This House would have no elections rather than sham elections

This House would have no elections rather than sham elections

Elections are the lifeblood of all democracies; they are where the people have the chance to make their choice of government, often after years where their only real influence has been through protest and the media. Yet not all countries that have elections are really democratic. Elections have become close to universal with many countries that are ‘autocratic’ also having elections just like any democracy. These elections are often a sham in the sense that there is no real chance of there being a change in government as a result of the vote. Thus we might consider there to be another criteria beyond simply holding elections that determines if a country is truly democratic; whether the elections they hold are ‘free and fair’.

In the Declaration on Free and fair Elections the Inter-Parliamentary Council set out numerous conditions for elections qualifying as free and fair including:

“Voting Rights

  • Every adult citizen has the right to vote in elections, on a non-discriminatory basis.
  • No eligible citizen shall be denied the right to vote or disqualified from registration as a voter
  • Every voter is entitled to exercise his or her right equally with others and to have his or her vote accorded equivalent weight to that of others.

Party Rights

  • Everyone has the right to take part in the government of their country and shall have an equal opportunity to become a candidate for election
  • Everyone individually and together with others has the right:
    • To express political opinions without interference;
    • To seek, receive and impart information and to make an informed choice;
    • To move freely within the country in order to campaign for election;
    • To campaign on an equal basis with other political parties, including the party forming the existing government.

Responsibilities of States… to guarantee the rights and institutional framework for periodic and genuine, free and fair elections”[1]

There are many ways in which there may be elections within an autocratic setting. In a few cases the ‘democratic element’ is purely for show; Qatar is from this year (2013) holding elections (currently suspended due to a handover of power) for its advisory council but as an advisory body it is clear the real power will remain with the Emir.[2] It is much more usual that the ruling party simply ensures that the opposition can never get enough seats to form a majority. This may be done in several different ways. In Burma (Myanmar) for example the National League for Democracy faces a parliament where many of the seats are not contested in elections, in the House of Representatives the ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party has 259 seats, of which 110 were directly appointed.[3] The main opposition the National League for Democracy won 40 out of the 45 seats it contested in byelections showing that it would likely win if there were an election without restrictions.[4] Alternatively as in Zimbabwe there may be intimidation and violence in the elections themselves.[5] Or the results may be determined in advance through ballot stuffing, vote rigging, and bussing in supporters so they vote several times as occurs in Russia.[6] The methods may be different but the outcome is the same; certain victory for the ruling party.

[1] I have only taken a selection of the most important here and clearly most of the rest is very important too. Inter-Parliamentary Union, ‘Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair Elections’ Unanimously adopted by the Inter-Parliamentary Council at its 154th session (Paris, 26 March 1994), http://www.ipu.org/cnl-e/154-free.htm

[2] Khatri, Shabin, ‘Emir: Qatar to hold first legislative elections in 2013’, Doha News, 2012, http://dohanews.co/post/12195657837/emir-qatar-to-hold-first-legislative-elections-in-2013

[4] Golluoglu, Esmer, ‘Aung San Suu Kyi hails ‘new era’ for Burma after landslide victory’, The Guardian, 2 April 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/02/aung-san-suu-kyi-new-era-burma

[5] ‘Zimbabwe: No Justice for Rampant Killings, Torture’, Human Rights Watch, 8 March 2011, http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/08/zimbabwe-no-justice-rampant-killings-torture

[6] International Election Observation Russian Federation, Presidential Election – 4 March 2012, ‘Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions’, 5 March 2012, http://www.osce.org/odihr/88667

 

Open all points
Points-for

Points For

POINT

Holding sham elections is fundamentally dishonest as it is asking the people to choose a government and then ignoring their choice. Not holding elections is at least honestly telling the people that they get no say in who is in power. Holding a sham election inevitably means having to lie to the people somewhere along the line; whether it is in preventing people registering, or voting, or in manipulating the results. The people usually know the result is a sham or at least are suspicious – in the latest Zimbabwean election the headlines in the newspapers included “ZANU-PF gloats over victory”.[1]

Without a sham election the government can at least be honest with their people so enabling a level of trust or even a kind of contract between the two – the government and the people each lets the other get on with it. Thus for example in China trust in government in 2012 was 76% against the world average of 51%.[2]

[1] Chinaka, Cris, ‘Africa and West at odds over disputed Zimbabwe election’, Reuters, 4 August 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/04/us-zimbabwe-election-idUSBRE97205J20130804

[2] Sedghi, Ami, and Rogers, Simon, ‘Do we trust our government? See how your country compares’, TheGuardian.com, 24 January 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2012/jan/24/trust-in-government-country-edelman

COUNTERPOINT

Being honest about depriving the people of their right to choose the government is not beneficial. An unwillingness to hold elections does not build any trust even when the government has proved itself capable at governing because an unwillingness to hold elections fundamentally shows distrust by government of the people. If the government trusted the people in return it would trust them to elect a competent government and representatives.

