This House would extend NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine

Many people in both Ukraine and Georgia wish to join NATO, and that is the best reason for welcoming them into the alliance. NATO is an alliance of democratic states and should respond positively to the request of a sovereign nation. In Georgia a non-binding referendum on whether to join NATO showed 77% of voters in favor of joining.[1] Polls show that some 50% of Ukrainians in 2002 said that would support Ukraine’s membership in NATO if a referendum on this issue were held.[2]

Both states are at risk of being pushed around by Russia, partly because their desire to adopt “western” democratic values is at odds with the more autocratic values of Russia’s leadership. They also fear that Russia has designs on their territory and sovereignty, knowing that many in the Russian elite have never fully accepted the collapse of the old Soviet Union. These fears have been realised with Russian forces in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Crimea. Joining NATO offers Georgia and Ukraine the protection of a proven alliance and a clear route to European Union membership that has already been travelled by other former Soviet states. Ukraine and Georgia as European states have a right to join NATO if they would satisfy all criteria for NATO membership.[3]

[1] NATO, ‘Backgrounder, Deepening relations with Georgia’, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2011, p.15, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20111109_backgrounder_nato_georgia-eng.pdf

[2]Katchanovski, Ivan, ‘The Orange Evolution? The “Orange Revolution” and Political Changes in Ukraine.” Post-Soviet Affairs, 24 (4), 2008, p. 376.

[3] Katchanovski, Ivan, ‘Puzzles of EU and NATO Accession of Post-Communist Countries.’ Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 12 (3), 2011, p 309.

It is far from the settled will of the Georgian and Ukrainian peoples that they wish to join NATO. Georgia’s President Saakashvili did wish to join, but after his disastrous attempt to regain control of South Ossetia was unable to bring his country with him. Saakashvilli was defeated in parliamentary elections and ran up against his term limit at the end of 2013[1] opening the way towards better relations with Russia. Public opposition to NATO membership in Ukraine since the US-led war in Iraq 2003 outweighed support for joining the alliance.[2] Ukraine is split over NATO membership, with most of the Russian-speaking East of the country firmly opposed to the idea, and only about 30% support overall.[3] The crisis of Ukraine’s pro-western coalition over how to respond to the conflict in Georgia showed how divisive the question is; the President firmly supported Georgia while the PM kept quiet.[4] In any case, NATO membership should not automatically be extended to every nation which wishes it, but only offered when the current members of the alliance judge it to be in their strategic interest to do so.

[1] Traub, James, ‘The Georgia Syndrome’, ForeignPolicy, 13 August 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/08/13/the_georgia_syndrome

[2] Katchanovski, Ivan, ‘The Orange Evolution? The “Orange Revolution” and Political Changes in Ukraine.” Post-Soviet Affairs, 24 (4), 2008, p. 376.

[3] Atwell, Kyle, ‘Two Different Paths to NATO: Georgia and Ukraine’, Atlantic Review, 7 November 2008, http://atlanticreview.org/archives/1206-Two-Different-Paths-to-NATO-Georgia-and-Ukraine.html

[4] Arel, Dominique, ‘Ukraine Since the War in Georgia’, Survival, Vol.50, No.6, pp.15-25, http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/Arel%20Survival%20Final.pdf, p.16 

[4] Arel, Dominique, ‘Ukraine Since the War in Georgia’, Survival, Vol.50, No.6, pp.15-25, http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/Arel%20Survival%20Final.pdf, p.16 

Expansion to include Georgia and Ukraine is in the interests of NATO. After more than a decade without a clear role, the alliance now once again stands for the principle of solidarity between western liberal democracies. The hopes of the 1990s for a new world order in which a democratic and liberalising Russia would see partnership with NATO and other western clubs as strongly in its own interest died during the Presidency of Vladimir Putin. Russia once again poses a threat to Europe and needs to be contained or at least shown that NATO has not forgotten about it. This is shown by President Putin’s continuing lashing out at foreign countries for funding NGOs and plans to boost defense spending.[1] Extending NATO up to Russia’s southern border will signal the West’s strength and determination and force Russia to respect the alliance and its members.

[1] Cullison, Alan, ‘Putin Warms West on Interference’, The Wall Street Journal, 28 November 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204753404577064260032325868.html?mod=googlenews_wsj

Further expansion is not in NATO’s interests. The alliance is based on the principle that the security of one is the security of all, so that all members will go to war if any one member is attacked. This is a very serious commitment and should not lightly be extended to new nations. The irresponsible manner in which Georgia provoked a conflict with Russia, ignoring US warnings, shows the danger of being sucked into quarrels in which most NATO members have no strategic interest. It was obvious from this conflict that Georgia could not defend itself so the burden would fall on NATO.[1] Like the breakaway regions of Georgia, Ukraine also contains many Russian-speakers who look to Moscow for protection, especially in the Crimea which hosts Russia’s Black Sea fleet.[2] If Ukraine had been a member of NATO when Russia moved troops into Crimea then NATO would be a dangerous confrontation with Russia.

