This House would intervene to prevent the collapse of the state in other countries.

States should act to help the people of a failing state, as once it collapses no government services will be provided, including law and order. States should work with the UN in leading attempts at conflict resolution, and should engage in subsequent peacekeeping missions and investment in nation-building initiatives (e.g. funding and organising the reintegration of non-combatants into society, organising elections, building up civil society, creating effective government institutions, etc.). The failure of the UN operation in Somalia in 1990 is telling; the country has not had a functioning central government ever since.[1] Intervention to prevent such outcomes will require both greater willingness to commit funds on the part of the powerful states and a commitment to conflict resolution which has been largely lacking in recent national policy world-wide.

[1] CNN (2011, June 21) Somalia again is at top of failed states list. Retrieved June 23, 2011 from CNN Wire: http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/06/21/failed.states/

States should act to protect their own civilians first and foremost, not those in failing states. As such, soldiers should not be sacrificed for the lives of civilians elsewhere; that is not what soldiers enlist for nor does it fit a state’s role as a guarantor of security for its own citizens. Civilians in failing states are the ones that ultimately need to take the responsibility for usurping the incumbent powers in their state. Furthermore, even if it were the case that states should act to prevent failing states, there are means to do this that do not include intervention; charities can provide humanitarian assistance, states can offer mediation services if there is a dispute and diaspora communities can provide finance. 

It is in the interests of international stability that failing states are rescued before it is too late. Failed states often infect a whole region, as the collapse of Liberia did in West Africa - a problem known as contagion. Neighbouring states back different factions with arms and squabble over resources, such as the diamonds of Sierra Leone and the mineral wealth of Congo. Internally neighbours are destabilised by floods of refugees and weapons from next door. Their own rebel groups can also easily find shelter to regroup and mount fresh attacks in the lawless country just over their borders. Former U.N. Secretary Boutros-Ghali claimed, as his justification for support for failing states, that the U.N. has a responsibility under its Charter to ‘maintain international peace and security’ amid fears ‘the demise of a state is often marked by violence and widespread human rights violations that affect other states’.[1] Intervention prevents this by entailing the establishment of conditions for reconstruction which thereafter provides physical infrastructure, facilities and social services. The ultimate goal therefore of the intervention is to ensure that both the state concerned and the region as a whole require no further military or monetary support.[2]

[1] Ratner, S. R., & Helman, G. B. (2010, June 21). Saving Failed States. Retrieved May 16, 2011, from Foreign Policy: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/saving_failed_states

[2] Coyne, C. (2006). Reconstructing weak and failed states: Foreign intervention and the Nirvana Fallacy. Retrieved June 24, 2011 from Foreign Policy Analysis, 2006 (Vol. 2, p.343-360) p.343

Failing states do not infect a whole region. The contagion theory is hard to apply beyond a small group of countries in West Africa - elsewhere failed states do not tend to drag down their neighbours with them. For example, countries bordering Somalia, such as Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Eritrea, are far from perfect but none of them are close to being considered a failed state. In fact, whilst Somalia is seen as the basket case in the region after the failed U.N. intervention in 1992, the percentage of its population that lives on less than $1 a day is in fact less than those of its West African neighbours.[1] Therefore, in most cases the best solution to the problem of failed states is not intervention but for regional groups (e.g. ECOMOG in West Africa, the African Union in Western Sudan, the European Union in Macedonia, Australia in East Timor) to take responsibility for their areas rather than to overburden the USA and UN. In sum, ‘not all failing states pose true dangers to the peace’ and therefore the U.N.’s responsibility for ‘international peace and security’ is not a sufficient basis for action to resurrect all failing or failed states’.[2]

[1] Coyne, C. (2006). Reconstructing weak and failed states: Foreign intervention and the Nirvana Fallacy. Retrieved June 24, 2011 from Foreign Policy Analysis, 2006 (Vol. 2, p.343-360) p.351

[2] Ratner, S. R., & Helman, G. B. (2010, June 21). Saving Failed States. Retrieved May 16, 2011, from Foreign Policy: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/saving_failed_states

