This House Believes the International Criminal Court is a force for good.

This House Believes the International Criminal Court is a force for good.

Especially since the end of World War II, there have been calls for a global system of justice and an effort to prevent massive atrocities from occurring. Tribunals to prosecute crimes committed in Yugoslavia and Rwanda brought up the question of whether a permanent court would be beneficial. The International Criminal Court (ICC) was born out of these efforts to recognize an international court on July 1, 2002 with the founding of the Rome Statute to prosecute crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes. The Rome Statute states that the court also has jurisdiction over crimes of aggression, but lacks a definition of what constitutes those crimes and thus will only have the ability to prosecute them when there is an amendment passed. The ICC differs from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in that the ICJ tries legal disputes between countries; the ICC is specific to individuals. The ICC is a permanent court that will try individuals if either a) the Security Council refers a case to the court, or b) if the state on whose territory the crime was committed/the state of the accused's nationality has ratified the Rome Statute. Thus, the ICC relies on the cooperation of member states to find and apprehend criminals. The Security Council's role in the court was a contentious issue during the conference held to draft the Rome Statute and remains one of the issues with the court today; currently, the Security Council can either refer cases or delay them for 12 months an unlimited number of times. The ICC prosecutor may investigate cases based upon information from reliable sources other than the Security Council such as non-governmental organizations, victims, etc.1

Currently, 115 countries have ratified the Rome Statute and another 34 have signed but not ratified the treaty. Proponents argue that the ICC is a necessary step to fight heinous crimes and institute justice while deterring crime in an increasingly globalized world. Other nations who oppose the ICC, such as the United States, China, and Russia cite issues of sovereignty and abuse. Possible alternatives to the ICC include individual tribunals and reconciliation programs. This debate questions whether the ICC should be accepted by nations and consequently whether states should ratify the Rome Statute.

1 Prakash, K. P. "International Criminal Court: A Review." Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 37, No. 40, October 5-11, 2002, pp. 4113-4115.

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Points-for

Points For

POINT

The ICC is uniquely beneficial because of its intention to be a permanent force that will always hold people accountable, instead of slowly reacting to crimes after-the-fact. It is intended to be universal and apply to every situation without mandating the creation of a new tribunal every time something happens, and may be even more effective than tribunals at responding to crimes. Even though tribunals such as the ones for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda may have worked, they were "necessarily limited in scope" and cannot be applied on a large scale, which is what is needed.1 Additionally, those tribunals were relatively ineffective, as they took two years to set up, and relying on establishing new tribunals every single time wastes precious time. Doing so would also let smaller but still serious crimes slip under the radar, as they would not warrant the creation of a new tribunal, but may still count as a crime against humanity.2

1 Kirsch, Philippe. "The International Criminal Court: Current Issues and Perspectives." Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 64 No. 1, Winter 2001, 3-11.

2 Marler, Melissa K. "The International Criminal Court: Assessing the Jurisdictional Loopholes in the Rome Statute." Duke Law Journal, Vol. 49 No. 3, December 1999, 825-853.

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COUNTERPOINT

Individual tribunals are actually better at addressing the specific situation.

The idea of "universal jurisdiction" becomes dangerous when it is regarded as a blanket solution. For example, after the Spanish Civil War, post-Franco Spain decided to avoid trials for the sake of national reconciliation that enabled it to become a peaceful democracy. Setting a precedent of universal jurisdiction for punishment unnecessarily precludes better reactions more tailored to the specific scenario.1 (See opposition argument #3 for elaboration).

1 Kissinger, Henry. "The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction." Foreign Affairs, July/August 2001, Accessed 14 August 2011.

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POINT

The ICC demonstrates that there is an existing legal court that will hold individuals accountable should they decide to commit grave crimes. The mere existence of the court and the possibility of prosecution (even if not 100%) is beneficial in terms of deterring future atrocities. No leader wants to lose power, and an ICC warrant limits the movement and liberties of leaders. This is empirically true – in Uganda, high-ranking officials of the Lord’s Resistance Army specifically cited potential prosecution by the ICC as a reason they put down their arms. LRA officials like Joseph Kony have to spend valuable time on evading the ICC that would otherwise be used to perpetuate crimes, showing that there are still marginal benefits even if leaders themselves are not always apprehended.[i]

[i] Scheffer, David and John Hutson. “Strategy for U.S. Engagement with the International Criminal Court.” Century Foundation, 2008. http://tcf.org/events/pdfs/ev244/Scheffer.pdf. Accessed 14 August 2011.