[1] Tayler, Jeffrey, ‘Russia: Back to the Future’, the Atlantic, September 2008, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/09/russia-back-to-the-future/7029/

[2] Varettoni, William, ‘Crimea’s Overlooked Instability’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol.34, No.3, Summer 2011, pp.87-99, https://csis.org/files/publication/twq11summervarettoni.pdf, p.89 

There is a strong precedent for letting Ukraine and Georgia join NATO. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are also former Soviet states, and Russia objected to their entry into NATO quite as much as it objects today about its Black Sea neighbours.[1] Yet Russia was not allowed a veto over their futures, and it soon got over its annoyance, continuing to participate in joint forums with NATO and to cooperate with the USA over Afghanistan, North Korea and nuclear non-proliferation. So NATO is already committed to the defence of states in Russia’s near-abroad, and should not fear further expansion.

[1] Black, Stephen J., ‘NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States: What Can the Great Powers Do’, Strategic Studies Institute, November 1997, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=146

In retrospect, the decision to welcome the former Soviet states in the Baltic into NATO appears foolish. They continue to have a prickly relationship with Russia, which has some legitimate concerns about the treatment of large Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia, and about the siting of US nuclear defences. Their entry into NATO was forced upon Russia, which naturally saw it as an aggressive move designed to humiliate it, and marked the point when its pro-western policy shifted to a more nationalist and confrontational approach.[1] It also weakened the unity of NATO as there are quite legitimate doubts as to whether all the alliance’s members would really go to war with Russia over the integrity of, say, Estonia. Given this history, it would be madness to compound the problem by extending NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine.

[1] Fraser, Malcolm, ‘Ukraine: there’s no way out unless the west understands its past mistakes’, theguardian.com, 3 March 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/03/ukraine-theres-no-way-out-unless-the-west-understands-its-past-mistakes

Many people in both Ukraine and Georgia wish to join NATO, and that is the best reason for welcoming them into the alliance. NATO is an alliance of democratic states and should respond positively to the request of a sovereign nation. In Georgia a non-binding referendum on whether to join NATO showed 77% of voters in favor of joining.[1] Polls show that some 50% of Ukrainians in 2002 said that would support Ukraine’s membership in NATO if a referendum on this issue were held.[2]

Both states are at risk of being pushed around by Russia, partly because their desire to adopt “western” democratic values is at odds with the more autocratic values of Russia’s leadership. They also fear that Russia has designs on their territory and sovereignty, knowing that many in the Russian elite have never fully accepted the collapse of the old Soviet Union. These fears have been realised with Russian forces in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Crimea. Joining NATO offers Georgia and Ukraine the protection of a proven alliance and a clear route to European Union membership that has already been travelled by other former Soviet states. Ukraine and Georgia as European states have a right to join NATO if they would satisfy all criteria for NATO membership.[3]

[1] NATO, ‘Backgrounder, Deepening relations with Georgia’, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2011, p.15, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20111109_backgrounder_nato_georgia-eng.pdf

[2]Katchanovski, Ivan, ‘The Orange Evolution? The “Orange Revolution” and Political Changes in Ukraine.” Post-Soviet Affairs, 24 (4), 2008, p. 376.

[3] Katchanovski, Ivan, ‘Puzzles of EU and NATO Accession of Post-Communist Countries.’ Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 12 (3), 2011, p 309.

It is far from the settled will of the Georgian and Ukrainian peoples that they wish to join NATO. Georgia’s President Saakashvili did wish to join, but after his disastrous attempt to regain control of South Ossetia was unable to bring his country with him. Saakashvilli was defeated in parliamentary elections and ran up against his term limit at the end of 2013[1] opening the way towards better relations with Russia. Public opposition to NATO membership in Ukraine since the US-led war in Iraq 2003 outweighed support for joining the alliance.[2] Ukraine is split over NATO membership, with most of the Russian-speaking East of the country firmly opposed to the idea, and only about 30% support overall.[3] The crisis of Ukraine’s pro-western coalition over how to respond to the conflict in Georgia showed how divisive the question is; the President firmly supported Georgia while the PM kept quiet.[4] In any case, NATO membership should not automatically be extended to every nation which wishes it, but only offered when the current members of the alliance judge it to be in their strategic interest to do so.

