This House would criminalise blasphemy

Blasphemy cannot be shielded by the rationale which is used to defend freedom of speech. Blasphemy constitutes an attack on the religion it is targeted at. Beyond its ability to shock and offend, blasphemy exposes religious believers to ridicule, and perpetuates lies and falsehoods about their faith. Moreover, blasphemy also drives conflict and exclusion within particular faiths, deepening schismatic divisions and encouraging believers to become more hostile to those who do not share their religion.

Blasphemy occupies a distinctly different position in public debate and discussion than civil, respectful discourse about religion. The forms of blasphemy law that were maintained in the legal systems of western liberal democracies throughout the twentieth century criminalised only the most extreme and intentionally provocative forms of religious expression – images of religious figures involved in humiliating or sexualised scenarios; statements about a religion that amounted to hate speech; and words that were intended to mislead and deceive the naïve, credulous or doubting. The English blasphemy case of R v Boulter drew on the conclusions of the sixth report of the commissioners on criminal law, which had observed that a criminal charge could only arise when “irreligion” took the form of an “insult to God and man”. The judge in the case remarked that “if the decencies of controversy are observed, even the fundamentals of religion may be attacked with tout the writer being guilty of blasphemy.”

Ruling in the case of Whitehouse v Lemon, heard in 1977, a senior English judge remarked that blasphemous libel, although thought to have fallen into disuse and irrelevance remained useful in safeguarding “the internal tranquillity of the kingdom.” This principle appears to be an antecedent to the public order justification for hate speech legislation – speech that spurs people to commit violent or disruptive acts should be curtailed to protect public safety. That case restated the idea that “It is not blasphemous to speak or publish opinions hostile to the Christian religion, or to deny the existence of God, if the publication is couched in decent in temperate language.”

This is the sense in which the proposition side will discuss the term “blasphemous”. The proposition side does not intend to limit free speech, but has every intention of ensuring that free speech is not undermined or delegitimised by allowing the unobstructed broadcasting of hateful and provocative statements. We protect freedom of speech in our society not as a good in and of itself, but because through debate of even the most improbable propositions, socially valuable ideas may emerge and concerns that might otherwise be hidden can be expressed. By contrast, language aimed solely at offense has no redeeming value and does not contribute to any wider exchange of ideas and concerns. Blasphemy does not appeal to reason, and by being directly exclusionary and offensive, it limits that ability of believers and non-believers to engage in structured debate.

Blasphemy can be a valuable act of expression. It is misleading to try and conflate blasphemous statements with statements that lack intellectual merit, are bigoted or hateful. The proposition side attempt to exclude “decent and temperate” questioning of religious values from the scope of anti-blasphemy laws, but they fail to recognise that language is a broad, imprecise and malleable tool. Words that may be understood as temperate and even-handed by one speaker may deeply shock another. Even a simple and plainly stated denial of God’s existence was interpreted as tantamount to blasphemy by the early liberal philosopher John Locke. Locke saw acceptance of the core truths of the Christian bible as being a vital indicator of and individual’s trustworthiness and willingness to comply with social norms.

It is easy to envision scenarios in which adherents of certain religions may find any attempt to dispute the historical and philosophical foundations of their faith deeply offensive, no matter how calmly and respectfully the dissenting position is communicated. Discussions of natural selection have become one such battleground. Despite the measures taken by philosophers and scientists to highlight the compatibility between religious faith and scientifically informed ontologies, despite the measured and carefully regulated court cases that have been used to decide this issue, many Christians regard discussion and teaching of evolution as part of natural history threatening and offensive.

Even irreverent humour or mockery can sometimes be used to make valid and useful observations about the structure and values of religions. For example, the act of angering someone by ridiculing their deity, or the tenets of their faith, could make the point that a particular religion is closed-minded or too hidebound. Important aspects of our characters are revealed when we are invited to adopt aggressive or defensive attitudes.  It is not for a government to decide whether blasphemous statements contribute to social discourse; it is up to the individuals engaged in that exchange. It is not acceptable, in the absence of an intention to expose a particular group of people to a real risk of physical harm, to allow debate and free speech to be curtailed by the use of legal force.

