This House would use Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to strike terrorist targets.

There are only two things that really matter when targeting terrorists; is the terrorist eliminated, and is collateral damage kept to a minimum? In Pakistan there have been a total of 334 strikes by UAVs between 2004 and June 2012 with the total reported killed at 2496-3202 of which only 482-832 were civilians according to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism.[1] Moreover the number of civilians killed in strikes is falling; 28 percent of casualties in 2008 were civilians but by 2011 this had fallen to 16 percent[2] and this is a figure that is likely to continue falling as drones improve technologically making identification easier and making strikes more precise. These figures show that the United States in its use of drones is not only hitting a lot of terrorist targets and eliminating them but is causing very little collateral damage in comparison to the number of strikes made.

[1] Woods, Chris, and Serle, Jack, ‘June Update – US covert actions in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalis’, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2 July 2012.

[2] Shane, Scott, ‘The Moral Case for Drones’, The New York Times, 14 July 2012.

Because drones are not on the ground and can’t check the identities of those who are killed there is no way of knowing if they really do cause less civilian casualties; what the proposition calls ‘collateral damage’. We also do not know what damage would be caused by other forms of attack on the same targets. It is however definitely open to question whether these attacks really do cause less civilian casualties. Local activists believe that around 3,000 people have been killed in Waziristan of whom only 185 were named al Qaeda operatives – a very poor ratio of 16 civilians for every al Qaeda man killed.[1] The Brookings institution meanwhile estimates that for every al Qaeda and Taliban militant killed there are ten civilian casualties.[2] If either of these estimates are anywhere near the mark then there are very large number of civilian casualties, much higher than proposition believes, and probably higher than other forms of strikes would cause.

[1] Shackle, Samira, ‘Drones and the “bugsplats” they cause’, New Statesman, 13 June 2012.

[2] Byman, Daniel L., ‘Do Targeted Killings Work?’, ForeignPolicy.com, 14 July 2009.

We need to eliminate terrorists somehow and UAVs are the best possible equipment with which to carry out this mission. All the other options either would result in significantly more casualties or would have other problems that would likely allow terrorists to escape.

First there is the collateral damage that would be caused by using other alternatives to striking terrorists. Professor Plaw of the University of Massachusetts says that when terrorists were being confronted by the Pakistani Army, who were attacking at the behest of the United States, 46% of casualties were collateral damage. A similar number of 41% was the figure when Israel was targeting Hamas.[1] When compared to the 16 or 28% collateral damage figures for UAVs the choice should be easy.

Moreover other options have other disadvantages. Sending a hit squad in to eliminate terrorists may mean little collateral damage but would cause a diplomatic crisis as it would be tantamount to invading another country. Using a missile or local support on the other hand significantly increases the chances of the target escaping. Pakistan’s ISI, military intelligence, has for example been accused of helping the Taliban – they could hardly be trusted to kill them.[2]

[1] Shane, Scott, ‘The Moral Case for Drones’, The New York Times, 14 July 2012.

[2] Perlez, Jane, ‘Pakistan Scorns U.S. Scolding on Terrorism’, The New York Times, 23 September 2011.

It is wrong to simply make drones “a default strategy to be used anywhere”. Yes some of the time drones will be the right choice for catching terrorists and other militants but much of the time they won’t be. Instead of spurning institutions like the ISI and Pakistan’s Military we should be relying on them to fight extremism. This targeting of terrorists is happening in other countries sovereign territory. Their sovereignty should be respected wherever possible meaning that the Pakistanis, the Somalis and the Yemenis should be the ones who carry out these engagements.

Again here there is the difficulty of not knowing how many were killed in drone strikes (see counter to prop 1). We cannot compare other types of strikes unless we have more reliable figures. This is something that sending special forces in would help with; they would have much more accurate figures of who they kill and could check whether they really killed the person they were supposed to be targeting. This would prevent any attempt to inflate the kill count through including those they are not sure of as terrorists.[1]

[1] Becker, Jo, and Shane, Scott, ‘Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will’, The New York Times, 29 May 2012.

