This House would lift all veto powers of individual EU member states

European Union has been based on principles of solidarity and mutual help. This means that sometimes, in order to ensure the ‘greater good’, one has to forgo a bit of his own self-interest.  Because European Union holds together 28 culturally and economically different countries, qualified majority voting is sufficient to ensure that no state will be harmed by the decisions made on the international level. The fact that some states would like to retain their right of veto undermines the basic principles of the EU because no such process, where a single state is able to prevent majority from adopting a measure can be called democratic. It this system the minority, or individual state, can ignore the will of the majority indefinitely. Moreover, Zamora (in Sieberson, 2010)[1] states that “international agreement is impossible to obtain when any single participant can block a decision; to achieve unanimous consent… a decision must be diluted so as to please everyone,” concluding that such result is unsatisfactory and prohibits effective functioning of an international organization, mainly in regards to urgent, practical problems.

[1] Sieberson, SC 2010, ‘Inching Toward EU Supranationalism? Qualified Majority Voting and Unanimity Under the Treaty of Lisbon’, Virginia Journal of International Law, vol. 50, no. 4, pp. 932, viewed 29 September 2013, <http://www.vjil.org/articles/inching-toward-eu-supranationalism-qualified-majority-voting-and-unanimity-under-the-treaty-of-lisbon>.

This is not completely true. The EU’s very economically successful pre-crisis state suggests that many of the decisions adopted by the EU are not “diluted to the point of being ineffective” and that in fact, EU works quite well. Although there are stark differences between individual member states they are able to overcome them and work meaningfully as a collective when progress is necessary. States are willing to sacrifice their interests in some areas if they get something in return elsewhere, or believe they will in the future. Therefore even if we accept the assertion that unanimous requirement is undemocratic, in a society with knowledgeable individuals, the veto is only used as a last resort. Thus what happens is that the allegedly "undemocratic" process functions as well as democratic process, but on top has an additional check or balance to prevent anything that is found particularly egregious to pass. 

Unanimous voting provides states seeking additional gains with a tool to actually achieve their egoistic goals. In order for the whole Union to pass legislation that would be beneficial to all, a single state has power to negotiate further benefits for itself, thus holding up a deal and sometimes making it less beneficial for others. Similar concerns were expressed in the EU Commission White Paper on European Governance as consensus requirement “often holds policy-making hostage to national interest”.[1] What is more, such behavior sets dangerous precedents that nations can put national interests in front of communal, effectively deteriorating the cooperative spirit of the EU and eventually destroying it altogether. As Sieberson claims[2], such was the case of French objections to the Treaty of Rome regarding the wider use of qualified majority voting in the fields of agriculture and the internal market. In the ‘empty chair crisis’ France boycotted Council meetings for seven months, until the deal called Luxembourg accord[3] was struck. “The Luxembourg accord is widely believed to have created a period of stagnation in the Community… Paul Craig describes this period as “the prime example of negative intergovernmentalism.”[4] It prevented consolidation of Europe and ensured the EC remained intergovernmental by effectively curtailing qualified majority voting as any state could veto by invoking national interests.

[1] European Governance, A White Paper 2001, Commission of the European Communities, pp. 29, viewed 29 September 2013,
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_0428en01.pdf>.

[2] Sieberson, SC 2010, ‘Inching Toward EU Supranationalism? Qualified Majority Voting and Unanimity Under the Treaty of Lisbon’, Virginia Journal of International Law, vol. 50, no. 4, pp. 934, viewed 29 September 2013, <http://www.vjil.org/articles/inching-toward-eu-supranationalism-qualified-majority-voting-and-unanimity-under-the-treaty-of-lisbon>.

[3] Eurofond 2007, Luxembourg Compromise, viewed 29 September 2013, <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/luxembourgcompromise.htm>.

[4] Sieberson, SC 2010, ‘Inching Toward EU Supranationalism? Qualified Majority Voting and Unanimity Under the Treaty of Lisbon’, Virginia Journal of International Law, vol. 50, no. 4, pp. 934, viewed 29 September 2013, <http://www.vjil.org/articles/inching-toward-eu-supranationalism-qualified-majority-voting-and-unanimity-under-the-treaty-of-lisbon>.

Even though this point correctly presents a theoretical possibility, the reality is different. Europe has since come up with an alternative solution that means the need for unanimity does not always mean decision-making can be slowed by a spoiler; the opt-out. Countries can negotiate to opt out of further integration on areas where they believe their national interests are threatened. This then allows all the other states to carry on with integration without risking a veto from the states that do not wish to follow that path. What further corroborates this point is that since Luxembourg accord, nothing similar has ever occurred, and even the compromise allowing for invoking national interests to halt QMV is no longer used. Thus it is irrational to fear “empty chairs” now, when all the states are aware of the possibility of a stalemate, and would, perhaps, never wanted to be held accountable for such situation.