POINT

It is hard to see what the benefit of an election that can change nothing is, but there are certainly all the costs associated with a normal election. Elections can be costly in financial terms, the United States elections cost several billion dollars but even much smaller and less extravagant elections need financing. Zimbabwe’s elections in 2013 forced the government to ask its neighbours for $85 million to carry out the polls, for a nation that is essentially bankrupt this is a lot of money.[1]

Another cost is uncertainty. In fully democratic elections the uncertainty is with what the policies will be when the government changes. With sham elections the uncertainty is whether the elections will be a focus for violence. Sometimes this is during campaigning itself as with Zimbabwe in 2008 where up to 200 people were killed.[2] Otherwise violence occurs when there is a perception that an election has been stolen so the Green Movement in Iran took to the streets and was met with a violent crackdown in 2009.[3]

[1] VOA News, ‘Zimbabwe Seeks Help to Cover Election Costs’, Voice of America, 10 July 2013, http://www.voanews.com/content/zimbabwe-seeks-help-to-cover-election-costs/1699194.html

[2] ‘Zimbabwe: No Justice for Rampant Killings, Torture’, Human Rights Watch, 8 March 2011, http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/08/zimbabwe-no-justice-rampant-killings-torture

[3] AFP, ‘Iran opposition says 72 killed in vote protests’, Google, 3 September 2009, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iaWYtGitSBRRBJkDanoZ1gwP4DBA

COUNTERPOINT

While elections can create a focal point for protest and violence this may actually make things more predictable not less. Countries without elections are not without opposition groups and protests, all this means is that the spark for the protests is going to be different; police beating someone up, a particularly extravagant piece of corruption, an attempted cover up, the disappearance of an opposition activist. Not having elections simply prevents the divisions in society from being highly visible; it does not get rid of the divisions, indeed it gets rid of one of the safety valves.

POINT

Democracy and elections are about popularity but popular decisions are not always the right ones. Even mature democracies have sometimes seen their government’s make use of the levers of government to boost their electoral chances; for example Margaret Thatcher’s government stoked the economy in the Lawson boom in 1987 which just happened to be an election year.[1] Governments without elections can engage in long term planning and make unpopular decisions without fear of the consequences. Thus for example Saudi Arabia is willing to pump less oil (and so get less money in the short term at least) in order to create stability in the oil market by having enough excess capacity to prevent price spikes.

[1] Congdon, Tim, Keynes, the Keynesians and Monetarism, 2007, p.73 http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=7DiRU-TROV0C

COUNTERPOINT

There is little evidence that countries without elections are more willing to take difficult decisions, or able to take wise decisions, than those that face some form of election. Many petro states have failed to diversify their economies despite having the money to do so – often investing in wild ideas such as Saudi Arabia investing $84 billion in agriculture in the desert from 1985-2000.[1]  

[1] Alterman, Jon B., ‘Water and National Strength in Saudi Arabia’, Center for Strategic & International Studies, March 2011, http://csis.org/files/publication/110405_Water%20and%20national%20strength%20in%20Saudi%20Arabia.pdf

POINT

Not having any elections – or only elections for a powerless advisory parliament – may actually have a benefit in putting responsibility squarely on the shoulders of the rulers. Only a country that is comparatively well governed, or successful, can manage without a democratic safety valve.  It is notable that the remaining absolute monarchies or those where the King rules as well as reigns are mostly very wealthy petro states. Several of the remaining communist regimes, China and Vietnam, rely on rapid economic growth to cement their legitimacy combined with meritocracy in their selection of leaders. In both cases there is an incentive for good governance by those in power as they are in for the long term. The leaders know they are not going to be elected out of office so have the motivation to reduce corruption and create long term growth through investment in infrastructure because this will benefit them in the future.[1]

[1] Feldman, Noah, ‘Feldman examines corruption and political legitimacy in China’, Harvard Law School, 11 March 2013, http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2013/03/11_feldman-corruption-political-legitimacy-china.html