Failed states also export dangers more widely, as they often provide an opportunity for drug crops such as Opium (Afghanistan) or Coca (parts of Colombia) to be grown, processed and traded without fear of authority, with devastating effects both locally and globally. Desperate people may also take refuge in religious or political extremism, which may in time come to threaten the rest of the world. In so doing, failed states often become havens for terrorists, who can find safety in them to plot against the West, to establish training camps for future terrorists, and to build up finance, weapons and other resources with which to mount campaigns. In what was a key claim that later underpinned the 2002 US National Security Strategy and the U.S. War on Terror, Stephen Walt, a professor of international relations at Harvard University, has described failed states as ‘breeding grounds of instability, mass migration, and murder’.[1] This can be seen in Somalia, where states in recent years have ‘begun to fear al Qaeda will take advantage of the lawlessness’.[2] Other fragile states, such as Niger, Congo and Sierra Leone have radioactive and other valuable minerals which could be very dangerous in the hands of determined terrorists. The USA should work with the UN to strengthen governments so that they can more effectively maintain internal order while controlling their borders and tracking resource-flows.

[1] Rotberg, R. I. (2002, July/August). Failed States in a World of Terror. Retrieved March 16, 2011, from Council on Foreign Relations: http://www.cfr.org/africa/failed-states-world-terror/p4733

[2] Dickinson, E. (2010, December 14). WikiFailed States. Retrieved May 16, 2011, from Foreign Policy: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/12/13/wikifailed

There is very limited evidence to support the theory that failed states become havens for terrorists. It is true that there are some Al-Qaeda sympathisers in Somalia, but these seem to be few in number and no greater in threat to the USA and its allies than similar groups in other countries. Nor is Afghanistan a good example of this theory; Osama Bin Laden was invited to take refuge there by an established government - the Taliban - only after they had successfully grabbed power in Afghanistan. Before this, Bin Laden was sheltered in Sudan - not in the war-torn and lawless south, but in the northern part where the government was in firm control.[1] Here the problem was not a failed state, but rather one with an extreme Islamist government. On the other hand, Iran and Syria are both accused of providing bases for terrorists, but neither could be considered a failed state.

[1] Hehir, A. (2007) ‘The Myth of the Failed State and the War on Terror’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, Vol. 1/3, pp. 307-326 

The United Nations, and its resident body, the Security Council, has both the right and the capability to intervene in countries in order to maintain the peace. Peace in this sense represents more than the absence of bloodshed, but also provides the means by which aid organizations can enter a territory and provide the requisite resources to prevent civilian suffering. The United Nations have proven their efficacy in this area, mandating an intervention in the Ivory Coast in 2003 that sought to prevent the exacerbation of tensions between the government and rebel forces.[1] A ceasefire was eventually brokered in 2007 and the failure of the state averted. U.N. forces in Macedonia during the 1990s were also credited with ‘successfully contributing to the prevention of conflict spill over and having a stabilizing effect in the country’.[2] U.N. interventions to prevent the failure of states can and do work.

[1] BBC News (2003, February 5) UN backs Ivory Coast peacekeepers. Retrieved June 20, 2011 from BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2727365.stm

[2] Kim, J.  (1998, July 23). Macedonia: Conflict Spillover Prevention. Retrieved September 9, 2011 from CRS Report for Congress: http://www.fas.org/man/crs/98-333.pdf

The United Nations has demonstrated that it lacks both the organizational ethos and the forces required to effectively prevent the failure of states. The veto power on the Security Council ensures that troops for intervention are only mandated when they suit the interests of the most powerful states. Furthermore, the nature of the UN’s forces, almost always composite forces made up of a number of different states, renders them ineffective once on the ground. The example of Sierra Leone is telling, a ceasefire was only agreed upon three years after the UN entered the state, and as late as 2009, the UN’s own head in the region noted the country is still in a precarious situation, ‘with ethnic and interreligious conflicts and increasing threats from international crime’.[1] Failure was not prevented, merely put off.

