This House would re-engage with Myanmar

The isolation of Myanmar by some of the developed Western powers is arbitrary and marked by hypocrisy. The real reasons for the stance taken by these countries are political. There is little consistency in the attitude taken towards other governments and dictatorships across the world that also have questionable human rights records (Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to name a few), but either offer other strategic and economic benefits, or are much more influential in international affairs than Myanmar. Myanmar is only part of a group of countries (also including Cuba and North Korea) whose economic and political policies have remained relatively opaque to arm-twisting by the US and the EU. It is unfair to impose sanctions on and isolate Myanmar on this basis, especially in an emerging multi-polar international environment. 

This argument is not a defence of the government in Myanmar. Making it a question of who is pointing fingers itself politicizes a principled stance against an undoubtedly unjust system. The US and the EU have been consistent in their criticism of the military-controlled government and in their principled support for pro-democracy activists in Myanmar. This is in line with their stated positions on human rights and democracy across the world – with political allies or enemies - and in accordance with international treaties that they are signatories to. They have long voiced concerns over human rights violations in China and India, for instance. Only because their moral position may not have been as influential in relation to certain countries, or that it has been diplomatically unfeasible to take stronger positions in certain circumstances due to global power relations, it does not mean they should not take such a position in the case of Myanmar as well.¹

¹ Schmahmann, David, The unconstitutionality of state and local enactments in the United States restricting business ties with Burma (Myanmar) Vanderbilt journal of transnational law. March 1997, vol 30, no 2.

Myanmar has taken significant steps towards democratisation in the last three years. The new constitution and the elections that resulted in the current civilian government being appointed represent a marked shift in its governance structure. Though there may be scope for improvement in its democratic framework, institutions for democratic functioning have been created and this is a huge step forward. Aung San Suu Kyi has also been released from house arrest, and the tone of the statements made by the new government has been a reconciliatory one. A new human rights commission has also been established. While the pace of reform may not match the supposed expectations of the US and the EU, Myanmar’s choice to change gradually and engage with them on its own terms must be respected. The fundamental circumstances under which a policy of limited engagement was adopted with Myanmar have changed, and this calls for reassessment. 

Despite the change in nominal governmental structure, the real holders of power have remained the same. The president Thein Sein was handpicked by the outgoing military leader Than Shwe. The top posts in government and one-fourth of parliament is reserved was the military. Arbitrary laws prevented leaders of the NLD, including Aung San Suu Kyi, from participating in the elections. Elections do not equal democracy. Other than the sugar-coated words of the new government, there has been no real movement towards democratic reform. The international community has long called for an impartial investigation into the systematic human rights violations to bring its perpetrators to justice. None of this has been promised, or is likely to be achieved under a military-controlled government, the main aim of which is to hoodwink the international community and provide security to the guilty leaders of the military junta.¹

¹ Ellgee, ‘Myanmar hides behind ‘democracy’’, Aljazeera, 27 January 2011.

Reengagement has potential for having a positive influence in various contexts.  Myanmar is rich in natural resources, including forest products, minerals and gems. Removing trade restrictions and offering developmental aid would benefit the local economy and population.¹ In the longer term, economic activity can act as a stimulus for development of a stronger legal and business framework to reduce corruption. If the US and the EU create confidence in the Myanmar government that they are willing to offer something constructive rather than critical, it may be possible to ask for greater transparency in government and reduce systematic violations of human rights as well.² The newly elected civilian government has indicated it is willing to pursue democratic reform, and the US and the EU should not lose this opportunity for change.  

¹ BBC News, ‘India and Burma expand trade ties and sign gas deals’, 14 October 2011.

