This House supports head of state immunity

This House supports head of state immunity

Traditionally, heads of states, and other state officials, have enjoyed some form of immunity from prosecution. Immunity can be divided up in to two types – functional immunity, which is immunity for official actions, and personal immunity, which is attached to the individual. Head of state immunity typically falls under functional immunity. Personal immunity typically applies to individuals such as diplomats (Diplomatic immunity is outlined in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations). This debate is focused on both of these forms of immunity when applied to political figures.

In 2002, the International Court of Justice, a UN body entirely unrelated to the International Criminal Court, confirmed the existence of state immunity[1] as a part of customary international law, in a case concerning a Belgian arrest warrant for the DR Congolese foreign minister, who was alleged to have incited genocide, which was issued under a Belgian universal jurisdiction law that allowed the Belgian courts to try war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, even if they are outside Belgium.

The issue was put to the test regarding the situation of the later life of former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. Following the ousting of democratically elected president Salvador Allende in a military coup Pinochet lead a military junta that, during his 27 year CIA backed[2] rule, committed a significant number of large scale human rights abuses[3].  Due to immunity that was created by the succeeding Chilean government, he was not prosecuted there; however he was indicted in Spain under universal jurisdiction in 1998 while he was in the United Kingdom for medical treatment.

The issue of head of state immunity lead to a battle over the possibility of his extradition in the British courts, going to its highest  court three times – first on the issue of whether he was immune from prosecution in Spain[4], secondly on an issue of bias[5] (one of the original judges, Leonard Hoffmann, had failed to  disclose that he was an unpaid director of the charitable wing of Amnesty International[6]), and a third, on the same issue as the first, after the unprecedented setting aside of the initial decision[7]. Eventually, the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords (a de facto court, rather than an arm of the legislature, since fully spun off in to the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom) ruled that he did not have head of state immunity for some, but not all, of the charges, and allowed the Home Secretary to authorize his extradition. The original decision in Pinochet I was that torture cannot be a state function, negating functional head of state immunity. The decision in the third case was that he was not immune due to the torture convention, rather than anything in customary international law. Eventually Pinochet’s extradition was vetoed by Home Secretary Jack Straw, he returned to Chile, where he was indicted, but died before he could be tried.

International tribunals have typically rejected all forms of head of state immunity, Rome Statute Article 27 makes “official capacity” irrelevant in the work of the ICC, following on from similar positions in the ICTY and ICTR. These courts have repeatedly made determinations that state immunity does not apply at international tribunals, most recently done so by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, in the case of Charles Taylor[8].

The issue of the trial of serving heads of state has resurfaced following the indictment of Uhuru Kenyatta, current president of Kenya, for his alleged role in violence after the 2007 election. Kenyatta, who was elected after the indictment, is still operating as president of Kenya (a fellow defendant in a separate trial, William Ruto, is Deputy President). This issue has been made more complex due to the shooting by al-Shabab linked gunmen at the Westgate shopping centre, with Kenyatta having to lead the response to the attacks while preparing to defend himself at the Hague[9]. Kenyatta’s trial is, at the time of writing, due to start on the 12th of November 2013, but he will not need to be present for all of the trial[10].

[1] Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 ( Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium) http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/121/8126.pdf

[2] Kornbluh, Peter, ‘CIA Acknowledges Ties to Pinochet’s Repression’, The National Security Archive, 19 September 2000, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20000919/

[4] R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte,  http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1998/41.html (Also known as Pinochet I)

[5] In re Pinochet http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1999/1.html (Also known as Pinochet II)

[6] ‘A look at Lord Hoffmann’, BBC News, 17 December 1998, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/235456.stm

[7] R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendary Magistrate, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1999/17.html

[8] Prosecutor v Taylor, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=7OeBn4RulEg=&tabid=191

[9] ‘Could Westgate deal a fatal blow to the ICC?’, BBC News, 17 October 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24562337

[10] ‘Trial Chamber V(b) conditionally excuses Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta from continuous presence at his trial starting on 12 November 2013’, International Criminal Court, 18 October 2013, http://icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/954.aspx

 

Open all points
Points-for

Points For

POINT

International diplomacy involves visits by both diplomats and government figures to other states. This can even include states where relations are tense or even hostile. India and Pakistan, who have a very tense relationship and share one of the most fortified borders in the world, the line of control that divides Kashmir, have embassies in each other. Even throughout the Cold War, the USA and Soviet Union had a full and normal diplomatic relations.