COUNTERPOINT

The problem with good governance and economic success as the basis of legitimacy is that a crisis of legitimacy is created whenever growth falters or corruption comes to light. Legitimacy based upon performance also has the problem that if a certain performance becomes normal then the benchmarks must be higher and higher over time to continue to provide legitimacy.[1] Having legitimacy at least in part based on periodic elections, even if these are somehow rigged, is more sustainable as the legitimacy is renewed whenever there is a new election or change in government. This has the added benefit that as fairer elections are seen as more legitimate there is a greater chance that sham elections will become real elections to ensure the regime has more legitimacy even at the risk of it being voted out -  as shown recently by Burma being willing to take the democratic route.

[1] Lam, Jon-Jon, ‘Performance Legitimacy: an Unstable Model for Sustaining Power’, The Politic, 10 January 2013, http://thepolitic.org/performance-legitimacy-an-unstable-model-for-sustaining-power/

Points-against

Points Against

POINT

Holding sham elections is fundamentally dishonest as it is asking the people to choose a government and then ignoring their choice. Not holding elections is at least honestly telling the people that they get no say in who is in power. Holding a sham election inevitably means having to lie to the people somewhere along the line; whether it is in preventing people registering, or voting, or in manipulating the results. The people usually know the result is a sham or at least are suspicious – in the latest Zimbabwean election the headlines in the newspapers included “ZANU-PF gloats over victory”.[1]

Without a sham election the government can at least be honest with their people so enabling a level of trust or even a kind of contract between the two – the government and the people each lets the other get on with it. Thus for example in China trust in government in 2012 was 76% against the world average of 51%.[2]

[1] Chinaka, Cris, ‘Africa and West at odds over disputed Zimbabwe election’, Reuters, 4 August 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/04/us-zimbabwe-election-idUSBRE97205J20130804

[2] Sedghi, Ami, and Rogers, Simon, ‘Do we trust our government? See how your country compares’, TheGuardian.com, 24 January 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2012/jan/24/trust-in-government-country-edelman

COUNTERPOINT

Being honest about depriving the people of their right to choose the government is not beneficial. An unwillingness to hold elections does not build any trust even when the government has proved itself capable at governing because an unwillingness to hold elections fundamentally shows distrust by government of the people. If the government trusted the people in return it would trust them to elect a competent government and representatives.

POINT

It is hard to see what the benefit of an election that can change nothing is, but there are certainly all the costs associated with a normal election. Elections can be costly in financial terms, the United States elections cost several billion dollars but even much smaller and less extravagant elections need financing. Zimbabwe’s elections in 2013 forced the government to ask its neighbours for $85 million to carry out the polls, for a nation that is essentially bankrupt this is a lot of money.[1]

Another cost is uncertainty. In fully democratic elections the uncertainty is with what the policies will be when the government changes. With sham elections the uncertainty is whether the elections will be a focus for violence. Sometimes this is during campaigning itself as with Zimbabwe in 2008 where up to 200 people were killed.[2] Otherwise violence occurs when there is a perception that an election has been stolen so the Green Movement in Iran took to the streets and was met with a violent crackdown in 2009.[3]

[1] VOA News, ‘Zimbabwe Seeks Help to Cover Election Costs’, Voice of America, 10 July 2013, http://www.voanews.com/content/zimbabwe-seeks-help-to-cover-election-costs/1699194.html

[2] ‘Zimbabwe: No Justice for Rampant Killings, Torture’, Human Rights Watch, 8 March 2011, http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/08/zimbabwe-no-justice-rampant-killings-torture

[3] AFP, ‘Iran opposition says 72 killed in vote protests’, Google, 3 September 2009, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iaWYtGitSBRRBJkDanoZ1gwP4DBA

COUNTERPOINT

While elections can create a focal point for protest and violence this may actually make things more predictable not less. Countries without elections are not without opposition groups and protests, all this means is that the spark for the protests is going to be different; police beating someone up, a particularly extravagant piece of corruption, an attempted cover up, the disappearance of an opposition activist. Not having elections simply prevents the divisions in society from being highly visible; it does not get rid of the divisions, indeed it gets rid of one of the safety valves.