With Greece as a trigger, the Eurozone and the whole EU have significantly suffered in the last five years as a result of massive and still on-going economic crisis. The Euro currency is, damaged by the vast differences between individual Eurozone members, with respect to their fiscal and monetary policies. While some states (commonly referred to as PIIGS) do have bigger problems with their finances, it is unthinkable for the others to be held responsible when serious issues, such as an inability to pay the debts, arise. Nevertheless, this was the case with Greece, when tens of billions of taxpayers’ money were used to service debts of one irresponsible state. Despite more than 50% of private sector debt being cut down by creditors, the threat of Greece’s default still lingers in the air. Getting rid of the unanimity requirement would make Europe much more able to respond quickly to crises. In the long run it would make negotiations for a federal union much easier, eventually turning it into reality. Achieving political integration and the abandonment of the veto that would come with it would then enable solutions to economic problems benefiting the whole even it unpalatable to some. Such position is also taken by Jacques Attali, a French economist who argues that “the institutional reform towards a federal Europe is necessary to implement a common fiscal and budgetary system.”[1]

[1] Attali, J 2012, ‘Attali: A federal Europe is the only crisis exit strategy’, EurActiv, 18 April, viewed 29 September 2013, <http://www.euractiv.com/euro-finance/attali-federal-europe-crisis-exi-interview-512208>.

This argument is based on the premise that federalization is a great idea. But, is it? It is hard to assess the extent to which federalization of the EU help make it a better union. What is clear, however, is that there are a whole load of questions to be answered before a federal union is attempted. As Cocodia[1]  concludes “…if it must be, [it] ought to be a very slow and cautious project which should not be embarked upon unless issues such as group relations, societal culture/language and trust have been properly addressed.” These group relations and trust require that individual members concerns not be ignored. A sustainable federal union would be able to coexist with a veto because it would mean interests are close enough together that it would almost never be used.

[1] Cocodia, J 2010, ‘Problems of Integration in a Federal Europe’, Crossroads, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 57-81, viewed 1 October 2013, <http://www.webasa.org/Pubblicazioni/Cocodia_2010_1.pdf>.

European Union has been based on principles of solidarity and mutual help. This means that sometimes, in order to ensure the ‘greater good’, one has to forgo a bit of his own self-interest.  Because European Union holds together 28 culturally and economically different countries, qualified majority voting is sufficient to ensure that no state will be harmed by the decisions made on the international level. The fact that some states would like to retain their right of veto undermines the basic principles of the EU because no such process, where a single state is able to prevent majority from adopting a measure can be called democratic. It this system the minority, or individual state, can ignore the will of the majority indefinitely. Moreover, Zamora (in Sieberson, 2010)[1] states that “international agreement is impossible to obtain when any single participant can block a decision; to achieve unanimous consent… a decision must be diluted so as to please everyone,” concluding that such result is unsatisfactory and prohibits effective functioning of an international organization, mainly in regards to urgent, practical problems.

[1] Sieberson, SC 2010, ‘Inching Toward EU Supranationalism? Qualified Majority Voting and Unanimity Under the Treaty of Lisbon’, Virginia Journal of International Law, vol. 50, no. 4, pp. 932, viewed 29 September 2013, <http://www.vjil.org/articles/inching-toward-eu-supranationalism-qualified-majority-voting-and-unanimity-under-the-treaty-of-lisbon>.

This is not completely true. The EU’s very economically successful pre-crisis state suggests that many of the decisions adopted by the EU are not “diluted to the point of being ineffective” and that in fact, EU works quite well. Although there are stark differences between individual member states they are able to overcome them and work meaningfully as a collective when progress is necessary. States are willing to sacrifice their interests in some areas if they get something in return elsewhere, or believe they will in the future. Therefore even if we accept the assertion that unanimous requirement is undemocratic, in a society with knowledgeable individuals, the veto is only used as a last resort. Thus what happens is that the allegedly "undemocratic" process functions as well as democratic process, but on top has an additional check or balance to prevent anything that is found particularly egregious to pass. 

Unanimous voting provides states seeking additional gains with a tool to actually achieve their egoistic goals. In order for the whole Union to pass legislation that would be beneficial to all, a single state has power to negotiate further benefits for itself, thus holding up a deal and sometimes making it less beneficial for others. Similar concerns were expressed in the EU Commission White Paper on European Governance as consensus requirement “often holds policy-making hostage to national interest”.[1] What is more, such behavior sets dangerous precedents that nations can put national interests in front of communal, effectively deteriorating the cooperative spirit of the EU and eventually destroying it altogether. As Sieberson claims[2], such was the case of French objections to the Treaty of Rome regarding the wider use of qualified majority voting in the fields of agriculture and the internal market. In the ‘empty chair crisis’ France boycotted Council meetings for seven months, until the deal called Luxembourg accord[3] was struck. “The Luxembourg accord is widely believed to have created a period of stagnation in the Community… Paul Craig describes this period as “the prime example of negative intergovernmentalism.”[4] It prevented consolidation of Europe and ensured the EC remained intergovernmental by effectively curtailing qualified majority voting as any state could veto by invoking national interests.