[1] Traub, James, ‘The Georgia Syndrome’, ForeignPolicy, 13 August 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/08/13/the_georgia_syndrome

[2] Katchanovski, Ivan, ‘The Orange Evolution? The “Orange Revolution” and Political Changes in Ukraine.” Post-Soviet Affairs, 24 (4), 2008, p. 376.

[3] Atwell, Kyle, ‘Two Different Paths to NATO: Georgia and Ukraine’, Atlantic Review, 7 November 2008, http://atlanticreview.org/archives/1206-Two-Different-Paths-to-NATO-Georgia-and-Ukraine.html

[4] Arel, Dominique, ‘Ukraine Since the War in Georgia’, Survival, Vol.50, No.6, pp.15-25, http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/Arel%20Survival%20Final.pdf, p.16 

[4] Arel, Dominique, ‘Ukraine Since the War in Georgia’, Survival, Vol.50, No.6, pp.15-25, http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/Arel%20Survival%20Final.pdf, p.16 

Expansion to include Georgia and Ukraine is in the interests of NATO. After more than a decade without a clear role, the alliance now once again stands for the principle of solidarity between western liberal democracies. The hopes of the 1990s for a new world order in which a democratic and liberalising Russia would see partnership with NATO and other western clubs as strongly in its own interest died during the Presidency of Vladimir Putin. Russia once again poses a threat to Europe and needs to be contained or at least shown that NATO has not forgotten about it. This is shown by President Putin’s continuing lashing out at foreign countries for funding NGOs and plans to boost defense spending.[1] Extending NATO up to Russia’s southern border will signal the West’s strength and determination and force Russia to respect the alliance and its members.

[1] Cullison, Alan, ‘Putin Warms West on Interference’, The Wall Street Journal, 28 November 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204753404577064260032325868.html?mod=googlenews_wsj

Further expansion is not in NATO’s interests. The alliance is based on the principle that the security of one is the security of all, so that all members will go to war if any one member is attacked. This is a very serious commitment and should not lightly be extended to new nations. The irresponsible manner in which Georgia provoked a conflict with Russia, ignoring US warnings, shows the danger of being sucked into quarrels in which most NATO members have no strategic interest. It was obvious from this conflict that Georgia could not defend itself so the burden would fall on NATO.[1] Like the breakaway regions of Georgia, Ukraine also contains many Russian-speakers who look to Moscow for protection, especially in the Crimea which hosts Russia’s Black Sea fleet.[2] If Ukraine had been a member of NATO when Russia moved troops into Crimea then NATO would be a dangerous confrontation with Russia.

[1] Tayler, Jeffrey, ‘Russia: Back to the Future’, the Atlantic, September 2008, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/09/russia-back-to-the-future/7029/

[2] Varettoni, William, ‘Crimea’s Overlooked Instability’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol.34, No.3, Summer 2011, pp.87-99, https://csis.org/files/publication/twq11summervarettoni.pdf, p.89 

There is a strong precedent for letting Ukraine and Georgia join NATO. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are also former Soviet states, and Russia objected to their entry into NATO quite as much as it objects today about its Black Sea neighbours.[1] Yet Russia was not allowed a veto over their futures, and it soon got over its annoyance, continuing to participate in joint forums with NATO and to cooperate with the USA over Afghanistan, North Korea and nuclear non-proliferation. So NATO is already committed to the defence of states in Russia’s near-abroad, and should not fear further expansion.

[1] Black, Stephen J., ‘NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States: What Can the Great Powers Do’, Strategic Studies Institute, November 1997, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=146

In retrospect, the decision to welcome the former Soviet states in the Baltic into NATO appears foolish. They continue to have a prickly relationship with Russia, which has some legitimate concerns about the treatment of large Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia, and about the siting of US nuclear defences. Their entry into NATO was forced upon Russia, which naturally saw it as an aggressive move designed to humiliate it, and marked the point when its pro-western policy shifted to a more nationalist and confrontational approach.[1] It also weakened the unity of NATO as there are quite legitimate doubts as to whether all the alliance’s members would really go to war with Russia over the integrity of, say, Estonia. Given this history, it would be madness to compound the problem by extending NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine.

[1] Fraser, Malcolm, ‘Ukraine: there’s no way out unless the west understands its past mistakes’, theguardian.com, 3 March 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/03/ukraine-theres-no-way-out-unless-the-west-understands-its-past-mistakes

Western countries should seek to compromise with Russia, as they need its cooperation in a whole range of areas. Global efforts against terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change, energy security and organised crime will all fail without Russian participation. Russia’s veto power on the United Nations Security Council also means that alienating Moscow could frustrate international efforts to bring security and freedom to states such as Sudan, Myanmar, Zimbabwe and Iraq. In particular the west needs Russian help in Syria; the UNSC has only been able to get humanitarian resolutions on the country when Russia has been cooperative.[1] And NATO depends on Russian goodwill to allow supplies into Afghanistan via the safer northern route,[2] cooperation that is likely to be withdrawn if Georgia and Ukraine remain candidates for membership.