Just as diplomatic immunity prevents politically motivated arrests of diplomats, head of state immunity is necessary to “grease the wheels” of international diplomacy to allow international summits to take place without campaigns for the arrest and trial before domestic courts of foreign politicians.

If a head of state were to be arrested for trial before a foreign domestic court, it would cause immense damage to diplomatic relations between those two countries, Russia recently got into a row over the arrest of one of its diplomats in the Netherlands. The diplomat was quickly released but Russia still demanded the ‘guilty parties’ be punished.[1] The reaction to the arrest of a head of state or government would be much greater and would likely mean the breaking of diplomatic ties. Leaders would be much less willing to visit the country where the arrest occurred in the future for fear it would happen to them and would damage the world diplomatic system by challenging the idea of diplomatic immunity.

[1] ‘Moscow not satisfied with 'sorry' after diplomat arrest’, DutchNews.nl, 17 October 2013, http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2013/10/moscow_not_satisfied_with_sorr.php

COUNTERPOINT

Whatever the justification, impunity is unacceptable. It is a key part of the rule of law that everyone is subject to the law. To grant individuals impunity for whatever reason is unacceptable.

Even if diplomatic immunity is accepted, diplomats are less likely in their role to commit international crimes that a head of state or government is because diplomats do not have access to the coercive machinery that enable these crimes. Diplomatic relations can carry on very well without senior government figures being able to travel wherever they want to. Summits are a luxury not a necessity and most of the deals they make have been hammered out by the diplomats beforehand.

POINT

Heads of state and senior politicians are targets for political stunts. This could be seeking to get a political opponent locked up so as to benefit from the removal of an opponent. Alternatively it may be as part of a publicity stunt to highlight their own issue of concern or organisation. In both cases the trial does not need to convict as the figure being in a trial will be enough to damage them and provide publicity.

In 2009, following a request by supporters of Palestine, an arrest warrant was sought at Westminster magistrates’ court for the arrest of Tzipi Livni, who was Foreign Minister of Israel during Israel’s 2008-2009 invasion of the Gaza Strip, also known as Operation Cast Lead. At the time of the attempted arrest Livni was no longer in office but the action was clearly a stunt.

Livni was not arrested in the end, because she cancelled her trip to the UK, and the warrant was dropped by the Director of Public Prosecutions, Kier Starmer[1]. However, a needless diplomatic incident was still caused.

[1] Hastings, Rob, ‘DPP blocks bid to arrest Tzipi Livni for war crimes’, The Independent, 7 October 2011, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/dpp-blocks-bid-to-arrest-tzipi-livni-for-war-crimes-2366583.html

COUNTERPOINT

Many of these so-called “stunts” may actually be legitimate accusations that deserve to be heard in a court. If an accusation is unfounded, charges will not be brought (or not confirmed at the ICC, for example), or a verdict of not guilty returned.

Just because a person is high profile does not mean that they are innocent of wrongdoing. In the Livni case she as Foreign Minister may have been the wrong target. A more appropriate one would be the Defense minister or Prime Minister but it is understandable that there should be an effort to make ministers accountable for military actions they initiate. 

POINT

Sometimes people will do bad things in order to achieve good and necessary results. For example, the Allied bombing campaigns in the Second World War would be highly likely to amount to a war crime under the Rome Statute if they were done today. They were indiscriminate, they targeted civilians, and additionally even at the time were recognised as having little military value. Instead the idea was to terrorise the civilian population.[1] Yet they were considered to be necessary as showing the allies were doing something to aid the Soviet Union. The same might be the case with the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, they clearly targeted civilians, yet if they helped end the war without a ground invasion of Japan then this war crime might have been for the greater good.[2]

Head of state immunity allows individuals to take unpopular and difficult decisions that are necessary for a greater good in government without fear of prosecution for their actions. We need our leaders to be able to take decisions based on the national interest, not based upon their concern for their life after office.