The meaning of words need not be plain and obvious, either. Implication and allusion play an important role in language. Implied meanings and innuendos have done much to complicate the legal processes used to protect individual reputations against slurs and falsehoods. In a criminal, rather than a civil context, similar principles are likely to make blasphemy prosecutions expensive, unwieldy and inconsistent.

Laws combating discrimination- such as the blasphemy law that the proposition side are advocating- promote social cohesion and stability, both important policy objectives in increasingly mobile and cosmopolitan societies.

The United Nations General Assembly in 2006 argued “defamation of religions is among the causes of social disharmony and leads to violations of human rights.” (United Nations General Assembly, ‘Combating defamation of religions’, 2006). Coexistence between communities with radically different creeds, values and viewpoints needs to be carefully supervised in multi-cultural societies. Too often the uncertainty that accompanies migrant life can serve to inspire to give too much credence to the views of zealots and fundamentalists. To prevent communities deliberately isolating themselves from their neighbours; to prevent communal violence, it is necessary for the state to create an environment in which disputes can be resolved by impartial and properly trained prosecutorial authorities. Discrimination laws are instrumental to building peaceful social realities. They signify a welcoming society, in which it is unacceptable to offend entire segments of the population by debasing what they hold most precious.

Blasphemous statements have a power that reaches far beyond “ordinary” hate speech. Acts covered by this law would include intentionally provocative publications such as the cartoons of the prophet Mohammed that featured prominently in a Danish newspaper in 2005. These images led to widespread protests and violence in both western states and majority Muslim countries. The offensive content of the cartoons gave credence and legitimacy to sects and clerics espousing absolutist ideas that have no space for compromise or understanding. Further, the protests also brought individuals who would ordinarily have considered themselves moderates into contact with violent extremists. Neither of these outcomes does anything to promote a culture of free and frank discussion within the societies affected.

The legal measures that side proposition supports do not oblige free thinkers to remain silent in the face of zealotry and bigotry. However, they does require writers, journalists and artists to apply their reason and their sense to content that they want to publish for mass consumption. Much like laws that prevent the negligent operation of businesses, anti-blasphemy laws would set a minimal standard of responsible conduct in order to ensure that publications did not cause a dangerous level of offense to significant numbers ordinary and rational religious believers. Legal definitions and enforcement of standards of responsibility do not preclude individuals from pursuing dangerous or entrepreneurial business ventures or public works. They need not prevent the creation of controversial and challenging forms of free expression either.

Blasphemy laws are unlikely to promote social harmony as readily as the proposition side claims they will. Accusations of blasphemy can enflame tensions between antagonistic groups. Telling people they no longer have recourse to words to voice their disagreements and discontentment might push them to resort to violence instead. Communities with diverging beliefs are unlikely to engage in discussion and negotiation if statements aimed at promoting peace can easily be used to launch expensive libel prosecutions. Exchanges and debates between different communities will not take place if participants fear that they might be arrested if an audience member choses to take offence at their words.

Anti-blasphemy laws would undoubtedly control group violence of the sort that followed the publication of the “Mohammed cartoons”.  But they would also spur further social division, and deepen misunderstandings about religion. Anti-blasphemy laws would remove debate on religion from the public sphere and leave both bigots and zealots to propagate their distorted interpretations of religious belief unchallenged in private. To the case more simply, debate and discussion on the nature of religion and the nature of the sacred will always occur. Even if the proposition side successfully extend hate speech laws to encompass blasphemy, they will not be able to prevent private discussion these concepts without abolishing democracy wholesale and advocating the creation of a surveillance state. A blasphemy law would only serve to prevent groups with differing ideas from being brought together to engage in debate and conversation. Contact between groups would cease, because of concerns that allegations of blasphemy might lead, at the very least, to unwelcome and intrusive police and prosecutorial investigations. But discussion of controversial ideas about other faiths would continue. In the absence of dissenting voices, closed and concealed dialog would be vulnerable to manipulation and inaccuracies.