POINT

Democracy and elections are about popularity but popular decisions are not always the right ones. Even mature democracies have sometimes seen their government’s make use of the levers of government to boost their electoral chances; for example Margaret Thatcher’s government stoked the economy in the Lawson boom in 1987 which just happened to be an election year.[1] Governments without elections can engage in long term planning and make unpopular decisions without fear of the consequences. Thus for example Saudi Arabia is willing to pump less oil (and so get less money in the short term at least) in order to create stability in the oil market by having enough excess capacity to prevent price spikes.

[1] Congdon, Tim, Keynes, the Keynesians and Monetarism, 2007, p.73 http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=7DiRU-TROV0C

COUNTERPOINT

There is little evidence that countries without elections are more willing to take difficult decisions, or able to take wise decisions, than those that face some form of election. Many petro states have failed to diversify their economies despite having the money to do so – often investing in wild ideas such as Saudi Arabia investing $84 billion in agriculture in the desert from 1985-2000.[1]  

[1] Alterman, Jon B., ‘Water and National Strength in Saudi Arabia’, Center for Strategic & International Studies, March 2011, http://csis.org/files/publication/110405_Water%20and%20national%20strength%20in%20Saudi%20Arabia.pdf

POINT

Not having any elections – or only elections for a powerless advisory parliament – may actually have a benefit in putting responsibility squarely on the shoulders of the rulers. Only a country that is comparatively well governed, or successful, can manage without a democratic safety valve.  It is notable that the remaining absolute monarchies or those where the King rules as well as reigns are mostly very wealthy petro states. Several of the remaining communist regimes, China and Vietnam, rely on rapid economic growth to cement their legitimacy combined with meritocracy in their selection of leaders. In both cases there is an incentive for good governance by those in power as they are in for the long term. The leaders know they are not going to be elected out of office so have the motivation to reduce corruption and create long term growth through investment in infrastructure because this will benefit them in the future.[1]

[1] Feldman, Noah, ‘Feldman examines corruption and political legitimacy in China’, Harvard Law School, 11 March 2013, http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2013/03/11_feldman-corruption-political-legitimacy-china.html

COUNTERPOINT

The problem with good governance and economic success as the basis of legitimacy is that a crisis of legitimacy is created whenever growth falters or corruption comes to light. Legitimacy based upon performance also has the problem that if a certain performance becomes normal then the benchmarks must be higher and higher over time to continue to provide legitimacy.[1] Having legitimacy at least in part based on periodic elections, even if these are somehow rigged, is more sustainable as the legitimacy is renewed whenever there is a new election or change in government. This has the added benefit that as fairer elections are seen as more legitimate there is a greater chance that sham elections will become real elections to ensure the regime has more legitimacy even at the risk of it being voted out -  as shown recently by Burma being willing to take the democratic route.

[1] Lam, Jon-Jon, ‘Performance Legitimacy: an Unstable Model for Sustaining Power’, The Politic, 10 January 2013, http://thepolitic.org/performance-legitimacy-an-unstable-model-for-sustaining-power/

POINT

The acceptance by most autocrats that there need to be elections shows the idea that legitimacy derives from the people is generally accepted.  Meaning that these states are already part way to having a genuine democracy. Having regular elections, even if the outcome is preordained, means that the electorate becomes used to voting and the idea of voting to make their voice heard. In such circumstances eventually they are going to want their vote to really count. If there is a creeping process of reform eventually this will result in free and fair elections.

Having any kind of elections means that there are people who are recognised as an opposition. This means that there is a viable alternative to the ruling party which can be turned to in a crisis, or can take on the leadership role when the regime is finally toppled. For example in Philippines the opposition was able to create a united opposition party in 1984 and coalesce around Corazon Aquino in the snap elections of 1985.[1] This meant that Aquino was in a position to swiftly set up a government following the people power revolution and flight of Marcos.[2]

[1] Kline, William E., ‘The Fall of Marcos: A Problem in U.S. Foreign Policymaking’, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1992, http://www.princeton.edu/~bsimpson/Hist%20725%20Summer%202006/Philippines-the%20fall%20of%20Marcos.pdf Pp.4, 10

[2] Reaves, Joseph A., ‘Marcos Flees, Aquino Rules’, Chicago Tribune, 26 February 1986, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1986-02-26/news/8601140956_1_marcos-final-destination-marcos-flight-ferdinand-e-marcos

COUNTERPOINT

States can have elections that have almost no chance of changing the government for decades. These elections can actually set back the cause for genuine democracy. There are several reasons for this. First having elections, or marginally expanding the number of parties or franchise, so providing liberal political reform can be used to keep the opposition on side through constantly dangling the prospect of further reform. Thus Sadat in 1977 allowed elections in response to discontent over peace overtures to Israel and in 1984 following his assassination Mubarak made these elections multiparty.[1]

Secondly having elections can be used to disrupt the opposition as coalitions of disparate elements are difficult to create so it will likely lead to internal squabbling and victory for the ruling party. Encouraging such squabbling will then prevent there being a single recognised opposition party or figure than can be seen as able to take over. When there is no clear path after a revolution the people are going to be much more likely to stick with the dictator they know.