[1] Grayling, A.C., ‘Bombing civilians is not only immoral, it’s ineffective’, The Guardian, 27 March 2006, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2006/mar/27/comment.secondworldwar

[2] See the debatabase debate ‘This House believes that the use of atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki was justified

COUNTERPOINT

That’s equally an argument against international criminal law as head of state immunity. While there may be instances where the head of state or government has to take decisions that might be criminal for the greater good – for example ordering the abduction or assassination of a terrorist – these instances are rare and most of the time the courts will take into account the good as well as the bad. However there are equally times where it is good that someone fears prosecution, if they do it is a sign that what they are doing is wrong. Bombing of Germany could have ended when all military targets had been hit, it need not have involved incendiary bombing of civilian targets. In Japan there was a third option of accepting a conditional surrender – one that guaranteed the position of the Emperor, since the Allies ultimately agreed this anyway there would have been little loss.

Points-against

Points Against

POINT

International diplomacy involves visits by both diplomats and government figures to other states. This can even include states where relations are tense or even hostile. India and Pakistan, who have a very tense relationship and share one of the most fortified borders in the world, the line of control that divides Kashmir, have embassies in each other. Even throughout the Cold War, the USA and Soviet Union had a full and normal diplomatic relations.

Just as diplomatic immunity prevents politically motivated arrests of diplomats, head of state immunity is necessary to “grease the wheels” of international diplomacy to allow international summits to take place without campaigns for the arrest and trial before domestic courts of foreign politicians.

If a head of state were to be arrested for trial before a foreign domestic court, it would cause immense damage to diplomatic relations between those two countries, Russia recently got into a row over the arrest of one of its diplomats in the Netherlands. The diplomat was quickly released but Russia still demanded the ‘guilty parties’ be punished.[1] The reaction to the arrest of a head of state or government would be much greater and would likely mean the breaking of diplomatic ties. Leaders would be much less willing to visit the country where the arrest occurred in the future for fear it would happen to them and would damage the world diplomatic system by challenging the idea of diplomatic immunity.

[1] ‘Moscow not satisfied with 'sorry' after diplomat arrest’, DutchNews.nl, 17 October 2013, http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2013/10/moscow_not_satisfied_with_sorr.php

COUNTERPOINT

Whatever the justification, impunity is unacceptable. It is a key part of the rule of law that everyone is subject to the law. To grant individuals impunity for whatever reason is unacceptable.

Even if diplomatic immunity is accepted, diplomats are less likely in their role to commit international crimes that a head of state or government is because diplomats do not have access to the coercive machinery that enable these crimes. Diplomatic relations can carry on very well without senior government figures being able to travel wherever they want to. Summits are a luxury not a necessity and most of the deals they make have been hammered out by the diplomats beforehand.

POINT

Heads of state and senior politicians are targets for political stunts. This could be seeking to get a political opponent locked up so as to benefit from the removal of an opponent. Alternatively it may be as part of a publicity stunt to highlight their own issue of concern or organisation. In both cases the trial does not need to convict as the figure being in a trial will be enough to damage them and provide publicity.

In 2009, following a request by supporters of Palestine, an arrest warrant was sought at Westminster magistrates’ court for the arrest of Tzipi Livni, who was Foreign Minister of Israel during Israel’s 2008-2009 invasion of the Gaza Strip, also known as Operation Cast Lead. At the time of the attempted arrest Livni was no longer in office but the action was clearly a stunt.

Livni was not arrested in the end, because she cancelled her trip to the UK, and the warrant was dropped by the Director of Public Prosecutions, Kier Starmer[1]. However, a needless diplomatic incident was still caused.