² Human Rights Watch, ‘China: press visiting Burmese leader on elections and accountability’, 6 September 2010, (example of how state relations can encourage democracy) 

Since the government is still controlled by the military and there is no evidence to that corruption levels will go down in the new regime, engaging in trade with Myanmar will only strengthen the ruling elite. There is little accountability for developmental aid actually reaching its desired goals.¹ Trading with Myanmar means trading with organisations controlled by the state/military in a nationalised economy. Common people are exploited and kept in poverty while the profits are reaped by a few. This has been the experience of international trade with Myanmar involving countries other than US and EU, and there is no reason that this will change. Further, there is no necessary link between business activity and development of the rule of law, as the experience of many African countries has shown. Opportunistic business entities are more likely to be involved in rent-seeking monopolistic practices that benefit them, instead of causing social change.

¹ BBC News, ‘UN frustrated at Burma response’, 13 May 2008.

The policy of disengagement has not resulted in any meaningful change in Myanmar, politically or economically. Since Myanmar has not been dependent on the US or the EU, sanctions and arms embargoes have not had any effect on the government. The changes in 2010-2011 have been due to the influence of the NLD, and certain regional players (like Thailand and China) which have sought to directly engage with Myanmar. Further, the sections of the population that are most affected by the sanctions are those not in the top tier of the political and economic class, but smaller manufacturers and the working class. Restrictions on exports and developmental aid from the US and the EU prevent local manufacturers and consumers from having access to them. On the other hand, restrictions on imports from Myanmar weaken the market for its exporters. These factors only further impoverish and alienate the local population, increasing economic disparity, and consequently the power of the ruling elite in the national context as well.

While the policy of disengagement may not have achieved all its goals, it has brought to the forefront a moral standard by which the government can be judged. This has helped frame global opinion and influenced regional players’ attitudes to Myanmar as well to some extent. More harm is done by continuing to engage with Myanmar since that option offers no incentive or pressure for democratic reform. Trading with Myanmar will only add to the economic and political clout of the ruling elite, as the ‘trickle down’ to the population as a whole is minimal. A policy of disengagement, at the very least, prevents the military (which is sensitive to international opinion) from becoming even stronger. 

Myanmar has continuing economic and political relations with many other countries, including members of the ASEAN, and significantly, China (which is also the source of a large proportion of foreign investment in Myanmar). These countries, some of which are major economic and political partners of the US and the EU, do not share the same attitude about the legitimacy of the Myanmar government and the approach that should be taken towards it. For the purposes of regional stability, it would be better for the US and the EU to align their positions with the others. This reduces the risk of diplomatic rifts which could destabilise the region. Further, if the international community presents a united viewpoint on what steps Myanmar should take to improve its democracy, such steps are more likely to be taken.

Though countries in South Asia have displayed ambivalence in their attitude towards Myanmar, it is not a reason for the US and the EU to change their stance. Regional players have sometimes tended to support the pro-democracy movement in their rhetoric, but have not adopted policies that are aligned with it. Therefore, they have not been able to cause any real democratic reform. If there is a united international community that does not actively seek to isolate Myanmar, but to the contrary engages with it, the force that can drive such reform will become even weaker. The risk of harm from long-existent differences in attitudes between regional players and those who seek to disengage is very low, and nothing has occurred since 1990 to suggest otherwise.

The isolation of Myanmar by some of the developed Western powers is arbitrary and marked by hypocrisy. The real reasons for the stance taken by these countries are political. There is little consistency in the attitude taken towards other governments and dictatorships across the world that also have questionable human rights records (Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to name a few), but either offer other strategic and economic benefits, or are much more influential in international affairs than Myanmar. Myanmar is only part of a group of countries (also including Cuba and North Korea) whose economic and political policies have remained relatively opaque to arm-twisting by the US and the EU. It is unfair to impose sanctions on and isolate Myanmar on this basis, especially in an emerging multi-polar international environment. 

