy – indeed that’s the whole point. Every single issue is the subject of its own debate, campaign and even referendum, and most voters will lose track. It’s a simple question of motivation: people with extreme views will tend to be strongly driven to impose their beliefs, whilst people whose special interests are at stake will be prepared to go out and fight for them. Ordinary working people or people without strong political views will not have the time or the inclination to put in the high level of involvement participatory democracy requires.

POINT

Giving people more responsibility for making political decisions is itself a good thing. Participating in political decision-making allows citizens to achieve a higher state of intellectual and moral maturity, letting them lead better and wiser lives. Since the difficult business of government forces them to learn how to make tough choices and compromise they will quickly abandon their simplistic prejudices and assumptions. Representative democracy is the opposite: it treats the public as if they are incapable of making important choices themselves, and thus denies most citizens a chance to meaningfully participate. Representative democracy often implies a mercantile vision of the political performance, where the politicians play the role of the sellers and the voters act as a simple buyers of political options.[1] This means that the vast majority of voters remain ignorant at best, and apathetic at worst. This leaves them vulnerable to manipulation by deceitful politicians and political commentators. Furthermore, since many government decisions involve major moral dilemmas, citizens who participate in such decision-making will develop a more nuanced moral understanding and more thoughtful personal conduct. Thus, all democratic participation is beneficial. Participatory forms of democracy allows people to participate more than they otherwise would. Evidence for the impact of democratic participation is that radical and intolerant views are frequently expressed in young democracies but fade away as participation in democratic politics implants in the people respect for due process and different points of view. A good example of this is that intolerant far-right parties are much more successful in the young democracies of Eastern Europe than the old democracies of Western Europe.[2]

[1] Macpherson, C.B. (1977). The Life and BTimes of Liberal Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press).

[2] The Economist (12 November 2009) “Right on down”, http://www.economist.com/node/14859369

COUNTERPOINT

This point only stands if participatory democracy actually involves more participation. In reality, when taking the example of referendums, for most voters all that changes under a participatory system is that they get to vote more regularly – which given how turned off voting many people are this may simply lead to them ignoring all the new votes. In any referéndum all the electors have to do is decide to vote yes or no. There’s hardly any intellectual stimulation at all. This binary choice is much more basic than choosing which political party to vote for, and encourages even sloppier thinking – just look at the misleading claims the “No to AV” campaign spread in the 2011 UK referendum on electoral reform.[1] Then, participatory democracy is not the be all and end all, we should not ask only for more participation but we must move towards a more deliberative democracy, where the public debate and consequent consensus is an important issue to pass new political decisions.[2]

[1] Newman, C. (25 February 2011) “FactCheck: the AV campaign gets dirty” 4 news. http://blogs.channel4.com/factcheck/factcheck-the-av-campaign-gets-dirty/5789

[2] Elster, J. (Ed.). (1998). Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

POINT

Participatory democracy will lead to better decisions because laws will only be passed if they can be justified to the people. Professional politicians are disproportionately drawn from the privileged classes and are often ignorant of the effects their policies will have on ordinary people – as are the civil servants who advise them. Moreover, professional politicians are susceptible to corruption, lobbying or bullying by powerful vested interests seeking to direct government policy away from the general interest represented by the vast majority of the individual citizens, who generally lack such a determinant influence over the decision-making. Participatory democracy will therefore make sure that the legislation that is passed will help the people as much as possible; for example they will limit unecessary bureaucracy and make sure that policies are fair. Thus for example Switzerland has passed with 68% of the vote in a referendum  a proposal that prevents big payouts for managers known as ‘golden handshakes’ and ‘golden parachutes’ and shareholders will have a veto over saleries.[1]

[1] Willsher, K., and Inman, P. (3 March 2013) “Voters in Swiss referendum backs curbs on executives’ pay and bonuses” The Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/03/swiss-referendum-executive-pay

COUNTERPOINT

Professional politicians know that they will be held accountable if they pass policies that are ineffective or damaging. This gives them a big incentive to carefully research all the options before making an important decision, and they have the time and the resources to do so (making decisions is their only job). Ordinary citizens do not have a big incentive to get a policy right unless they can directly see how it affects them, and even if they had the inclination to make an informed decision, they will lack the time and resources. Participatory democracy is therefore much more likely to lead to a muddle of contradictory legislation as different groups focus on different legislation without an overarching vision that advances the nation’s interests.