[1] Hastings, Rob, ‘DPP blocks bid to arrest Tzipi Livni for war crimes’, The Independent, 7 October 2011, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/dpp-blocks-bid-to-arrest-tzipi-livni-for-war-crimes-2366583.html

COUNTERPOINT

Many of these so-called “stunts” may actually be legitimate accusations that deserve to be heard in a court. If an accusation is unfounded, charges will not be brought (or not confirmed at the ICC, for example), or a verdict of not guilty returned.

Just because a person is high profile does not mean that they are innocent of wrongdoing. In the Livni case she as Foreign Minister may have been the wrong target. A more appropriate one would be the Defense minister or Prime Minister but it is understandable that there should be an effort to make ministers accountable for military actions they initiate. 

POINT

Sometimes people will do bad things in order to achieve good and necessary results. For example, the Allied bombing campaigns in the Second World War would be highly likely to amount to a war crime under the Rome Statute if they were done today. They were indiscriminate, they targeted civilians, and additionally even at the time were recognised as having little military value. Instead the idea was to terrorise the civilian population.[1] Yet they were considered to be necessary as showing the allies were doing something to aid the Soviet Union. The same might be the case with the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, they clearly targeted civilians, yet if they helped end the war without a ground invasion of Japan then this war crime might have been for the greater good.[2]

Head of state immunity allows individuals to take unpopular and difficult decisions that are necessary for a greater good in government without fear of prosecution for their actions. We need our leaders to be able to take decisions based on the national interest, not based upon their concern for their life after office.

[1] Grayling, A.C., ‘Bombing civilians is not only immoral, it’s ineffective’, The Guardian, 27 March 2006, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2006/mar/27/comment.secondworldwar

[2] See the debatabase debate ‘This House believes that the use of atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki was justified

COUNTERPOINT

That’s equally an argument against international criminal law as head of state immunity. While there may be instances where the head of state or government has to take decisions that might be criminal for the greater good – for example ordering the abduction or assassination of a terrorist – these instances are rare and most of the time the courts will take into account the good as well as the bad. However there are equally times where it is good that someone fears prosecution, if they do it is a sign that what they are doing is wrong. Bombing of Germany could have ended when all military targets had been hit, it need not have involved incendiary bombing of civilian targets. In Japan there was a third option of accepting a conditional surrender – one that guaranteed the position of the Emperor, since the Allies ultimately agreed this anyway there would have been little loss.

POINT

A key principle of the rule of law is that everyone is subject to the law – even the agents of states[1]. It must apply equally to the most as well as the least powerful.

This must apply to international criminal law as well as the domestic criminal law. It would be unjustifiable for one individual to be able to face prosecution as a private citizen for genocide, but not a head of state who has much greater capacity to engage in such acts. It effectively would allow genocide, which is prohibited by a convention the vast majority of states have signed and ratified, as an expression of national sovereignty.

[1] ‘What is the rule of law?’, United Nations Rule of Lawhttp://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=3

COUNTERPOINT

Even though it does effectively create impunity, this is not a unique phenomenon. Decisions on who to prosecute will always happen, and some form of bias against prosecuting powerful people is to some extent inevitable. So in practice not everyone is equal before the law.

The ICC specifically builds in a way of deferring prosecutions if needed in Article 16 of the Rome Statute. This shows that the ICC accepts the need to postpone cases, possibly indefinitely. The ICC therefore in practice accepts it cannot prosecute in every case where there may be a case to answer.

POINT

The prosecution of high ranking government officials is part of the Nuremberg precedent that international criminal law largely dates back to. Hideki Tojo, the Prime Minister of Imperial Japan in the Second World War, was tried, convicted and executed as part of the Tokyo trials for Japan’s acts of aggression in going to war. Karl Doenitz was prosecuted despite having briefly been Germany’s head of state; that position did not nullify the crimes he carried out as commander of Germany’s unrestricted submarine warfare campaign.  

Following that, the ICTY tried Slobodan Milosevic, who died before the trial finished, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone convicted Charles Taylor.