[1] European Governance, A White Paper 2001, Commission of the European Communities, pp. 29, viewed 29 September 2013,
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_0428en01.pdf>.

[2] Sieberson, SC 2010, ‘Inching Toward EU Supranationalism? Qualified Majority Voting and Unanimity Under the Treaty of Lisbon’, Virginia Journal of International Law, vol. 50, no. 4, pp. 934, viewed 29 September 2013, <http://www.vjil.org/articles/inching-toward-eu-supranationalism-qualified-majority-voting-and-unanimity-under-the-treaty-of-lisbon>.

[3] Eurofond 2007, Luxembourg Compromise, viewed 29 September 2013, <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/luxembourgcompromise.htm>.

[4] Sieberson, SC 2010, ‘Inching Toward EU Supranationalism? Qualified Majority Voting and Unanimity Under the Treaty of Lisbon’, Virginia Journal of International Law, vol. 50, no. 4, pp. 934, viewed 29 September 2013, <http://www.vjil.org/articles/inching-toward-eu-supranationalism-qualified-majority-voting-and-unanimity-under-the-treaty-of-lisbon>.

Even though this point correctly presents a theoretical possibility, the reality is different. Europe has since come up with an alternative solution that means the need for unanimity does not always mean decision-making can be slowed by a spoiler; the opt-out. Countries can negotiate to opt out of further integration on areas where they believe their national interests are threatened. This then allows all the other states to carry on with integration without risking a veto from the states that do not wish to follow that path. What further corroborates this point is that since Luxembourg accord, nothing similar has ever occurred, and even the compromise allowing for invoking national interests to halt QMV is no longer used. Thus it is irrational to fear “empty chairs” now, when all the states are aware of the possibility of a stalemate, and would, perhaps, never wanted to be held accountable for such situation.

With Greece as a trigger, the Eurozone and the whole EU have significantly suffered in the last five years as a result of massive and still on-going economic crisis. The Euro currency is, damaged by the vast differences between individual Eurozone members, with respect to their fiscal and monetary policies. While some states (commonly referred to as PIIGS) do have bigger problems with their finances, it is unthinkable for the others to be held responsible when serious issues, such as an inability to pay the debts, arise. Nevertheless, this was the case with Greece, when tens of billions of taxpayers’ money were used to service debts of one irresponsible state. Despite more than 50% of private sector debt being cut down by creditors, the threat of Greece’s default still lingers in the air. Getting rid of the unanimity requirement would make Europe much more able to respond quickly to crises. In the long run it would make negotiations for a federal union much easier, eventually turning it into reality. Achieving political integration and the abandonment of the veto that would come with it would then enable solutions to economic problems benefiting the whole even it unpalatable to some. Such position is also taken by Jacques Attali, a French economist who argues that “the institutional reform towards a federal Europe is necessary to implement a common fiscal and budgetary system.”[1]

[1] Attali, J 2012, ‘Attali: A federal Europe is the only crisis exit strategy’, EurActiv, 18 April, viewed 29 September 2013, <http://www.euractiv.com/euro-finance/attali-federal-europe-crisis-exi-interview-512208>.

This argument is based on the premise that federalization is a great idea. But, is it? It is hard to assess the extent to which federalization of the EU help make it a better union. What is clear, however, is that there are a whole load of questions to be answered before a federal union is attempted. As Cocodia[1]  concludes “…if it must be, [it] ought to be a very slow and cautious project which should not be embarked upon unless issues such as group relations, societal culture/language and trust have been properly addressed.” These group relations and trust require that individual members concerns not be ignored. A sustainable federal union would be able to coexist with a veto because it would mean interests are close enough together that it would almost never be used.

[1] Cocodia, J 2010, ‘Problems of Integration in a Federal Europe’, Crossroads, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 57-81, viewed 1 October 2013, <http://www.webasa.org/Pubblicazioni/Cocodia_2010_1.pdf>.

With the recent developments in the EU, the potential that some states may leave is a growing concern. People’s opinion towards the EU is becoming increasingly negative (trust towards EU has in 2012, compared to 2007, declined in all the nations except for Belgium).[1] This stems mainly from the fact that the EU is forcefully trying to invade the decision-making process of the sovereign members. Directives and regulations influencing lives within the nations agreed on at the supranational level, often it is felt without a democratic mandate, are not kindly welcomed. Therefore it is to no amazement that taking away the unanimity requirement, which is now used in the most important and controversial changes, would create huge pressure on the national parliaments to oppose such dictatorship. Fisher argues the idea of federal states “shows itself to be an artificial construct which ignores the established realities in Europe.”[2] Leaving would then be considered a feasible option, thus making the federalization completely counter-productive.