When engaging in covert operations it is essential that the right target is identified so that the correct target is eliminated. This is something that using UAVs allows as they are able to track their target, sometimes for days, before attacking. This means there is much more time for scrutiny of targets and possible collateral damage.

This also means that there is plenty of room for the decisions to be made right at the top. Every person on the kill list gets discussed at a weekly meeting of more than 100 members of the US government’s security apparatus. President Obama himself signs off on strikes and can change the decision if the situation on the ground changes. Former National Security Advisor Jones says “Many times… at the 11th hour we waved off a mission simply because the target had people around them and we were able to loiter on station until they didn’t.”[1]

While UAVs may be ‘unmanned’ they are certainly heavily monitored as each drone has 43 military personnel rotating in three shifts. They include seven joystick pilots, seven system operators, and five mission coordinators, there is also from the CIA 66 people, including 34 video crew members, and 18 intelligence analysts.[2] This means that there are a large number of eyeballs to make sure that the right person is being targeted, to check he is with as few others as possible before the strike. None of this would be possible with other forms of attack where the emphasis has to be on the speed of the operation.

[1] Becker, Jo, and Shane, Scott, ‘Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will’, The New York Times, 29 May 2012.

[2] Kaplan, Fred, ‘Who’s Afraid of the Kill List’, Slate, 15 June 2012.

This is incorrect; It makes the assumption that UAVs could not be used at all if they were not being used to attack targets. They could still be used in a surveillance role so providing the same amount of time to deliberate before striking in a different fashion, one that is appropriate to the situation.

To put it bluntly any military or intelligence service wants to keep its own men safe while carrying out its missions; Unmanned Aerial Vehicles are the ultimate capability with which to manage this. No military or civilian personnel are going to be killed if the delivery vehicle is controlled from the United States. This means that unlike in other methods of attack the UAV can take its time even if it is at risk. In the war in Kosovo NATO air forces had to launch their attacks from 15,000 feet due to worries they would be shot down.[1] Attacking from such a height from a fast moving aeroplane makes missing the target much more likely.

[1] Thomas, Timothy, ‘Kosovo and the Current Myth of Information Superiority’, Parameters, Spring 2000, pp.13-29.

Today most forms of conflict do not have much risk to western militaries. While the attacks were carried out from high in the sky NATO did not suffer a single loss in combat operations over Kosovo in 1999.[1] Moreover this lack of danger with UAVs is potentially immoral; we no longer have a war in which both sides are at risk rather a shooting range for drones to kill ‘terrorists’. Having at least some danger is needed as a restraint on the use of force. A good litmus test to use for the authorisation of lethal force would be whether the public would find the goals of the action worthwhile even if it did result in the loss of several soldiers.

[1] Gallis, Paul E., ‘Kosovo: Lessons Learned from Operation Allied Force’, CRS Report for Congress, 19 November 1999, p.8 

There are only two things that really matter when targeting terrorists; is the terrorist eliminated, and is collateral damage kept to a minimum? In Pakistan there have been a total of 334 strikes by UAVs between 2004 and June 2012 with the total reported killed at 2496-3202 of which only 482-832 were civilians according to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism.[1] Moreover the number of civilians killed in strikes is falling; 28 percent of casualties in 2008 were civilians but by 2011 this had fallen to 16 percent[2] and this is a figure that is likely to continue falling as drones improve technologically making identification easier and making strikes more precise. These figures show that the United States in its use of drones is not only hitting a lot of terrorist targets and eliminating them but is causing very little collateral damage in comparison to the number of strikes made.

[1] Woods, Chris, and Serle, Jack, ‘June Update – US covert actions in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalis’, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2 July 2012.

[2] Shane, Scott, ‘The Moral Case for Drones’, The New York Times, 14 July 2012.