POINT

People should be free to get on with their private lives, but they can’t do that if they’re expected to also be their own government. The reason why we delegate powers to politicians is that we want to have a say in government and still be free to get on with our lives. The business of government is tremendously complex and most people just don’t care about having total control over the details of policy – they just want the power to kick out governments that are no good. Think about it: how many people actually have time, on top of all the other things they have to do, to attend weekly meetings and committees, research technical policy details to decide which policy they will support and then go out and vote on a dozen issues every week? You’ll notice that all the ancient direct democracies – like ancient Athens – were societies in which there were more slaves than citizens. It is only because the slaves did all the work that the citizens were free to spend their time playing politics. The key point is, under the status quo, people who deeply care about politics can get involved in politics – they can join a party, write to politicians, canvass for issues etc – and the people who don’t care about politics that much but still have an opinion are free to vote and then get on with their lives. But under a more direct democracy people have to choose between devoting half of their lives to politics or losing all possible influence over the curse of the decision-making. It’s not right that ordinary citizens should be forced to choose between having any say in politics and having a private life. This makes the difference between the "liberty of the ancients" and the "liberty of the moderns".[1]

[1] Constant, B. (1816). The Liberty of Ancients Compared with that of Moderns. See online at: http://www.uark.edu/depts/comminfo/cambridge/ancients.html

COUNTERPOINT

Under participatory democracy people can participate as much or as little as they like. They are not obliged to vote in every referendum or attend every public meeting, but they have the right to. If they only care about a few political issues, they can just vote on those and ignore everything else. That way they get to have their say on just the issues they care about without becoming part-time citizen-politicians. Moreover, that would be more effective than simply voting for a politician once every five years because it would allow them to specifically vote on the issues they cared about rather than having to support an all-or-nothing manifesto that they will probably only partially agree with.

POINT

Referendums will lead to poor-quality snap decisions. The problem with referendums is that they are called and voted on quickly, without a series of lengthy parliamentary debates or review by committees. This means that decisions are essential made by short-term popular opinion. This is a problem because there are many policies that are painful and unpopular in the short term but essential in the long run, such as cutting unaffordable public debts. Under representative democracy, governments can make these tough decisions and hope that they pay off before the next election. Harmful short-termism is particularly likely because voters, unlike professional politicians, may lack the technical or economic expertise to realise the necessity of adopting long-term solutions. A clear example is the effect of referenda over the fiscal policy in California.[1] Then, when short-terminism is at the heart of political decisions in a given society, it becomes very difficult to govern. Furthermore, it establishes a more instable political ground for the future generations, who may suffer from the irresponsible political measures adopted by their predecessors, for example inheriting disproportionate amounts of public debt.

[1] Plunkett, J. (18 April 2010) “Would California-style referendums be good for Britain?” guardian.co.uk. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/apr/18/general-election-2010-california

COUNTERPOINT

That is just a case for having a cooling-off period in between the proposal of a new law and the referendum on it. There is no reason why referendums cannot have a lengthy public debate before the vote takes place. It is not clear that the voters will only look at the short-term consequences: in the 2010 UK General Election the British voters backed the Conservative Party and their long-term deficit reduction plan, for example.[1] Furthermore, professional politicians may also take decisions thinking in the short term in order to raise their popularity. In such case, referenda would not be worse than the representative system.