This argument is not a defence of the government in Myanmar. Making it a question of who is pointing fingers itself politicizes a principled stance against an undoubtedly unjust system. The US and the EU have been consistent in their criticism of the military-controlled government and in their principled support for pro-democracy activists in Myanmar. This is in line with their stated positions on human rights and democracy across the world – with political allies or enemies - and in accordance with international treaties that they are signatories to. They have long voiced concerns over human rights violations in China and India, for instance. Only because their moral position may not have been as influential in relation to certain countries, or that it has been diplomatically unfeasible to take stronger positions in certain circumstances due to global power relations, it does not mean they should not take such a position in the case of Myanmar as well.¹

¹ Schmahmann, David, The unconstitutionality of state and local enactments in the United States restricting business ties with Burma (Myanmar) Vanderbilt journal of transnational law. March 1997, vol 30, no 2.

Myanmar has taken significant steps towards democratisation in the last three years. The new constitution and the elections that resulted in the current civilian government being appointed represent a marked shift in its governance structure. Though there may be scope for improvement in its democratic framework, institutions for democratic functioning have been created and this is a huge step forward. Aung San Suu Kyi has also been released from house arrest, and the tone of the statements made by the new government has been a reconciliatory one. A new human rights commission has also been established. While the pace of reform may not match the supposed expectations of the US and the EU, Myanmar’s choice to change gradually and engage with them on its own terms must be respected. The fundamental circumstances under which a policy of limited engagement was adopted with Myanmar have changed, and this calls for reassessment. 

Despite the change in nominal governmental structure, the real holders of power have remained the same. The president Thein Sein was handpicked by the outgoing military leader Than Shwe. The top posts in government and one-fourth of parliament is reserved was the military. Arbitrary laws prevented leaders of the NLD, including Aung San Suu Kyi, from participating in the elections. Elections do not equal democracy. Other than the sugar-coated words of the new government, there has been no real movement towards democratic reform. The international community has long called for an impartial investigation into the systematic human rights violations to bring its perpetrators to justice. None of this has been promised, or is likely to be achieved under a military-controlled government, the main aim of which is to hoodwink the international community and provide security to the guilty leaders of the military junta.¹

¹ Ellgee, ‘Myanmar hides behind ‘democracy’’, Aljazeera, 27 January 2011.

Reengagement has potential for having a positive influence in various contexts.  Myanmar is rich in natural resources, including forest products, minerals and gems. Removing trade restrictions and offering developmental aid would benefit the local economy and population.¹ In the longer term, economic activity can act as a stimulus for development of a stronger legal and business framework to reduce corruption. If the US and the EU create confidence in the Myanmar government that they are willing to offer something constructive rather than critical, it may be possible to ask for greater transparency in government and reduce systematic violations of human rights as well.² The newly elected civilian government has indicated it is willing to pursue democratic reform, and the US and the EU should not lose this opportunity for change.  

¹ BBC News, ‘India and Burma expand trade ties and sign gas deals’, 14 October 2011.

² Human Rights Watch, ‘China: press visiting Burmese leader on elections and accountability’, 6 September 2010, (example of how state relations can encourage democracy) 

Since the government is still controlled by the military and there is no evidence to that corruption levels will go down in the new regime, engaging in trade with Myanmar will only strengthen the ruling elite. There is little accountability for developmental aid actually reaching its desired goals.¹ Trading with Myanmar means trading with organisations controlled by the state/military in a nationalised economy. Common people are exploited and kept in poverty while the profits are reaped by a few. This has been the experience of international trade with Myanmar involving countries other than US and EU, and there is no reason that this will change. Further, there is no necessary link between business activity and development of the rule of law, as the experience of many African countries has shown. Opportunistic business entities are more likely to be involved in rent-seeking monopolistic practices that benefit them, instead of causing social change.

¹ BBC News, ‘UN frustrated at Burma response’, 13 May 2008.

The policy of disengagement has not resulted in any meaningful change in Myanmar, politically or economically. Since Myanmar has not been dependent on the US or the EU, sanctions and arms embargoes have not had any effect on the government. The changes in 2010-2011 have been due to the influence of the NLD, and certain regional players (like Thailand and China) which have sought to directly engage with Myanmar. Further, the sections of the population that are most affected by the sanctions are those not in the top tier of the political and economic class, but smaller manufacturers and the working class. Restrictions on exports and developmental aid from the US and the EU prevent local manufacturers and consumers from having access to them. On the other hand, restrictions on imports from Myanmar weaken the market for its exporters. These factors only further impoverish and alienate the local population, increasing economic disparity, and consequently the power of the ruling elite in the national context as well.