Because drones are not on the ground and can’t check the identities of those who are killed there is no way of knowing if they really do cause less civilian casualties; what the proposition calls ‘collateral damage’. We also do not know what damage would be caused by other forms of attack on the same targets. It is however definitely open to question whether these attacks really do cause less civilian casualties. Local activists believe that around 3,000 people have been killed in Waziristan of whom only 185 were named al Qaeda operatives – a very poor ratio of 16 civilians for every al Qaeda man killed.[1] The Brookings institution meanwhile estimates that for every al Qaeda and Taliban militant killed there are ten civilian casualties.[2] If either of these estimates are anywhere near the mark then there are very large number of civilian casualties, much higher than proposition believes, and probably higher than other forms of strikes would cause.

[1] Shackle, Samira, ‘Drones and the “bugsplats” they cause’, New Statesman, 13 June 2012.

[2] Byman, Daniel L., ‘Do Targeted Killings Work?’, ForeignPolicy.com, 14 July 2009.

We need to eliminate terrorists somehow and UAVs are the best possible equipment with which to carry out this mission. All the other options either would result in significantly more casualties or would have other problems that would likely allow terrorists to escape.

First there is the collateral damage that would be caused by using other alternatives to striking terrorists. Professor Plaw of the University of Massachusetts says that when terrorists were being confronted by the Pakistani Army, who were attacking at the behest of the United States, 46% of casualties were collateral damage. A similar number of 41% was the figure when Israel was targeting Hamas.[1] When compared to the 16 or 28% collateral damage figures for UAVs the choice should be easy.

Moreover other options have other disadvantages. Sending a hit squad in to eliminate terrorists may mean little collateral damage but would cause a diplomatic crisis as it would be tantamount to invading another country. Using a missile or local support on the other hand significantly increases the chances of the target escaping. Pakistan’s ISI, military intelligence, has for example been accused of helping the Taliban – they could hardly be trusted to kill them.[2]

[1] Shane, Scott, ‘The Moral Case for Drones’, The New York Times, 14 July 2012.

[2] Perlez, Jane, ‘Pakistan Scorns U.S. Scolding on Terrorism’, The New York Times, 23 September 2011.

It is wrong to simply make drones “a default strategy to be used anywhere”. Yes some of the time drones will be the right choice for catching terrorists and other militants but much of the time they won’t be. Instead of spurning institutions like the ISI and Pakistan’s Military we should be relying on them to fight extremism. This targeting of terrorists is happening in other countries sovereign territory. Their sovereignty should be respected wherever possible meaning that the Pakistanis, the Somalis and the Yemenis should be the ones who carry out these engagements.

Again here there is the difficulty of not knowing how many were killed in drone strikes (see counter to prop 1). We cannot compare other types of strikes unless we have more reliable figures. This is something that sending special forces in would help with; they would have much more accurate figures of who they kill and could check whether they really killed the person they were supposed to be targeting. This would prevent any attempt to inflate the kill count through including those they are not sure of as terrorists.[1]

[1] Becker, Jo, and Shane, Scott, ‘Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will’, The New York Times, 29 May 2012.

When engaging in covert operations it is essential that the right target is identified so that the correct target is eliminated. This is something that using UAVs allows as they are able to track their target, sometimes for days, before attacking. This means there is much more time for scrutiny of targets and possible collateral damage.

This also means that there is plenty of room for the decisions to be made right at the top. Every person on the kill list gets discussed at a weekly meeting of more than 100 members of the US government’s security apparatus. President Obama himself signs off on strikes and can change the decision if the situation on the ground changes. Former National Security Advisor Jones says “Many times… at the 11th hour we waved off a mission simply because the target had people around them and we were able to loiter on station until they didn’t.”[1]

While UAVs may be ‘unmanned’ they are certainly heavily monitored as each drone has 43 military personnel rotating in three shifts. They include seven joystick pilots, seven system operators, and five mission coordinators, there is also from the CIA 66 people, including 34 video crew members, and 18 intelligence analysts.[2] This means that there are a large number of eyeballs to make sure that the right person is being targeted, to check he is with as few others as possible before the strike. None of this would be possible with other forms of attack where the emphasis has to be on the speed of the operation.