 

COUNTERPOINT

Deterrence only works if the court actually prosecutes people; however, its crippling inefficiency renders its deterrent effect nonexistent.

To date, the ICC has yet to actually punish anyone. The lack of hard power and enforcement mechanisms makes it impossible for the ICC to be effective. Tribunals like the ICTY were effective because of US support, military backing, and financial power; the ICC lacks this type of sway and is destined to fail. (See more in the opposition point #2). If the court does not actually punish people, there is little to no deterrent effect, since it poses no credible threat to criminals.1

1 Goldsmith, Jack. "The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court." The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 70 No. 1, Winter 2003, 89-104.

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POINT

The only way to ensure that leaders get what they deserve is to establish a free-standing, independent court that holds people accountable. The ICC acts as a permanent international court (as opposed to tribunals set up by a specific group of nations).1 By issuing arrest warrants for leaders who would otherwise continue their actions without any blame, the ICC attempts to punish them. The goal is to ensure that no individual gets away with committing terrible crimes. Additionally, the court gives victims a role in the process, has the power to give them reparations, and ensures they see criminals brought to justice.2The court has not punished anyone yet because it is still considerably young, but has proceedings going on currently.

1 Carroll, James. "The International Criminal Court." Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. 54 No. 1, Autumn 2000, 21-23.

2Duffy, Helen. "Toward Eradicating Impunity: The Establishment of an International Criminal Court." Social Justice, Vol. 26 No. 4, Winter 1999, 115-124.

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COUNTERPOINT

Pursuance by the ICC doesn't actually result in punishment of the leader; empirically, it has actually strengthened criminals' power after criticizing them.

Nations, such as African nations like Chad, have painted the actions of the ICC as signs of Western imperialism and domination. Sudan's Bashir, accused of genocide and other crimes against humanity, used the ICC's arrest warrant against him as a sign of heroism and created a rally-around-the-flag effect, further strengthening his regime. Moreover, the ICC's work encourages leaders to cling to their power rather than give it and face prosecution, making punishment even more difficult. At worst, the ICC is actually counterproductive when it comes to punishing leaders and giving them retribution; at best, it is simply an ineffective court.1

1 "The International Criminal Court: Why Africa Still Needs it." The Economist, 3 June 2010.

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POINT

In today's world, crimes are no longer confined to single nations and affect the world due to the effects of globalization. An international court is necessary as a global solution to problems that often involve multiple actors; a permanent international court accounts for all parties involved.1 For example the Lord's Resistance Army has been mostly active in Uganda but has often hidden from the Ugandan military by crossing into Southern Sudan or the Democratic Republic of Congo. Because it is not limited to a specific territory, the ICC has truly global jurisdiction and therefore is most appropriate given the recent rise of international crimes. Joining the ICC would also encourage nations to recognize that crimes are no longer confined to specific borders and that the notion of territoriality provides a dangerously limited view of the scope of crimes today; ratifying the Rome Statute would force nations to recognize that domestic and international law inevitably interact.2 The domestic-foreign distinction has allowed states to ignore or commit certain atrocities in the name of national interest.

1 Ferencz, Benjamin B. "A Nuremberg Prosecutor's Response to Henry Kissinger's Essay 'The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction.'" Published by Derechos Human Rights, 27 September 2002. Accessed 14 August 2011.

2 Ralph, Jason. "International Society, the International Criminal Court and American Foreign Policy." Review of International Studies, Vol. 31 No. 1, January 2005, 27-44.

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COUNTERPOINT

The ICC actually fails to account for the individual nature of crimes and is not the best solution for a "globalizing world" because it promotes retribution at the expense of peace.

Sometimes, amnesty and reconciliation are better than pursuing retribution and punishment. Even if the ICC does punish people, it may be doing so at the expense of the overall protection of human rights – emphasizing prosecution potentially detracts from goals like democratic reconstruction and conflict resolution. For example, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Committee was widely considered successful because it promoted peace even while giving amnesty to many criminals. Ultimately, it accounted for victims, allowed for open dialogue, and laid the foundation for South Africa to transition to a stable situation. The ICC’s focus on arrest and punishment precludes these types of solutions.[i]

[i] Mayerfeld, Jamie. “Who Shall be Judge? The United States, the International Criminal Court, and the Global Enforcement of Human Rights.” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 25 No. 1, February 2003, 93-129.