While the policy of disengagement may not have achieved all its goals, it has brought to the forefront a moral standard by which the government can be judged. This has helped frame global opinion and influenced regional players’ attitudes to Myanmar as well to some extent. More harm is done by continuing to engage with Myanmar since that option offers no incentive or pressure for democratic reform. Trading with Myanmar will only add to the economic and political clout of the ruling elite, as the ‘trickle down’ to the population as a whole is minimal. A policy of disengagement, at the very least, prevents the military (which is sensitive to international opinion) from becoming even stronger. 

Myanmar has continuing economic and political relations with many other countries, including members of the ASEAN, and significantly, China (which is also the source of a large proportion of foreign investment in Myanmar). These countries, some of which are major economic and political partners of the US and the EU, do not share the same attitude about the legitimacy of the Myanmar government and the approach that should be taken towards it. For the purposes of regional stability, it would be better for the US and the EU to align their positions with the others. This reduces the risk of diplomatic rifts which could destabilise the region. Further, if the international community presents a united viewpoint on what steps Myanmar should take to improve its democracy, such steps are more likely to be taken.

Though countries in South Asia have displayed ambivalence in their attitude towards Myanmar, it is not a reason for the US and the EU to change their stance. Regional players have sometimes tended to support the pro-democracy movement in their rhetoric, but have not adopted policies that are aligned with it. Therefore, they have not been able to cause any real democratic reform. If there is a united international community that does not actively seek to isolate Myanmar, but to the contrary engages with it, the force that can drive such reform will become even weaker. The risk of harm from long-existent differences in attitudes between regional players and those who seek to disengage is very low, and nothing has occurred since 1990 to suggest otherwise.

The new civilian government in Myanmar is as illegitimate as the rule of the military junta which led to its creation. The military junta itself was guilty of overruling the democratic verdict in 1990 that gave power to the NLD. Under the new constitution, 25% of all seats in parliament and the most influential governmental posts are reserved for the military, and more than 75% majority is required for amending the constitution. Political prisoners (including Aung San Suu Kyi) were not permitted to participate in the elections. Further, the election process itself has been described as a sham, involving violence and intimidation of democratic activists. The current government is only a tool for the preceding military junta to consolidate its power and provide a safety valve for its leaders through apparently legitimate means. It attempts to use the false democratic process as a veil to resist international criticism. Widespread human rights violations, ethnic violence, and undemocratic curtailment of the freedom of speech have characterised the period of rule of the military junta. By engaging with it at the political or economic level, other countries provide it with a false sense of legitimacy. This is morally at odds with established standards in of human rights and international relations, especially where other illegitimate governments (Syria, Iraq, and North Korea for instance) across the world continually face censure and isolation.

This argument assumes that democracy, and that too a particular kind of democracy, is the only legitimate form of government possible. The kind of democracy that is followed in the West may not be appropriate for Myanmar, in any case not at this stage. There are economic and political inequalities in Myanmar and its democracy is not perfect. However, if everyone was allowed to participate in elections, the country is likely to slip into a situation of civil war, since the elected individuals may not wield real power. Attempts at imposing a particular style of democracy in countries that may not be ready for it can be counter-productive (as in East Timor, for instance). Further, not every country in the world has claimed itself to be a champion of democracy across the world. Such countries have no obligation to denounce a foreign regime, and have a right to decide what their policies should be. An apparently democratic government may not be a good one (for instance, Zimbabwe), and an undemocratic government may not necessarily be a bad one (for instance, China and Venezuela). There is no basis to say that any uniformity has been achieved in accepted international standards for the legitimacy of governments. 