[1] Lust, Ellen, ‘The Multiple Meanings of Elections In Non-Democratic Regimes: Breakdown, Response and Outcome in the Arab Uprisings’, Yale University, p.5. http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/ECM_PRO_074099.pdf

POINT

Elections almost anywhere in the world mean politicians getting out and campaigning. Regardless of the legitimacy of the final election the leadership of the country will be going out and meeting voters. In many of these events individuals won’t be able to express their views but there are also likely to be protests and meetings where individuals can get their views across. This provides an opportunity for the leader to stay in touch with the people – often a problem with dictators who have been in power too long.  

Dictators will want to, and often believe that they are likely to win even without resort to fraud, as Marcos did in 1985.[1] They are then are much more likely to consider the views of the electorate to still be relevant if there are elections than if there are not. Thus for example Mugabe in the most recent elections made a bid for, and won, the youth vote by promising a direct stake in the economy,[2] so responding to their desire for jobs.[3]

[1] Kline, William E., ‘The Fall of Marcos: A Problem in U.S. Foreign Policymaking’, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1992, http://www.princeton.edu/~bsimpson/Hist%20725%20Summer%202006/Philippines-the%20fall%20of%20Marcos.pdf p. 10

[2] Agyemang, Roy, ‘Why a Robert Mugabe victory would be good for Zimbabwe’, theguardian.com, 2 August 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/02/robert-mugabe-zimbabwe-victory-good

[3] AFP, ‘Youth, rural voters may hold key to Zimbabwe election’, Fox News, 27 July 2013, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/07/27/youth-rural-voters-may-hold-key-to-zimbabwe-election/

COUNTERPOINT

There is little difference between a stage managed election and stage managed events without elections. In either case the chances of the autocrat meeting real people who present opinions that are not on the party message are slim. 

POINT

In an election the people show what their policy preferences will be. Even if the government is engaging in vote rigging or voter intimidation they will still know how the people voted or wanted to vote (if they stuffed the ballot they will know how many extra votes they added) so will have some guidance as to the policies that the people wish implemented. If there are multiple different parties competing in the elections then it will be possible to tell which party platforms are the most popular and so which to take ideas from.

If there are elections then there are opposition parties and independent MPs who are given much more space than they would be without elections. Being MPs gives the opposition some status and gives them a controlled setting in which to criticise the government. This provides the opposition with the chance to channel the voice of the people and encourage change from the governing party.  

COUNTERPOINT

If the government were genuinely interested in what the people want then there would be far more reliable ways than through an election. Polling could be done on each individual policy providing a much finer granularity of response to tell policymakers what they really want. All that a government will be able to tell from a sham election is that the people don’t like the government. 

POINT

For an autocracy the election for the top job needs to be predetermined, but the other elections do not. This means that elections for the legislature can still be competitive. The seats do have some influence, provide patronage, and have status attached so there are plenty of people who want to contest them. In the Arab world before the Arab spring there was a less than 25% incumbency rate for legislatures.[1] Having elections that determine control in local areas or allow opposition some control in parliament is far preferable to the alternative where the government appoints everyone. Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy in Burma have for example gained entry into Parliament and have despite being a minority had an impact. This has particularly been the case internationally. They have helped liberalise the new Foreign Investment Law and have encouraged more liberalised freedom of the press and association.[2]

[1] Lust, Ellen, ‘The Multiple Meanings of Elections In Non-Democratic Regimes: Breakdown, Response and Outcome in the Arab Uprisings’, Yale University, p.7. http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/ECM_PRO_074099.pdf

[2] Turnell, Sean, ‘Myanmar has made a good start to economic reform’, East Asia Forum, 27 March 2013, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/03/27/myanmar-has-made-a-good-start-to-economic-reform/

COUNTERPOINT

This is simply co-opting the opposition in an attempt to allow the regime to survive longer than it would otherwise done. As Morgan Tsvangirai of the Movement for Democratic Change in Zimbabwe has found out even being in a coalition government with a dictator does not give you the power to change the outcome over the long term. He has called his election defeat “coup by ballot” reflecting the vote rigging that he believes occurred to keep President Mugabe in power.[1] The Movement may have had a significant impact during its time in government economically but it totally failed to prise the real power out of the hands of Zanu PF.