 

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POINT

There is a growing global consensus that crimes against humanity need to be punished, as demonstrated by the tribunals to address the crimes of Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The question is no longer whether we should set up an international court but rather how to best do it, and the ICC gives the international community a framework within which to work to establish a strong courts.1 Rejection of the ICC has become a symbol of rejection of international norms, and countries that have refused to ratify the Rome Statute in the name of national interest, such as the United States, have been seen as imperialist, isolationist, and against global efforts to tackle important issues.

1 Prakash, K. P. "International Criminal Court: A Review." Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 37, No. 40, October 5-11, 2002, pp. 4113-4115.

2Carter, Ralph G. "Leadership at Risk: The Perils of Unilateralism." Political Science and Politics, Vol. 36 No. 1, January 2003, 17-22

COUNTERPOINT

Promoting the ICC will only further split the global community by allowing the court to become a political tool.

The US Department of State published a report explaining that one of the reasons it opposes ratification of the Rome Statute is because it would complicate military cooperation with allies, who would be obligated to hand over US nationals even without US permission if a warrant were issued for their arrest. This would strain international relations. Additionally, this would decrease global stability by discouraging the US from conducting missions abroad that are key to political stability in numerous areas; US peacekeepers are currently in about 100 nations.1 (See the last opposition argument for more information)

1 Grossman, Mark (Under Secretary for Political Affairs). Remarks to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Washington, DC, 6 May 2002, US Department of State.

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Points-against

Points Against

POINT

The ICC is uniquely beneficial because of its intention to be a permanent force that will always hold people accountable, instead of slowly reacting to crimes after-the-fact. It is intended to be universal and apply to every situation without mandating the creation of a new tribunal every time something happens, and may be even more effective than tribunals at responding to crimes. Even though tribunals such as the ones for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda may have worked, they were "necessarily limited in scope" and cannot be applied on a large scale, which is what is needed.1 Additionally, those tribunals were relatively ineffective, as they took two years to set up, and relying on establishing new tribunals every single time wastes precious time. Doing so would also let smaller but still serious crimes slip under the radar, as they would not warrant the creation of a new tribunal, but may still count as a crime against humanity.2

1 Kirsch, Philippe. "The International Criminal Court: Current Issues and Perspectives." Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 64 No. 1, Winter 2001, 3-11.

2 Marler, Melissa K. "The International Criminal Court: Assessing the Jurisdictional Loopholes in the Rome Statute." Duke Law Journal, Vol. 49 No. 3, December 1999, 825-853.

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COUNTERPOINT

Individual tribunals are actually better at addressing the specific situation.

The idea of "universal jurisdiction" becomes dangerous when it is regarded as a blanket solution. For example, after the Spanish Civil War, post-Franco Spain decided to avoid trials for the sake of national reconciliation that enabled it to become a peaceful democracy. Setting a precedent of universal jurisdiction for punishment unnecessarily precludes better reactions more tailored to the specific scenario.1 (See opposition argument #3 for elaboration).

1 Kissinger, Henry. "The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction." Foreign Affairs, July/August 2001, Accessed 14 August 2011.

improve this

 

POINT

The ICC demonstrates that there is an existing legal court that will hold individuals accountable should they decide to commit grave crimes. The mere existence of the court and the possibility of prosecution (even if not 100%) is beneficial in terms of deterring future atrocities. No leader wants to lose power, and an ICC warrant limits the movement and liberties of leaders. This is empirically true – in Uganda, high-ranking officials of the Lord’s Resistance Army specifically cited potential prosecution by the ICC as a reason they put down their arms. LRA officials like Joseph Kony have to spend valuable time on evading the ICC that would otherwise be used to perpetuate crimes, showing that there are still marginal benefits even if leaders themselves are not always apprehended.[i]

[i] Scheffer, David and John Hutson. “Strategy for U.S. Engagement with the International Criminal Court.” Century Foundation, 2008. http://tcf.org/events/pdfs/ev244/Scheffer.pdf. Accessed 14 August 2011.