[1] Becker, Jo, and Shane, Scott, ‘Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will’, The New York Times, 29 May 2012.

[2] Kaplan, Fred, ‘Who’s Afraid of the Kill List’, Slate, 15 June 2012.

This is incorrect; It makes the assumption that UAVs could not be used at all if they were not being used to attack targets. They could still be used in a surveillance role so providing the same amount of time to deliberate before striking in a different fashion, one that is appropriate to the situation.

To put it bluntly any military or intelligence service wants to keep its own men safe while carrying out its missions; Unmanned Aerial Vehicles are the ultimate capability with which to manage this. No military or civilian personnel are going to be killed if the delivery vehicle is controlled from the United States. This means that unlike in other methods of attack the UAV can take its time even if it is at risk. In the war in Kosovo NATO air forces had to launch their attacks from 15,000 feet due to worries they would be shot down.[1] Attacking from such a height from a fast moving aeroplane makes missing the target much more likely.

[1] Thomas, Timothy, ‘Kosovo and the Current Myth of Information Superiority’, Parameters, Spring 2000, pp.13-29.

Today most forms of conflict do not have much risk to western militaries. While the attacks were carried out from high in the sky NATO did not suffer a single loss in combat operations over Kosovo in 1999.[1] Moreover this lack of danger with UAVs is potentially immoral; we no longer have a war in which both sides are at risk rather a shooting range for drones to kill ‘terrorists’. Having at least some danger is needed as a restraint on the use of force. A good litmus test to use for the authorisation of lethal force would be whether the public would find the goals of the action worthwhile even if it did result in the loss of several soldiers.

[1] Gallis, Paul E., ‘Kosovo: Lessons Learned from Operation Allied Force’, CRS Report for Congress, 19 November 1999, p.8 

Using drones cuts down the options on the ground. A drone can only keep circling or go in for the attack; their only option is to kill a target or let them escape. Using ground forces; either your own, or in this case the Pakistani or Yemeni military, provides the third option of capturing the target. This is ethically a much better position for the United States to be in as it means that the terrorists can be given the option to surrender rather than simply being killed. This in turn would provide the benefit of allowing a trial helping to show the justice of the operation. Moreover these captured militants would likely be valuable intelligence assets who could be questioned which may well lead the intelligence services to other terrorists.  

Finally using drones is a very aggressive and provocative stance as it prevents any possibility of a peaceful resolution.  The usage of drones immediately eliminates the possibility of negotiation because drones are remote from their operators. This means that drones are unlikely to be useful in the many situations that could be helped by any form of contact.

Getting special forces or allies on the ground is not always an option. In countries like Somalia and Yemen where there have been conflicts between factions the authorities will not always cooperate and even if they do they may not control the territory where the strike team would need to operate. There will also be many times where it is simply too dangerous to try and snatch someone. If that person is a danger they need to be stopped in the quickest way possible; and that will be by the use of the UAV that is already far above monitoring the target.

Using drones encourages the use of lethal force rather than alternatives. The reason for this is obvious – it is much easier to resort to violence if you know there is no risk to yourself. With the operators thousands of miles away in the United States the only risk of using drones is the loss of equipment. As Christof Heyns, the UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial killings, has said “The term 'targeted killing' is wrong because it suggests little violence has occurred. The collateral damage may be less than aerial bombardment, but because they eliminate the risk to soldiers they can be used more often.”[1]

The use of drones is also politically expedient in a way that otherwise the use of force would not be. Dennis Blair, the former director of national intelligence, points out that the strike campaign is dangerously seductive as it is “low cost, no U.S. casualties, gives the appearance of toughness… It plays well domestically, and it is unpopular only in other countries. Any damage it does to the national interest only shows up over the long term.”[2] The use of force therefore becomes the first choice not the option of last resort. Even those within the U.S. administration such as Secretary of state Clinton have worried about a drones-only approach that ignored other options and does not look at solving the larger problems.[3]

[1] Bowcott, Owen, ‘Drone strikes threaten 50 years of international law, says UN rapporteur’, guardian.co.uk, 21 June 2012.