[1] Security Council (2009, September 14). Sierra Leone’s success in transition to stable democracy depends on government providing ‘peace dividend’, Security Council told. Retrieved June 21 from United Nations: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9740.doc.htm

States should act to help the people of a failing state, as once it collapses no government services will be provided, including law and order. States should work with the UN in leading attempts at conflict resolution, and should engage in subsequent peacekeeping missions and investment in nation-building initiatives (e.g. funding and organising the reintegration of non-combatants into society, organising elections, building up civil society, creating effective government institutions, etc.). The failure of the UN operation in Somalia in 1990 is telling; the country has not had a functioning central government ever since.[1] Intervention to prevent such outcomes will require both greater willingness to commit funds on the part of the powerful states and a commitment to conflict resolution which has been largely lacking in recent national policy world-wide.

[1] CNN (2011, June 21) Somalia again is at top of failed states list. Retrieved June 23, 2011 from CNN Wire: http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/06/21/failed.states/

States should act to protect their own civilians first and foremost, not those in failing states. As such, soldiers should not be sacrificed for the lives of civilians elsewhere; that is not what soldiers enlist for nor does it fit a state’s role as a guarantor of security for its own citizens. Civilians in failing states are the ones that ultimately need to take the responsibility for usurping the incumbent powers in their state. Furthermore, even if it were the case that states should act to prevent failing states, there are means to do this that do not include intervention; charities can provide humanitarian assistance, states can offer mediation services if there is a dispute and diaspora communities can provide finance. 

It is in the interests of international stability that failing states are rescued before it is too late. Failed states often infect a whole region, as the collapse of Liberia did in West Africa - a problem known as contagion. Neighbouring states back different factions with arms and squabble over resources, such as the diamonds of Sierra Leone and the mineral wealth of Congo. Internally neighbours are destabilised by floods of refugees and weapons from next door. Their own rebel groups can also easily find shelter to regroup and mount fresh attacks in the lawless country just over their borders. Former U.N. Secretary Boutros-Ghali claimed, as his justification for support for failing states, that the U.N. has a responsibility under its Charter to ‘maintain international peace and security’ amid fears ‘the demise of a state is often marked by violence and widespread human rights violations that affect other states’.[1] Intervention prevents this by entailing the establishment of conditions for reconstruction which thereafter provides physical infrastructure, facilities and social services. The ultimate goal therefore of the intervention is to ensure that both the state concerned and the region as a whole require no further military or monetary support.[2]

[1] Ratner, S. R., & Helman, G. B. (2010, June 21). Saving Failed States. Retrieved May 16, 2011, from Foreign Policy: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/saving_failed_states

[2] Coyne, C. (2006). Reconstructing weak and failed states: Foreign intervention and the Nirvana Fallacy. Retrieved June 24, 2011 from Foreign Policy Analysis, 2006 (Vol. 2, p.343-360) p.343

Failing states do not infect a whole region. The contagion theory is hard to apply beyond a small group of countries in West Africa - elsewhere failed states do not tend to drag down their neighbours with them. For example, countries bordering Somalia, such as Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Eritrea, are far from perfect but none of them are close to being considered a failed state. In fact, whilst Somalia is seen as the basket case in the region after the failed U.N. intervention in 1992, the percentage of its population that lives on less than $1 a day is in fact less than those of its West African neighbours.[1] Therefore, in most cases the best solution to the problem of failed states is not intervention but for regional groups (e.g. ECOMOG in West Africa, the African Union in Western Sudan, the European Union in Macedonia, Australia in East Timor) to take responsibility for their areas rather than to overburden the USA and UN. In sum, ‘not all failing states pose true dangers to the peace’ and therefore the U.N.’s responsibility for ‘international peace and security’ is not a sufficient basis for action to resurrect all failing or failed states’.[2]

[1] Coyne, C. (2006). Reconstructing weak and failed states: Foreign intervention and the Nirvana Fallacy. Retrieved June 24, 2011 from Foreign Policy Analysis, 2006 (Vol. 2, p.343-360) p.351

[2] Ratner, S. R., & Helman, G. B. (2010, June 21). Saving Failed States. Retrieved May 16, 2011, from Foreign Policy: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/saving_failed_states