 

COUNTERPOINT

Deterrence only works if the court actually prosecutes people; however, its crippling inefficiency renders its deterrent effect nonexistent.

To date, the ICC has yet to actually punish anyone. The lack of hard power and enforcement mechanisms makes it impossible for the ICC to be effective. Tribunals like the ICTY were effective because of US support, military backing, and financial power; the ICC lacks this type of sway and is destined to fail. (See more in the opposition point #2). If the court does not actually punish people, there is little to no deterrent effect, since it poses no credible threat to criminals.1

1 Goldsmith, Jack. "The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court." The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 70 No. 1, Winter 2003, 89-104.

improve this

 

POINT

The only way to ensure that leaders get what they deserve is to establish a free-standing, independent court that holds people accountable. The ICC acts as a permanent international court (as opposed to tribunals set up by a specific group of nations).1 By issuing arrest warrants for leaders who would otherwise continue their actions without any blame, the ICC attempts to punish them. The goal is to ensure that no individual gets away with committing terrible crimes. Additionally, the court gives victims a role in the process, has the power to give them reparations, and ensures they see criminals brought to justice.2The court has not punished anyone yet because it is still considerably young, but has proceedings going on currently.

1 Carroll, James. "The International Criminal Court." Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. 54 No. 1, Autumn 2000, 21-23.

2Duffy, Helen. "Toward Eradicating Impunity: The Establishment of an International Criminal Court." Social Justice, Vol. 26 No. 4, Winter 1999, 115-124.

improve this

 

COUNTERPOINT

Pursuance by the ICC doesn't actually result in punishment of the leader; empirically, it has actually strengthened criminals' power after criticizing them.

Nations, such as African nations like Chad, have painted the actions of the ICC as signs of Western imperialism and domination. Sudan's Bashir, accused of genocide and other crimes against humanity, used the ICC's arrest warrant against him as a sign of heroism and created a rally-around-the-flag effect, further strengthening his regime. Moreover, the ICC's work encourages leaders to cling to their power rather than give it and face prosecution, making punishment even more difficult. At worst, the ICC is actually counterproductive when it comes to punishing leaders and giving them retribution; at best, it is simply an ineffective court.1

1 "The International Criminal Court: Why Africa Still Needs it." The Economist, 3 June 2010.

improve this

 

POINT

In today's world, crimes are no longer confined to single nations and affect the world due to the effects of globalization. An international court is necessary as a global solution to problems that often involve multiple actors; a permanent international court accounts for all parties involved.1 For example the Lord's Resistance Army has been mostly active in Uganda but has often hidden from the Ugandan military by crossing into Southern Sudan or the Democratic Republic of Congo. Because it is not limited to a specific territory, the ICC has truly global jurisdiction and therefore is most appropriate given the recent rise of international crimes. Joining the ICC would also encourage nations to recognize that crimes are no longer confined to specific borders and that the notion of territoriality provides a dangerously limited view of the scope of crimes today; ratifying the Rome Statute would force nations to recognize that domestic and international law inevitably interact.2 The domestic-foreign distinction has allowed states to ignore or commit certain atrocities in the name of national interest.

1 Ferencz, Benjamin B. "A Nuremberg Prosecutor's Response to Henry Kissinger's Essay 'The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction.'" Published by Derechos Human Rights, 27 September 2002. Accessed 14 August 2011.

2 Ralph, Jason. "International Society, the International Criminal Court and American Foreign Policy." Review of International Studies, Vol. 31 No. 1, January 2005, 27-44.

improve this

 

COUNTERPOINT

The ICC actually fails to account for the individual nature of crimes and is not the best solution for a "globalizing world" because it promotes retribution at the expense of peace.

Sometimes, amnesty and reconciliation are better than pursuing retribution and punishment. Even if the ICC does punish people, it may be doing so at the expense of the overall protection of human rights – emphasizing prosecution potentially detracts from goals like democratic reconstruction and conflict resolution. For example, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Committee was widely considered successful because it promoted peace even while giving amnesty to many criminals. Ultimately, it accounted for victims, allowed for open dialogue, and laid the foundation for South Africa to transition to a stable situation. The ICC’s focus on arrest and punishment precludes these types of solutions.[i]

[i] Mayerfeld, Jamie. “Who Shall be Judge? The United States, the International Criminal Court, and the Global Enforcement of Human Rights.” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 25 No. 1, February 2003, 93-129.