While words can be powerful it is preferable to allow people to speak freely, even if what is said is not always constructive. The alternative is to make the courts and justice system complicit in creating a culture of victimhood and vexatious litigation.

Debate is also likely to suffer under this mechanism. By allowing a group that has been the target of a religious slur to feel victimised and justified in deploying the force of law against their opponents, we disincentivise these same religions from engaging with blasphemers and offering clear and robust justifications for the offence they feel.

The argument that blasphemy laws would bring different parts of society together is nonsense; firstly such laws tend to favour the largest religion in a society which would be to the detriment of minorities but also just because certain discourse is blocked does not mean that individuals will inherently become more educated about other cultures and beliefs. This is the case for example in Pakistan where minorities are rarely protected by blasphemy laws and are often persecuted by it, buts being a member of the Ahmadi sect is synonymous with being blasphemous to Islam and without having to prove intent the law is therefore used to persecute them and other minorities. (Mehmood, ‘Pakistan blasphemy laws retake center stage’, 2011)

Blasphemy cannot be shielded by the rationale which is used to defend freedom of speech. Blasphemy constitutes an attack on the religion it is targeted at. Beyond its ability to shock and offend, blasphemy exposes religious believers to ridicule, and perpetuates lies and falsehoods about their faith. Moreover, blasphemy also drives conflict and exclusion within particular faiths, deepening schismatic divisions and encouraging believers to become more hostile to those who do not share their religion.

Blasphemy occupies a distinctly different position in public debate and discussion than civil, respectful discourse about religion. The forms of blasphemy law that were maintained in the legal systems of western liberal democracies throughout the twentieth century criminalised only the most extreme and intentionally provocative forms of religious expression – images of religious figures involved in humiliating or sexualised scenarios; statements about a religion that amounted to hate speech; and words that were intended to mislead and deceive the naïve, credulous or doubting. The English blasphemy case of R v Boulter drew on the conclusions of the sixth report of the commissioners on criminal law, which had observed that a criminal charge could only arise when “irreligion” took the form of an “insult to God and man”. The judge in the case remarked that “if the decencies of controversy are observed, even the fundamentals of religion may be attacked with tout the writer being guilty of blasphemy.”

Ruling in the case of Whitehouse v Lemon, heard in 1977, a senior English judge remarked that blasphemous libel, although thought to have fallen into disuse and irrelevance remained useful in safeguarding “the internal tranquillity of the kingdom.” This principle appears to be an antecedent to the public order justification for hate speech legislation – speech that spurs people to commit violent or disruptive acts should be curtailed to protect public safety. That case restated the idea that “It is not blasphemous to speak or publish opinions hostile to the Christian religion, or to deny the existence of God, if the publication is couched in decent in temperate language.”

This is the sense in which the proposition side will discuss the term “blasphemous”. The proposition side does not intend to limit free speech, but has every intention of ensuring that free speech is not undermined or delegitimised by allowing the unobstructed broadcasting of hateful and provocative statements. We protect freedom of speech in our society not as a good in and of itself, but because through debate of even the most improbable propositions, socially valuable ideas may emerge and concerns that might otherwise be hidden can be expressed. By contrast, language aimed solely at offense has no redeeming value and does not contribute to any wider exchange of ideas and concerns. Blasphemy does not appeal to reason, and by being directly exclusionary and offensive, it limits that ability of believers and non-believers to engage in structured debate.

Blasphemy can be a valuable act of expression. It is misleading to try and conflate blasphemous statements with statements that lack intellectual merit, are bigoted or hateful. The proposition side attempt to exclude “decent and temperate” questioning of religious values from the scope of anti-blasphemy laws, but they fail to recognise that language is a broad, imprecise and malleable tool. Words that may be understood as temperate and even-handed by one speaker may deeply shock another. Even a simple and plainly stated denial of God’s existence was interpreted as tantamount to blasphemy by the early liberal philosopher John Locke. Locke saw acceptance of the core truths of the Christian bible as being a vital indicator of and individual’s trustworthiness and willingness to comply with social norms.