Failed states also export dangers more widely, as they often provide an opportunity for drug crops such as Opium (Afghanistan) or Coca (parts of Colombia) to be grown, processed and traded without fear of authority, with devastating effects both locally and globally. Desperate people may also take refuge in religious or political extremism, which may in time come to threaten the rest of the world. In so doing, failed states often become havens for terrorists, who can find safety in them to plot against the West, to establish training camps for future terrorists, and to build up finance, weapons and other resources with which to mount campaigns. In what was a key claim that later underpinned the 2002 US National Security Strategy and the U.S. War on Terror, Stephen Walt, a professor of international relations at Harvard University, has described failed states as ‘breeding grounds of instability, mass migration, and murder’.[1] This can be seen in Somalia, where states in recent years have ‘begun to fear al Qaeda will take advantage of the lawlessness’.[2] Other fragile states, such as Niger, Congo and Sierra Leone have radioactive and other valuable minerals which could be very dangerous in the hands of determined terrorists. The USA should work with the UN to strengthen governments so that they can more effectively maintain internal order while controlling their borders and tracking resource-flows.

[1] Rotberg, R. I. (2002, July/August). Failed States in a World of Terror. Retrieved March 16, 2011, from Council on Foreign Relations: http://www.cfr.org/africa/failed-states-world-terror/p4733

[2] Dickinson, E. (2010, December 14). WikiFailed States. Retrieved May 16, 2011, from Foreign Policy: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/12/13/wikifailed

There is very limited evidence to support the theory that failed states become havens for terrorists. It is true that there are some Al-Qaeda sympathisers in Somalia, but these seem to be few in number and no greater in threat to the USA and its allies than similar groups in other countries. Nor is Afghanistan a good example of this theory; Osama Bin Laden was invited to take refuge there by an established government - the Taliban - only after they had successfully grabbed power in Afghanistan. Before this, Bin Laden was sheltered in Sudan - not in the war-torn and lawless south, but in the northern part where the government was in firm control.[1] Here the problem was not a failed state, but rather one with an extreme Islamist government. On the other hand, Iran and Syria are both accused of providing bases for terrorists, but neither could be considered a failed state.

[1] Hehir, A. (2007) ‘The Myth of the Failed State and the War on Terror’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, Vol. 1/3, pp. 307-326 

The United Nations, and its resident body, the Security Council, has both the right and the capability to intervene in countries in order to maintain the peace. Peace in this sense represents more than the absence of bloodshed, but also provides the means by which aid organizations can enter a territory and provide the requisite resources to prevent civilian suffering. The United Nations have proven their efficacy in this area, mandating an intervention in the Ivory Coast in 2003 that sought to prevent the exacerbation of tensions between the government and rebel forces.[1] A ceasefire was eventually brokered in 2007 and the failure of the state averted. U.N. forces in Macedonia during the 1990s were also credited with ‘successfully contributing to the prevention of conflict spill over and having a stabilizing effect in the country’.[2] U.N. interventions to prevent the failure of states can and do work.

[1] BBC News (2003, February 5) UN backs Ivory Coast peacekeepers. Retrieved June 20, 2011 from BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2727365.stm

[2] Kim, J.  (1998, July 23). Macedonia: Conflict Spillover Prevention. Retrieved September 9, 2011 from CRS Report for Congress: http://www.fas.org/man/crs/98-333.pdf

The United Nations has demonstrated that it lacks both the organizational ethos and the forces required to effectively prevent the failure of states. The veto power on the Security Council ensures that troops for intervention are only mandated when they suit the interests of the most powerful states. Furthermore, the nature of the UN’s forces, almost always composite forces made up of a number of different states, renders them ineffective once on the ground. The example of Sierra Leone is telling, a ceasefire was only agreed upon three years after the UN entered the state, and as late as 2009, the UN’s own head in the region noted the country is still in a precarious situation, ‘with ethnic and interreligious conflicts and increasing threats from international crime’.[1] Failure was not prevented, merely put off.