 

improve this

 

POINT

There is a growing global consensus that crimes against humanity need to be punished, as demonstrated by the tribunals to address the crimes of Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The question is no longer whether we should set up an international court but rather how to best do it, and the ICC gives the international community a framework within which to work to establish a strong courts.1 Rejection of the ICC has become a symbol of rejection of international norms, and countries that have refused to ratify the Rome Statute in the name of national interest, such as the United States, have been seen as imperialist, isolationist, and against global efforts to tackle important issues.

1 Prakash, K. P. "International Criminal Court: A Review." Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 37, No. 40, October 5-11, 2002, pp. 4113-4115.

2Carter, Ralph G. "Leadership at Risk: The Perils of Unilateralism." Political Science and Politics, Vol. 36 No. 1, January 2003, 17-22

COUNTERPOINT

Promoting the ICC will only further split the global community by allowing the court to become a political tool.

The US Department of State published a report explaining that one of the reasons it opposes ratification of the Rome Statute is because it would complicate military cooperation with allies, who would be obligated to hand over US nationals even without US permission if a warrant were issued for their arrest. This would strain international relations. Additionally, this would decrease global stability by discouraging the US from conducting missions abroad that are key to political stability in numerous areas; US peacekeepers are currently in about 100 nations.1 (See the last opposition argument for more information)

1 Grossman, Mark (Under Secretary for Political Affairs). Remarks to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Washington, DC, 6 May 2002, US Department of State.

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POINT

A large issue with the ICC is that it subjects member states to definitions that can be interpreted in a number of ways. For example, University of Chicago law professor Jack Goldsmith explains that the ICC has jurisdiction over “a military strike that causes incidental civilian injury (or damage to civilian objects) ‘clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.’ Such proportionality judgments are almost always contested.”[i]

First, nations have a first and foremost obligation to protect their own citizens, but states’ ability to fulfill this duty would be hindered by the threat of ICC prosecution. Certain nations face asymmetrical warfare – for example, the US routinely fights combatants who use innocent human shields, soldiers disguised as civilians, hostage-takers, etc. When put in context, the US has had to take certain actions that would constitute war crimes in order to fulfill its overarching obligation to its own people; strict compliance with the ICC’s standards would deny countries’ abilities to protect their own people.[ii]

Second, the fear of prosecution by the ICC would discourage humanitarian missions, decreasing the protection of rights globally. A study noted that the United States, a nation that sends hundreds of thousands of troops on peacekeeping missions, could have been held responsible for war crimes or crimes of aggression for its interventions in places like Bosnia and Sudan.[iii]

[i] Goldsmith, Jack. “The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court.” The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 70 No. 1, Winter 2003, 89-104.

[ii] Schmitt, Michael. “Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian Law.” The Air Force Law Review, 2008.

[iii] Redman, Lauren Fielder. “United States Implementation of the International Criminal Court: Toward the Federalism of Free Nations.” Journal of Transnational Law and Policy, Fall 2007.

 

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COUNTERPOINT

To date, the ICC has empirically only issued warrants against leaders that nations have almost universally agreed upon committed heinous crimes. The existence of the ICC would only deter actions that are so atrocious, they would be comparable to the ones committed by those the ICC is currently pursuing. Countries that refuse to prosecute its own individuals should submit to the court to ensure that there is a baseline standard for rights protection, even in times of war. Otherwise, these crimes go unexposed and unpunished – for example, there has been very little discussion about certain US actions because certain presidential administrations have been adamant about prioritizing national interest over global standards of rights. US attacks on a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan, US invasion of Panama in 1989, US choice of targets in Afghanistan in 2001, and other actions have been left unexamined because of the lack of a third party with the consent to regulate international action; the ICC could solve this.[i]

[i] Forsythe, David P. “U.S. Action Empirically Goes Domestically Unchecked.” The United States and International Criminal Justice, Vol. 24 No. 4, November 2002, 985.