It is easy to envision scenarios in which adherents of certain religions may find any attempt to dispute the historical and philosophical foundations of their faith deeply offensive, no matter how calmly and respectfully the dissenting position is communicated. Discussions of natural selection have become one such battleground. Despite the measures taken by philosophers and scientists to highlight the compatibility between religious faith and scientifically informed ontologies, despite the measured and carefully regulated court cases that have been used to decide this issue, many Christians regard discussion and teaching of evolution as part of natural history threatening and offensive.

Even irreverent humour or mockery can sometimes be used to make valid and useful observations about the structure and values of religions. For example, the act of angering someone by ridiculing their deity, or the tenets of their faith, could make the point that a particular religion is closed-minded or too hidebound. Important aspects of our characters are revealed when we are invited to adopt aggressive or defensive attitudes.  It is not for a government to decide whether blasphemous statements contribute to social discourse; it is up to the individuals engaged in that exchange. It is not acceptable, in the absence of an intention to expose a particular group of people to a real risk of physical harm, to allow debate and free speech to be curtailed by the use of legal force.

The meaning of words need not be plain and obvious, either. Implication and allusion play an important role in language. Implied meanings and innuendos have done much to complicate the legal processes used to protect individual reputations against slurs and falsehoods. In a criminal, rather than a civil context, similar principles are likely to make blasphemy prosecutions expensive, unwieldy and inconsistent.

Laws combating discrimination- such as the blasphemy law that the proposition side are advocating- promote social cohesion and stability, both important policy objectives in increasingly mobile and cosmopolitan societies.

The United Nations General Assembly in 2006 argued “defamation of religions is among the causes of social disharmony and leads to violations of human rights.” (United Nations General Assembly, ‘Combating defamation of religions’, 2006). Coexistence between communities with radically different creeds, values and viewpoints needs to be carefully supervised in multi-cultural societies. Too often the uncertainty that accompanies migrant life can serve to inspire to give too much credence to the views of zealots and fundamentalists. To prevent communities deliberately isolating themselves from their neighbours; to prevent communal violence, it is necessary for the state to create an environment in which disputes can be resolved by impartial and properly trained prosecutorial authorities. Discrimination laws are instrumental to building peaceful social realities. They signify a welcoming society, in which it is unacceptable to offend entire segments of the population by debasing what they hold most precious.

Blasphemous statements have a power that reaches far beyond “ordinary” hate speech. Acts covered by this law would include intentionally provocative publications such as the cartoons of the prophet Mohammed that featured prominently in a Danish newspaper in 2005. These images led to widespread protests and violence in both western states and majority Muslim countries. The offensive content of the cartoons gave credence and legitimacy to sects and clerics espousing absolutist ideas that have no space for compromise or understanding. Further, the protests also brought individuals who would ordinarily have considered themselves moderates into contact with violent extremists. Neither of these outcomes does anything to promote a culture of free and frank discussion within the societies affected.

The legal measures that side proposition supports do not oblige free thinkers to remain silent in the face of zealotry and bigotry. However, they does require writers, journalists and artists to apply their reason and their sense to content that they want to publish for mass consumption. Much like laws that prevent the negligent operation of businesses, anti-blasphemy laws would set a minimal standard of responsible conduct in order to ensure that publications did not cause a dangerous level of offense to significant numbers ordinary and rational religious believers. Legal definitions and enforcement of standards of responsibility do not preclude individuals from pursuing dangerous or entrepreneurial business ventures or public works. They need not prevent the creation of controversial and challenging forms of free expression either.