[1] Torreblanca, JI, Leonard, M 2013, The Continent-wide Rise of Euroscepticism, European Council on Foreign Relations, viewed 6 October 2013, <http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR79_EUROSCEPTICISM_BRIEF_AW.pdf>.

[2] Sieberson, SC 2010, ‘Inching Toward EU Supranationalism? Qualified Majority Voting and Unanimity Under the Treaty of Lisbon’, Virginia Journal of International Law, vol. 50, no. 4, pp. 929, viewed 29 September 2013, <http://www.vjil.org/articles/inching-toward-eu-supranationalism-qualified-majority-voting-and-unanimity-under-the-treaty-of-lisbon>.

Federalization is a continual and on-going process. It does not happen overnight, and most importantly, it has been happening ever since the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) was founded. Therefore it is incorrect to think that there is anything like ‘hidden federalization,’ when its driving force are revisions of the common treaties which are agreed upon by all the member states. It is essential to point out that the EU is a democratic union, and member states joined the EU of their own accord. Becoming more federal would not affect this, there are many federal states that are democratic and not artificial such as Germany and the United States. Disposing of the unanimity requirement is not in any way harming the democratic principle of the EU as the changes will still have to be passed by Qualified Majority Vote. Strikingly, for many this is not enough, and other members have to understand that maybe without those who are not willing to move forward, the EU would be better off, what also means making tough decision of partially excluding those ‘backward’ states from further progress of the European Union. Concluding it in a single sentence, keeping the unanimity requirement intact servers only the egoistical needs of some specific nations.

While understanding the need to compromise, members of the EU are very different meaning that hardly any important decision made will fit all universally. The unanimity requirement is needed only in few exceptional cases, such as for common foreign and security policy, which is completely understandable, since it is hardly imaginable that a successful union can act internationally as a whole without the consent of all members. Members clearly need to decide between them, as they do now, which areas need unanimity. It will then only be applied to issues where there should be no shortcuts when discussing and making decisions. The unanimity requirement provides states with a guarantee that they will not be left out of the debate and that their voice matters equally, whatever the size and international position of the state. Without this guarantee, it is beyond doubt that trust among the members would be eroded, damaging the union’s unity of purpose.

Unlike the former Soviet Union, the European Union is no ‘jail’ and members can, even though such move would be unprecedented, leave the union at any time. It is therefore hard to define ‘oppressing for greater good’ when we realize that the state tacitly agrees to it by staying in the union, possibly because the membership is still beneficial, even if we consider the ‘oppression’ in question. In this case then are these ‘oppressed’ state not just lusting for something more rather than a reasonable concern regarding the national interests? Continuing in this line of thought, is this not the exact opposite of what the members should attempt to do? In cases where a state loses they should recognise that in some cases they will gain and others loose.

QMV in the Council before the accession of Croatia required 74.8% of the votes (258 out of 345). These votes are determined by an equation that takes into account size of population, e.g. Germany has 29 votes while Malta has only 3 votes.  Also, a Member State may ask that the qualified majority represents at least 62% of the total population of EU. This system, as Novak puts it, may be potentially oblivious to the needs of smaller states as “the presidency and the Commission seek the support of big countries as a priority because they thereby achieve a qualified majority more quickly.” Furthermore, Novak continues that sometimes, small countries lack resources and large civil services “which seems to lead them pretty mechanically to rely on the Commission’s expertise, or, less often, on that of representatives of big countries.”[1] There we see that substituting unanimity requirement with QMV poses a real danger of marginalizing smaller states through a seemingly ‘democratic voting procedure’. While it is bad enough to foster such behavior regarding the common EU policies, it is unthinkable that this could happen during negotiations on important treaties (like common EU treaties).

[1] Novak, S 2011, Qualified majority voting from the Single European Act to present day: an unexpected permanence, Notre Europe, viewed 29 September 2013, <http://www.notre-europe.eu/media/etud88_en-qualifiedmajority-voting-novak.pdf?pdf=ok>.

Similarly to the first counter-point, it is arguable to what extent it is true marginalization of smaller states when these states comply with terms of agreements. Why do they not seek further steps to avoid being included in such “disadvantageous” changes, e.g. opt-outs? Also, if the marginalization was truly that apparent it is to be believed that these states would try to, for instance, change the QMV weighting. This has however not happened. Once again, does it not only prove that what is attempted to be satisfied is only selfishness and not common goals aimed towards improving life of the whole EU?