[1] Security Council (2009, September 14). Sierra Leone’s success in transition to stable democracy depends on government providing ‘peace dividend’, Security Council told. Retrieved June 21 from United Nations: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9740.doc.htm

Interventions are not a panacea for failing states; they do not ensure the success of either the military offensive or subsequent reconstruction efforts on the ground during the occupation. If the intervention fails to overcome local forces, civilians are powerless to overcome a political hierarchy boosted by military victory and reliant on violence. Furthermore, even if the military offensive is successful, the underlying causes of the failure of the state are still present and may be exacerbated by the presence of an intervening force. As such, intervening forces must be aware that the decision is not simply whether intervention is necessary, but whether it will do more harm than good. Coyne describes this fallacy as the ‘Nirvana Fallacy’, whereby states assume that the ‘grass is always greener on the other side’. ‘It is assumed that the foreign governments can generate, via occupation and reconstruction, an outcome preferable to that which would occur absent of these interventions’. The reality challenges these assumptions, for Minxim Pei calculates just a 26% success rate for U.S.-led reconstruction efforts since the late nineteenth century.[1] If an intervening force can’t be certain, even remotely, of the benefit to the state concerned, it has little justification in deploying and risking the exacerbation of an already-precarious problem.

[1] Coyne, C. (2006). Reconstructing weak and failed states: Foreign intervention and the Nirvana Fallacy. Retrieved June 24, 2011 from Foreign Policy Analysis, 2006 (Vol. 2, p.343-360) p.344

Interventions can, and do, fail, however so long as their intentions are good, they must still be attempted if the effects of failed states are to be prevented. Furthermore, the humanitarian catastrophes linked to failing and failed states: ‘mass migration, environmental degradation, regional instability; energy insecurity and transnational terrorism’ are not the fault of a failed intervention, but a failed state.[1] The U.S.-led intervention in Somalia in 1992 is a case in point; though the intervention failed and, it could be argued, exacerbated conditions in Somalia, it did not lead to the state’s failure, it merely failed to prevent it. As such, the U.S. cannot be blamed for attempting to stand with Somalis and save their state; that they failed is unfortunate, but the subsequent continuing humanitarian catastrophe is not the fault of intervening forces.  So long as there is hope that interventions can prevent failed states, the success rate is above 0%, they should be attempted for the alternative is little better for the civilians concerned.

[1] Patrick, S. (2006) Weak states and global threats: Fact or fiction? Retrieved June 24, 2011 from the Washington Quarterly (29:2, p.27-53) p.27

Being willing to step into every fragile state could create a moral hazard. Irresponsible governments will assume that they will be bailed out by the powerful states, like the US, and the UN, who will always intervene to prevent unnecessary and wide-spread suffering.[1] This in itself makes future failures much more likely, as there is no incentive for governments to tackle corruption, crime or the other issues that push states to the brink of failure.[2] There needs to maintain a culpable fear of failure, separate from the regime change and economic reconstructing often enforced by the UN and IMF on failing states.

[1] Kuperman, A. (2006) ‘Suicidal Rebellions and the Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention’ in T. Crawford and A. Kuperman eds. Gambling on Humanitarian Intervention (London: Routledge).

[2] Rotberg, R. I. (2002, July/August). Failed States in a World of Terror. Retrieved March 16, 2011, from Council on Foreign Relations: http://www.cfr.org/africa/failed-states-world-terror/p4733

Punishment for the actions of irresponsible governments should not be handed down to civilians. The ‘safety net’ purports to protect civilians by preventing the failure of states; it does not guarantee the protection of those governments responsible for the near-failure. Furthermore, the fear of future failures is much more pronounced when states are left to fail, to export their anarchy to neighbouring states and their contraband to the world. As Rotberg therefore claims, ‘preventing states from failing, and resuscitating those that do fail, are…strategic and moral imperatives’.[1]

[1] Rotberg, R. I. (2002, July/August). Failed States in a World of Terror. Retrieved March 16, 2011, from Council on Foreign Relations: http://www.cfr.org/africa/failed-states-world-terror/p4733

The cost of intervention is too high. The United Nations has neither the money nor the support of the international community to undertake speculative missions. Already it fails to meet its targets for troops to provide peacekeeping in countries which request its help. The USA already contributes nearly a quarter of the UN's peacekeeping budget and cannot afford more at a time when it is already stretched by major commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is difficult to see where else the necessary funds could come from. The reconstruction of Afghanistan is expected to cost as much as $15 billion over the next ten years, ‘plus the cost of training a new army and police force’.[1] At a time of financial austerity, American citizens are entitled to ask whether their money is being spent prudently. The lives of intervening soldiers are not pawns, they should not be unnecessarily sent into death-traps like Somalia in 1990.[2]