The military-controlled government in Myanmar clearly does not have popular domestic support - otherwise the artificial election process would not have been necessary. Therefore, it derives its strength from the fact that many international players other than the US and the EU have continued to recognise it, while there is historic precedent for concerted international opinion having influenced illegitimate regimes (Haiti and South Africa, for instance). Having a nationalised economy increases the control the military has over trade and investment, while a majority of the country finds itself in poverty. The choice for the international community is between continuing to strengthen the military by engaging with it, or by disengaging (like the EU and the US) until the ruling elite runs out of resources and options. The former option does not give hope to any real democratic reform, while the latter option would take away the legitimacy of the government in the international arena.

While international support is important to some extent for the government, Myanmar has significant political and economic relations with many countries in the region, including China and North Korea, whose stance is strategically motivated and is not going to be influenced by what the US and the EU do. It is hard to fathom a situation in the foreseeable future where the military and government leadership will be forced to bow down to international pressure, whether or not certain countries choose to engage with it. The only way for the international community to remain relevant to Myanmar would be by engaging with it. The situation is different from that in South Africa and in Haiti because of the existence of strong allies, whose interests are different, if not opposed to in some respects, from those who follow a policy of disengagement with Myanmar.

International and domestic pressure has forced the military junta to set up a nominal civilian government. It is important to make sure that change goes further and becomes meaningful. This will involve bringing into force a fair constitution, curbing human rights violations and bringing its perpetrators to justice, and creating conditions for legitimate democratic elections to take place. By reengaging at this juncture, the signal the ruling elite in Myanmar will get is that this piecemeal, nominal change is sufficient to hold them in good stead in the international political arena for a longer period. It would also be a betrayal of the pro-democracy supporters in Myanmar, who continue to be cast out of the constitutional process and have little actual political influence under the existing system.¹

¹ Thanegi, Ma, ‘Burma sanctions: The case against’, BBC news, ‘4 March 2002’.

Reengagement will send a message to the Myanmar government that the steps it has taken have not gone unnoticed by the international community, and may lead to more substantive change over time. It will project the US and the EU as constructive actors in the process of reform. Reengagement is a way of gaining political and economic influence in Myanmar and in the region. It may lead to negotiations at some stage, and reengagement now would allow them to have a greater say at that time. By not engaging, the US and the EU are not actually able to increase the influence of the opponents of the current government either.

Certain members of the international community, especially regional players like China and India, have tended to ignore questions of legitimacy of the regime for economic and political benefits. While this may be beneficial to them in the short term, it is very harmful for Myanmar as a democracy in the future. Politically, a blind eye is being turned to a culture of violating human rights. If and when Myanmar becomes a real democracy, it is unlikely that it will magically transform into a model democratic state, unless enough emphasis is provided to fundamental principles of good governance at the outset. Economically, investment is being provided in a highly monopolistic and imperfect environment, without addressing problems of corruption and inadequacy of legal processes. In the long run, even if a democratic constitutional framework exists, the country is likely to continue to have high economic disparity and corrupt markets due to these reasons (in a manner comparable to how Russian markets have evolved since the 1990s). Reengagement should not be setting the stage for a shift from a military-controlled government to a poor democracy, which would also be harmful for stability in the region as a whole. 

Regional players like China and India are interested in border security and internal stability for Myanmar. There is no basis to say that their political and commercial relationship with Myanmar must necessarily be for short-term benefit. It is unfair to compare Myanmar with Western standards of preserving human rights or with ‘a model democratic state’, though there may not be any countries in the world that fit the description. It is sufficient if it is at a stage where its standard of governance is comparable with other countries in South Asia that do not face international isolation or censure. There is also evidence to show that exposure to more sophisticated markets does have a positive influence on the development of internal legal systems. Though Russia may not be a model economy, its economic growth has been accompanied by gradual changes to attitudes and institutions internally. Reengagement would make it easier for these changes to take place, while a policy of disengagement would, in effect, be a policy of apathy.