It is nothing new that international criminals can be prosecuted. While leaders have, and often still are, able to prevent themselves from being tied in their own country while they are in charge this should not apply the world over. 

COUNTERPOINT

No head of state was successfully prosecuted by a partially international court until Charles Taylor was convicted by the hybrid Special Court for Sierra Leone, the first to go on trial was in 1994. None of the post WW2 Allied trials featured a significant head of state; Hitler was dead and the entire Japanese imperial family was not charged, including emperor Hirohito, who continued serving as Japanese head of state until his death in 1989.

The charges against Doenitz all pertained to his actions prior to him taking the leadership of Germany so they cannot be said to be actions taken in the role of head of state. 

POINT

International criminal law, like any other form of criminal law, is supposed to be a deterrent. By giving a class of individuals impunity, these people cannot be deterred by International Criminal Law from committing some of the worst crimes known to humanity, including genocide. It is plain that many people who reach the heights of political power will use any method to remain in power – thus the resort to intimidation where it can be used to affect the vote, or in the case of Silvio Berlusconi the attempt to put in place an immunity law to prevent himself from being prosecuted for corruption.[1] Immunity will enable both large and small criminal acts, neither of which should be allowed.

[1] Kennedy, Duncan, ‘Berlusconi immunity law overruled’, BBC News, 8 October 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8295716.stm

COUNTERPOINT

There is no evidence as a whole to suggest international criminal law as a whole is a deterrent. Risk of prosecution or no risk of prosecution, there will always be leaders who commit horrible acts. Those who reach leadership positions where they can carry out acts that are considered to be heinous enough that they are prosecuted internationally clearly don’t believe that they will ever be brought to trial so likely consider whether or not they have immunity to be irrelevant.

Bibliography

‘Life under Pinochet: “They were taking turns to electrocute us one after the other”’, Amnesty International, 11 September 2013, http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/life-under-pinochet-they-were-taking-turns-electrocute-us-one-after-other-2013-09-11

R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte, Bailii,  http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1998/41.html (Also known as Pinochet I)

In re Pinochet, Bailii, http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1999/1.html (Also known as Pinochet II)

‘A look at Lord Hoffmann’, BBC News, 17 December 1998, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/235456.stm

‘Could Westgate deal a fatal blow to the ICC?’, BBC News, 17 October 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24562337

‘Moscow not satisfied with 'sorry' after diplomat arrest’, DutchNews.nl, 17 October 2013, http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2013/10/moscow_not_satisfied_with_sorr.php

Grayling, A.C., ‘Bombing civilians is not only immoral, it’s ineffective’, The Guardian, 27 March 2006, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2006/mar/27/comment.secondworldwar

Hastings, Rob, ‘DPP blocks bid to arrest Tzipi Livni for war crimes’, The Independent, 7 October 2011, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/dpp-blocks-bid-to-arrest-tzipi-livni-for-war-crimes-2366583.html

Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium), International Court of Justice, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/121/8126.pdf

‘Trial Chamber V(b) conditionally excuses Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta from continuous presence at his trial starting on 12 November 2013’, International Criminal Court, 18 October 2013, http://icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/954.aspx

Kornbluh, Peter, ‘CIA Acknowledges Ties to Pinochet’s Repression’, The National Security Archive, 19 September 2000, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20000919/

Kennedy, Duncan, ‘Berlusconi immunity law overruled’, BBC News, 8 October 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8295716.stm

Long, Gideon, ‘Chile recognises 9,800 more victims of Pinochet’s rule’, BBC News, 18 August 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-14584095

Sengupta, Kim, ‘Victims of Pinochet's police prepare to reveal details of rape and torture’, The Independent, 9 November 1998, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/victims-of-pinochets-police-prepare-to-reveal-details-of-rape-and-torture-1183793.html

Prosecutor v Taylor, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, Special Court for Sierra Leone, http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=7OeBn4RulEg=&tabid=191

‘What is the rule of law?’, United Nations Rule of Law, http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=3

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