[1] Rotberg, R. I. (2002, July/August). Failed States in a World of Terror. Retrieved March 16, 2011, from Council on Foreign Relations: http://www.cfr.org/africa/failed-states-world-terror/p4733

[2] Dickinson, E. (2010, December 14). WikiFailed States. Retrieved May 16, 2011, from Foreign Policy: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/12/13/wikifailed

The cost of intervention is lower than the cost of inactivity. Sometimes, as in Afghanistan and the former Yugoslavia, the situation will become so bad that US military intervention is necessary - this is hugely costly compared to funding preventative action through the United Nations. The role of failed states as reservoirs from which refugees, narcotics, terrorism, illegal diamonds, etc. are exported means that the USA already spends many billions of dollars a year in dealing with the mess they create. Finally, there is an opportunity cost of lost trade and investment which applies to the developing world and developed economies alike (e.g. the benefits to the US of trade with oil-rich Angola, Sudan and Congo). 

The current US approach to international development, in which aid, loans or market access are conditional upon good governance, should be maintained and even extended more widely. Such conditions provide incentives for developing countries to put constructive policies in place and reward those who fight corruption. As past failures show all too clearly, there is no point throwing money at chaotic, lawless and corrupt regimes - it will never reach the people anyway. In any case, humanitarian relief is not conditional and the USA continues to respond with compassion to emergencies anywhere in the world. It should also be noted that special measures to support states identified as at risk of failure could in themselves be harmful. Discussion of intervention will scare off investors and help to bring about economic collapse - becoming self-fulfilling prophecies.

Western aid ‘cannot reach its intended recipients because of violence, irreconcilable political divisions, or the absence of an economic infrastructure’.[1] There is a need to change the rules for access to US aid programmes (e.g. the Millennium Challenge Account) and trade preferences (e.g. the African Growth and Opportunity Act), and those of international organisations in which the USA is influential (e.g. the World Bank, G8 moves on debt relief). At present these programmes are structured to reward developing countries with particular government policies (e.g. protection of property rights, focus on education, sustainable budgets, anti-corruption measures, etc). Sensible though this seems, it denies international help to those states whose people need it most - those where government is weak or absent. Funding microcredit schemes, education, health and sanitation programmes in the more stable parts of failing states, and providing meaningful trade access could all provide long-term benefits to the USA.

[1] Ratner, S. R., & Helman, G. B. (2010, June 21). Saving Failed States. Retrieved May 16, 2011, from Foreign Policy: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/saving_failed_states

It is not for either the USA or the UN to impose a government upon individual countries. Doing so would deny the people of the failed state the right to chart their own future and be absent of the authorisation of the UN Charter, which states the organization is not allowed to intervene ‘in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’.[1] Furthermore, if the USA, or any one country, regularly intervened it would create more hostility towards that country, with accusations that it is acting out of a self-interested desire to exploit peoples economically. The personnel of that country could rapidly become a target for attacks. Nor is it desirable to encourage the UN to increase the level of its intervention in the domestic affairs of member states. This might start with weak countries but could rapidly become a habit and encourage the organisation in its ambitions to become a world government.

[1] Ratner, S. R., & Helman, G. B. (2010, June 21). Saving Failed States. Retrieved May 16, 2011, from Foreign Policy: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/saving_failed_states

The questionable foreign policy of previous U.S. administrations should not pre-empt future interventions, either by the United States or other nations genuinely intended to protect civilians in failing states, when mandated by the United Nations. The United Nations has expertise and is widely respected, which will be required considering the international reputation of the USA is now sufficiently damaged that the hostility it generates can undermine the good work it wishes to do. In partnership the USA can provide resources to enable the UN to secure the future stability of many fragile countries, while the UN's involvement can show that these operations are altruistic and pose no imperialist threat. Over time, commitment through the UN to international peace and humanitarian concerns will allow the USA to change the way it is viewed worldwide - an important aspect of the War on Terror. Regarding violations of sovereignty, former U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali dismisses objections: ‘the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty has passed; its theory was never matched by reality’.[1]

[1] Ratner, S. R., & Helman, G. B. (2010, June 21). Saving Failed States. Retrieved May 16, 2011, from Foreign Policy: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/saving_failed_states