[2] Becker, Jo, and Shane, Scott, ‘Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will’, The New York Times, 29 May 2012, p.8

[3] ibid, p.8

It is absolutely not the case that UAVs will mean unnecessary attacks that would not otherwise be made; all the targets are checked by a large number of national security experts and the attacks are signed off by the President himself. The attacks are therefore taken very seriously by the administration. Moreover that the attacks are low cost is exactly what we want – the capability to strike our enemies without losses to ourselves or any collateral damage should be prized not shunned. 

The use of drones further blurs the already worryingly indistinct line between a state of war and a state of peace. The drone attacks are taking place in countries where the United States does not have any legal authority. The United States is not officially at war with Pakistan, Yemen, or Somalia, yet has launched hundreds of attacks on these countries and their citizens. The assumption is that a state can be at war with a non-state actor such as a terrorist group and therefore is free to target them wherever this group may be found. This means that the US is prosecuting a war in which only it thinks it is at war while sovereign countries like Pakistan are targeted despite believing they are at peace. It is the use of drones that makes it easy to circumvent sovereignty and attack targets on another country’s soil so creating the ambiguity.

Equally worryingly is the blurring of the distinction between civilian and combatant. Firstly the U.S. has decided to define any adult male in the target area as a terrorist when many are most likely nothing of the sort.[1] Secondly the Geneva conventions and their 1977 additions at their heart have the assumption that civilians cannot engage in a war – they are innocent bystanders. This however has been changed by the use of drones; it is a civilian agency, the CIA, which controls the drones and pulls the trigger. This makes the CIA combatants so breaking the obligation not to engage as soldiers. This means that U.S. civilians lose their protected status and the U.S. can’t complain if U.S. citizens are targeted in retaliation as the terrorists can no longer distinguish between those who are targeting them and those who are not.[2]

[1] Hammond, Jeremy R., ‘The Immoral Case for Drones’, Foreign Policy Journal, 16 July 2012.

[2] Hallinan, Conn, ‘CIA’s Drone Wars Blurs Distinction Between Military and Civilian Combatants’, Foreign Policy In Focus, 6 October 2011.

This is a conflict situation, a war, pure and simple. While this is a new kind of conflict; when the opponent is a non-state actor states have to be able to strike at these groups that intend to attack them even when they are sheltering in other states. Such attacks should also not include the state where those groups are sheltering unless that state is supporting that group as was the case in Afghanistan.

Yes the distinction between civilian and combatant is blurred by this conflict but this is something that happens regardless of whether the United States uses UAVs. It is the terrorists themselves who through their horrific attacks by ‘civilians’ on civilian targets that strip away the distinction. The United States has to be able to respond with whatever method is most likely to prevent more of these terrorist attacks.

The United States is the first state with a large number of drones and other unmanned military vehicles. It is also the first country to use them. This inevitably means that the US is creating the precedent for how they will be used in future. The United States is aware of this potential and President Obama’s counterterrorism adviser John Brennan has stated “Other nations also possess this technology, and many more nations are seeking it, and more will succeed in acquiring it. President Obama and those of us on his national security team are very mindful that as our nation uses this technology, we are establishing precedents that other nations may follow, and not all of those nations may — and not all of them will be nations that share our interests or the premium we put on protecting human life, including innocent civilians.”[1] This is exactly the problem; do we really want to live in a world where any country can carry out targeted killings of people who are in another nation? Such a world would have the ever present risk of a covert conflict becoming a much more open shooting war.

[1] McNeal, Greg, ‘Is the U.S. Setting Precedents in its Drone Wars’, Forbes, 6 June 2012.

Any other nation seeking to take a precedent from the use of drones would have to be involved in a conflict against a terrorist organisation that poses a credible, clear, and present danger and not be able to fight those terrorists by other means. The situation in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia is in many ways unique in that these are states that have either failed or are near failure. As a result the sovereign government cannot be relied to combat terrorists on their own soil.