[1] BBC News, ‘Syria crisis: UN Security Council agrees aid resolution’, 23 February 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-26311212

[2] Cullison, Alan, ‘Russia Considers Blocking NATO Supply Routes’, The Telegraph, 28 November 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204753404577066421106592452.html

We do not need to buy Russia cooperation by sacrificing Georgian and Ukrainian sovereignty. The West would like Russian cooperation in a whole range of areas, but this isn’t a zero sum game where if one side wins the other must lose out. Russia should also worry about issues such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change, and the threat posed by failed states, so it is in its own interests to work with international partners to find global solutions. It also wants World Trade Organisation membership to continue its economic growth, especially if oil and gas prices should fall. For these reasons Russia will not make its whole foreign policy dependent on the expansion of NATO, but can be relied upon to continue existing partnerships because they are of mutual benefit.

NATO’s European members have an additional reason not to offend Russia by continuing to expand the alliance in defiance of Moscow. Much of Europe depends on imports of Russian gas for their energy needs, Russia currently supplies 25% of European gas and this may rise to as high as 55% by 2020.[1] Unfortunately the Kremlin has made clear over the past three years that it is prepared to use its control of energy as a political weapon. It has already limited the flow of energy to states (e.g. Ukraine, Belarus, Estonia) who have annoyed it on several occasions, and may well be prepared to turn lights, heating and factories off across Europe in retaliation for interference in its near abroad.[2]

Russia’s energy riches in a time of high oil prices also mean that it is far richer and self-confident than at any time since the fall of communism. The profits of its energy wealth have also enabled its military to be strengthened. This means that even if Moscow backed down in response to western assertiveness in the past, it is now determined to overturn past humiliations.

[1] Paillard, Christophe-Alexandre, ‘Rethinking Russia: Russia and Europe’s Mutual Energy Dependence’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 63, No.2, Spring/Summer 2010, pp.65-84, http://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/russia-and-europe%E2%80%99s-mutual-energy-dependence

[2] Weir, Fred, ‘Why Russia is cutting off gas supplies to Belarus’, The Christian Science Monitor, 21 June 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2010/0621/Why-Russia-is-cutting-off-gas-supplies-to-Belarus

Russian strength is illusory – the country’s wealth is highly dependent on the energy exports and its economy is very vulnerable to a fall in oil and gas prices. Russia needs to sell its oil at $115 per barrel for the budget to balance.[1] Despite recent hostility to foreign oil firms attempting to operate in Russia, in the long term the country also needs western investment and technology if it is to maintain its energy output by opening and exploiting new fields. Indeed, Europe cannot be held hostage to Russian energy policy – who else could Russia sell its oil and gas to?
Russia’s apparent military strength is also deceptive – its army and air force actually performed badly in Georgia and are no match for the modern forces available to NATO.

[1] Nikishenkov, Oleg, ‘Oil muddles Russia’s budget debate’, themoscownews, 16 May 2011,  http://themoscownews.com/business/20110516/188670156.html

The conflict in Georgia showed how NATO is already badly divided over how to respond to Russia. Old European states such as Germany and Italy are much readier to accommodate Russian interests than America,[1] which is supported by newer NATO members such as Poland and the Czech Republic. The same fault has been seen in relation to the response to Russian moves in Crimea; Germany has been much more cautious.[2] The United States faces a danger that if it pushes for NATO expansion in the face of Russian objections, it will split the alliance completely.

[1] Traynor, Ian, ‘Nato allies divided over Ukraine and Georgia’, guardian.co.uk, 2 December 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/dec/02/ukraine-georgia

[2] Dempsey, Judy, ‘Europe Is Completely Divided Over How to Respond to Russia’, Carnegie Europe, 4 March 2014, http://carnegieeurope.eu/2014/03/04/europe-is-completely-divided-over-how-to-respond-to-russia/h2gi

Dramatic and depressing as events in Georgia in 2008 were, the loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia actually make Georgia better suited to NATO membership than before. There would have been a clear danger of allowing Georgia into NATO if the status of these breakaway regions was unsettled, with the obvious potential for conflict with their Russian patron. Once Georgia can be brought to accept the permanent loss of these territories to Russia, then it becomes a much more united country, without any other obvious grounds for Russia’s future interference. This is similarly the case with Crimea; The Russian Black Sea Fleet based in a NATO member would have clearly been a risk.