[1] Smith, David, ‘Morgan Tsvangirai loses hope following election defeat’, The Guardian, 4 August 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/04/morgan-tsvangirai-mugabe-election-uprising

Bibliography

AFP, ‘Iran opposition says 72 killed in vote protests’, Google, 3 September 2009, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iaWYtGitSBRRBJkDanoZ1gwP4DBA

AFP, ‘Youth, rural voters may hold key to Zimbabwe election’, Fox News, 27 July 2013, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/07/27/youth-rural-voters-may-hold-key-to-zimbabwe-election/

Agyemang, Roy, ‘Why a Robert Mugabe victory would be good for Zimbabwe’, theguardian.com, 2 August 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/02/robert-mugabe-zimbabwe-victory-good

Alterman, Jon B., ‘Water and National Strength in Saudi Arabia’, Center for Strategic & International Studies, March 2011, http://csis.org/files/publication/110405_Water%20and%20national%20strength%20in%20Saudi%20Arabia.pdf

Chinaka, Cris, ‘Africa and West at odds over disputed Zimbabwe election’, Reuters, 4 August 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/04/us-zimbabwe-election-idUSBRE97205J20130804

Congdon, Tim, Keynes, the Keynesians and Monetarism, 2007, http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=7DiRU-TROV0C

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Golluoglu, Esmer, ‘Aung San Suu Kyi hails ‘new era’ for Burma after landslide victory’, The Guardian, 2 April 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/02/aung-san-suu-kyi-new-era-burma

‘Zimbabwe: No Justice for Rampant Killings, Torture’, Human Rights Watch, 8 March 2011, http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/08/zimbabwe-no-justice-rampant-killings-torture

International Election Observation Russian Federation, Presidential Election – 4 March 2012, ‘Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions’, 5 March 2012, http://www.osce.org/odihr/88667

Inter-Parliamentary Union, ‘Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair Elections’ Unanimously adopted by the Inter-Parliamentary Council at its 154th session (Paris, 26 March 1994), http://www.ipu.org/cnl-e/154-free.htm

Khatri, Shabin, ‘Emir: Qatar to hold first legislative elections in 2013’, Doha News, 2012, http://dohanews.co/post/12195657837/emir-qatar-to-hold-first-legislative-elections-in-2013

Kline, William E., ‘The Fall of Marcos: A Problem in U.S. Foreign Policymaking’, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1992, http://www.princeton.edu/~bsimpson/Hist%20725%20Summer%202006/Philippines-the%20fall%20of%20Marcos.pdf

Lam, Jon-Jon, ‘Performance Legitimacy: an Unstable Model for Sustaining Power’, The Politic, 10 January 2013, http://thepolitic.org/performance-legitimacy-an-unstable-model-for-sustaining-power/

Lust, Ellen, ‘The Multiple Meanings of Elections In Non-Democratic Regimes: Breakdown, Response and Outcome in the Arab Uprisings’, Yale University, http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/ECM_PRO_074099.pdf

Reaves, Joseph A., ‘Marcos Flees, Aquino Rules’, Chicago Tribune, 26 February 1986, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1986-02-26/news/8601140956_1_marcos-final-destination-marcos-flight-ferdinand-e-marcos

Sedghi, Ami, and Rogers, Simon, ‘Do we trust our government? See how your country compares’, TheGuardian.com, 24 January 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2012/jan/24/trust-in-government-country-edelman

Smith, David, ‘Morgan Tsvangirai loses hope following election defeat’, The Guardian, 4 August 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/04/morgan-tsvangirai-mugabe-election-uprising

‘Burma’, The World Factbook, 10 July 2013, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html

Turnell, Sean, ‘Myanmar has made a good start to economic reform’, East Asia Forum, 27 March 2013, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/03/27/myanmar-has-made-a-good-start-to-economic-reform/

VOA News, ‘Zimbabwe Seeks Help to Cover Election Costs’, Voice of America, 10 July 2013, http://www.voanews.com/content/zimbabwe-seeks-help-to-cover-election-costs/1699194.html

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