[1] Glover, J. (21 June 2010) “Budget 2010: Three quarters of voters back spending cuts not tax rises – Guardian/ICM poll” guardian.co.uk. http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/jun/21/budget-2010-guardian-icm-poll

POINT

An intrinsic problem with participatory democracy is that issues are easily misrepresented to the public. Whilst most voters may be intelligent and informed enough to understand a single issue in isolation, they will almost certainly not understand its complex relationship with other issues, and what a “yes” or “no” vote would mean for everything else – this is because only a full-time politician has the time and the resources to properly understand how dozens of different government policies fit together. An example of this effect is that in 1978 Californians voted to pass an amendment making it almost impossible to raise taxes, and then in 1994 voted for the “Three Strikes” Law that tripled their prison population. As a result, California is now almost bankrupt.[1] The reason why this happened was that these issues were presented in isolation from one another and from other issues as a simple yes-or-no choice – the public just didn’t connect the fact that if they were going to lock up more people for life, they would need higher taxes.

[1] Adams, G. (18 February 2009) “Jobs terminated as California goes bankrupt” The Independent. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/jobs-terminated-as-california-goes-bankrupt-1624892.html

COUNTERPOINT

The more experience of participatory democracy the people have, the better they will get at it. In particular, common wisdom will learn from past mistakes. Whilst the Californian example cited is true, it is also true that in 2000, just six years after the “Three Strikes” law was introduced, the 1978 tax amendment was partially repealed in response to money shortages.[1]

[1] State of California (7 November 2000) “Proposition 39 School Facilities. 55% Local Vote. Bonds, Taxes Accountability Requirements.” Smart Voter. http://www.smartvoter.org/2000/11/07/ca/state/prop/39/

POINT

Governments often have to pass decisions which anger small, well-organised special interest groups – like teachers unions – but are in the long-term interest of the country. Under representative democracy, the government can simply make the decisions it has to, and resist the political pressure these groups put on them. But under more direct forms of participatory democracy, the special interest groups can organise their members to campaign and vote against proposals which are good for the country but against their private interests. The reason why they are likely to be successful is that most voters won’t have the technical knowledge to recognise the importance of the proposal (curbing unaffordable public sector pensions, for example), they may be uninterested if they do not see how it directly affects them, and will probably be exhausted and bored of referendums if they are held very regularly – an effect observed in Switzerland called “election fatigue”.[1] As a result, turnout amongst regular voters is likely to be low, but the unions or interest groups will be well organised and will be active in campaigning and voting, since they know that they are fighting for their interests. The effect of this will be to enable organised interest groups to dictate policy on issues where they have a major conflict of interest. An example of this is a Californian initiative in 1990 to raise billions of dollars on the bond markets to invest in railways. The initiative was passed after a campaign funded by railway companies.[2]

[1] Buhlmann, M. et al. (2006) “National Elections in Switzerland: an Introduction” Swiss Political Science Review, 12(4) 1-12 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/j.1662-6370.2006.tb00058.x/pdf

[2] The Economist (17 December 2009) “The tyranny of the majority” http://www.economist.com/node/15127600

COUNTERPOINT

This point assumes that there will be no organisations capable of campaigning against special interests, and this is plainly false. Political parties, taxpayer’s organisations and even rival special interest groups already run counter campaigns against perceived special interest lobbying. Furthermore, special interest groups are naturally disadvantaged in the battle for public opinion because it is very easy to paint them as selfish or greedy. A good example of this is the hostility with which the public usually greets strikes and industrial action.[1] In addition, governments in liberal democracies might pay special attention to particular issues precisely because of the existence of powerful lobbies. In such case, they would be under-representing other groups or individual citizens becoming, then, the cause of the domination of the public decision-making by special interests.

[1] Smithson M. (21 June 2011) “ComRes finds little support for public sector strikes”, PoliticalBetting.com. http://www6.politicalbetting.com/index.php/archives/2011/06/21/comres-finds-little-support-for-public-sector-strikes/

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