 

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POINT

The issues the ICC deals with are inherently subjective, as there is clear disagreement about what counts as a war crime or what the exact definition of genocide is. This leaves dangerous room for the prosecutor to simply decide what he thinks counts as a crime under the statute. Under the Rome Statute, the prosecutor has the power to both initiate an investigation based on reasonable evidence (of which there are no clear standards for outlined in the Rome Statute) and refuse to follow up on an investigation in the name of "justice." There are no clear higher checks on the prosecutor, putting too much power in the hands of one single individual. Additionally, there is very limited judicial review, as the pre-trial chamber is composed of 1 or 3 judges, and the prosecutor is able to find a judge who is sympathetic to his views.1

1 Rubin, Alfred P. "The International Criminal Court: Possibilities for Prosecutorial Abuse." Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 64 No. 1, Winter 2001, 153-165.

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COUNTERPOINT

There are numerous checks that limit the power of the prosecutor and regulate the ICC's operations.

There are numerous checks outlined in the Rome Statute that limit the power of the prosecutor, eliminating any concerns of abuse. For example, Article 7 clearly defines what a crime against humanity is, and other types of crimes are extensively defined in the statute. Second, the ICC is allowed to step in only if the national government fails to prosecute criminals, meaning that it will never have to step in and exercise its power as long as countries are doing their jobs domestically, checking its jurisdiction. Third, there are multiple chambers that check each other; for example, the pre-trial chamber makes sure that the prosecutor has enough evidence before proceeding. Fourth, there are 18 judges from differing impartial backgrounds, ultimately making the ICC objective. Other checks can be found upon closer examination of the Rome Statute.1 Moreover, empirically, the prosecutor has not excessively punished any leader, so claims of abuse have yet to show true in the real world. Trials have been dismissed on the grounds of not having sufficient evidence, etc., so the ICC does not have unlimited power.

1 United Nations. "Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court." 2002. Accessed 14 August 2011.

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POINT

The court has no obvious enforcement mechanism, as it ultimately relies on states to take action in finding and turning over criminals. Although it can issue search warrants and declare that governments are not doing enough to prosecute criminals, that does not translate into real-world change that gets closer to punishing criminals. There is no reason for nations to submit to a court with no enforcement mechanism while simultaneously exposing themselves to a variety of risks as outlined in other arguments.1 For example, Chad is a party of the ICC but welcomed Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in July 2010. Although Chad was technically obligated to arrest him, there was no arrest made and Chad's president Idriss Deby welcomed Bashir with open arms, clearly demonstrating the ICC's lack of enforcement powers.2

1 Nanda, Ved P. "The Establishment of a Permanent International Criminal Court: Challenges Ahead." Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 20 No. 2, May 1998, 413-428.

2 Reuters. "Bashir Returns to Sudan After Defying ICC in Chad." 24 July 2010. Accessed 14 August 2011.

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COUNTERPOINT

The ICC has jurisdiction to defy unwilling governments and is still a step towards global enforcement of rights, even if it does not completely solve the problem.

The ICC can have jurisdiction over criminals whose states refuse to prosecute them (provided certain conditions are met), meaning that they can issue warrants for those who come from or lead countries that will not comply with the ICC. Moreover, the ICC centralizes prosecution efforts under one court, making possible prosecution much more efficient and likely and increasing whatever original chance there was of prosecuting the leader.

Even if the ICC does have trouble fully enforcing its decisions, it is still a step towards the idea of "collective enforcement," which entails states agreeing upon and following international norms by incorporating them into domestic law and promoting their enforcement. Ratification of the Rome Statute represents a commitment by national governments to assist the ICC with prosecution efforts.1

1 Mayerfeld, Jamie. "Who Shall be Judge? The United States, the International Criminal Court, and the Global Enforcement of Human Rights." Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 25 No. 1, February 2003, 93-129.

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POINT

Parts of the Rome Statue, such as the clauses relating to the Security Council, make it seem like a tool that will be used by the politically powerful. The Security Council has the power to refer cases to the prosecutor. Article 16 of the Rome Statute declares that the Security Council may postpone investigation and prosecution for 12 months if it decides, and may infinitely renew this delay, giving it final say on what gets tried and what doesn't. The ICC is not a truly independent judiciary and gives certain nations more power than others, making it an unfair and unjust court that does not treat its members equally.1

1 Teitelbaum, Alejandro. "Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Critique." Social Justice, Vol. 26 No. 4, Winter 1999, 107-114.

COUNTERPOINT

The ICC is an independent court with enough checks that only pursues the most heinous criminals.

The ICC was designed to pursue the "future Pol Pots, Saddam Husseins, and Milosevics who terrorize civilians on a massive scale." The fear of politically motivated prosecutions has yet to come true; the current warrants have been issued for only the gravest violators of rights on a widespread scale. Even if the Security Council has certain extra controls, the court is still ultimately fair in its actual procedure with its prosecutor, judges, etc.1 Additionally, there are numerous checks in the Rome Statute, as outlined in the first proposition counterargument.

1 Kirsch, Philippe. "The International Criminal Court: Current Issues and Perspectives." Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 64 No. 1, Winter 2001, 3-11.

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POINT

The ICC forces nations to accept that there is a binding power that overrides national law, undermining the government. John Bolton, former US ambassador to the United Nations, explains: "The ICC's failing stems from its purported authority to operate outside (and on a plane superior to) the U.S. Constitution, and thereby to inhibit the full constitutional autonomy of all three branches of the U.S. government, and indeed, of all states party to the statute. ICC advocates rarely assert publicly that this result is central to their stated goals, but it must be for the court and prosecutor to be completely effective."1 More specifically, Article 12 of the Rome Statute entails that the ICC's jurisdiction applies to all individuals, even of states that have not ratified the treaty. Governments cannot unconditionally bind its citizens to laws that are inflexible and contrary to the idea of sovereignty.2

1 Bolton, John. "The Risks and Weaknesses of the International Criminal Court from America's Perspective." Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 64 No. 1, Winter 2001, 167-180.

COUNTERPOINT

The ICC does not infringe upon national sovereignty because it only has jurisdiction if the national justice system is either ineffective or unable to prosecute the criminal.

National courts still have the responsibility and ability to prosecute their own criminals, and the ICC is only meant to be used as a last resort in case these national measures fail; there is no contradiction between the two.1 Sovereignty only exists if the state has internal control, and the ICC will only have jurisdiction in cases where the national justice system has proven that for some reason, it will not prosecute the criminal.

1 Nanda, Ved P. "The Establishment of a Permanent International Criminal Court: Challenges Ahead." Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 20 No. 2, May 1998, 413-428.

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Bibliography

Bolton, John. "The Risks and Weaknesses of the International Criminal Court from America's Perspective." Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 64 No. 1, Winter 2001, 167-180.

Carroll, James. "The International Criminal Court." Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. 54 No. 1, Autumn 2000, 21-23.

Carter, Ralph G. "Leadership at Risk: The Perils of Unilateralism." Political Science and Politics, Vol. 36 No. 1, January 2003, 17-22. 

Duffy, Helen. "Toward Eradicating Impunity: The Establishment of an International Criminal Court." Social Justice, Vol. 26 No. 4, Winter 1999, 115-124.

Ferencz, Benjamin B. "A Nuremberg Prosecutor's Response to Henry Kissinger's Essay 'The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction.'" Published by Derechos Human Rights, 27 September 2002. . Accessed 14 August 2011

Forsythe, David P. "U.S. Action Empirically Goes Domestically Unchecked." The United States and International Criminal Justice, Vol. 24 No. 4, November 2002, 985.

Goldsmith, Jack. "The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court." The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 70 No. 1, Winter 2003, 89-104.

Grossman, Mark (Under Secretary for Political Affairs). Remarks to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Washington, DC, 6 May 2002, US Department of State. Accessed 13 August 2011.

"The International Criminal Court: Why Africa Still Needs it." The Economist, 3 June 2010. 

Kirsch, Philippe. "The International Criminal Court: Current Issues and Perspectives." Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 64 No. 1, Winter 2001, 3-11.

Kissinger, Henry. "The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction." Foreign Affairs, July/August 2001, . Accessed 14 August 2011

McNerney, Patricia. "The International Criminal Court: Issues for Consideration by the United States Senate." Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 64 No. 1, Winter 2001, 181-191.

Marler, Melissa K. "The International Criminal Court: Assessing the Jurisdictional Loopholes in the Rome Statute." Duke Law Journal, Vol. 49 No. 3, December 1999, 825-853.

Mayerfeld, Jamie. "Who Shall be Judge? The United States, the International Criminal Court, and the Global Enforcement of Human Rights." Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 25 No. 1, February 2003, 93-129.

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