Blasphemy laws are unlikely to promote social harmony as readily as the proposition side claims they will. Accusations of blasphemy can enflame tensions between antagonistic groups. Telling people they no longer have recourse to words to voice their disagreements and discontentment might push them to resort to violence instead. Communities with diverging beliefs are unlikely to engage in discussion and negotiation if statements aimed at promoting peace can easily be used to launch expensive libel prosecutions. Exchanges and debates between different communities will not take place if participants fear that they might be arrested if an audience member choses to take offence at their words.

Anti-blasphemy laws would undoubtedly control group violence of the sort that followed the publication of the “Mohammed cartoons”.  But they would also spur further social division, and deepen misunderstandings about religion. Anti-blasphemy laws would remove debate on religion from the public sphere and leave both bigots and zealots to propagate their distorted interpretations of religious belief unchallenged in private. To the case more simply, debate and discussion on the nature of religion and the nature of the sacred will always occur. Even if the proposition side successfully extend hate speech laws to encompass blasphemy, they will not be able to prevent private discussion these concepts without abolishing democracy wholesale and advocating the creation of a surveillance state. A blasphemy law would only serve to prevent groups with differing ideas from being brought together to engage in debate and conversation. Contact between groups would cease, because of concerns that allegations of blasphemy might lead, at the very least, to unwelcome and intrusive police and prosecutorial investigations. But discussion of controversial ideas about other faiths would continue. In the absence of dissenting voices, closed and concealed dialog would be vulnerable to manipulation and inaccuracies.

While words can be powerful it is preferable to allow people to speak freely, even if what is said is not always constructive. The alternative is to make the courts and justice system complicit in creating a culture of victimhood and vexatious litigation.

Debate is also likely to suffer under this mechanism. By allowing a group that has been the target of a religious slur to feel victimised and justified in deploying the force of law against their opponents, we disincentivise these same religions from engaging with blasphemers and offering clear and robust justifications for the offence they feel.

The argument that blasphemy laws would bring different parts of society together is nonsense; firstly such laws tend to favour the largest religion in a society which would be to the detriment of minorities but also just because certain discourse is blocked does not mean that individuals will inherently become more educated about other cultures and beliefs. This is the case for example in Pakistan where minorities are rarely protected by blasphemy laws and are often persecuted by it, buts being a member of the Ahmadi sect is synonymous with being blasphemous to Islam and without having to prove intent the law is therefore used to persecute them and other minorities. (Mehmood, ‘Pakistan blasphemy laws retake center stage’, 2011)

“Blasphemy” is a very subjective term. The cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed referred to above were regarded by many as blasphemy, but to others they were a form of incisive commentary. (Badkhen A. 2006). Side proposition seems content to trigger a prosecution for blasphemy based on ideas of offence that might be confined to only a very small group of religious believers. Indeed, it is extremely difficult to determine how wide spread a sense of offense must be before a comment moves from being insulting to actively blasphemous. Zororastrian, Bahai and Yezidi religious communities exist in vanishingly small numbers in the UK, but members of each of these faiths have been subject to continual historical persecution. Should their experience of victimisation entitle them to more robust protection than the (relatively) large and wealthy Anglican church? Similarly, should the size of these communities mark them out as vulnerable, and deserving of some sort of legal advantage that allow them to more easily access the protection of anti-blasphemy laws?

Religious groups can often become divided over the correct response to attacks and crises. If the guiding principle is what the recipients of a certain type of speech will find offensive, that will vary widely from person to person even within the members of a certain religious group. Legal responses to this conundrum would run the risk of appearing to be arbitrary and failing to properly represent the diversity of views within a religious community. Further opportunities for division and dissatisfaction may also arise during the process of making a complaint and assisting the prosecutors pursuing it. Cases will, necessarily be heard in public and will require participants to repeat the slanderous and controversial statements that caused such offence, possibly spreading them amongst a wider audience. The public nature of court cases may even make them attractive to individuals who wish to draw attention to offensive views linked to particular religions.

This is problematic, because it would fail to provide guidance to citizens with respect to what the law requires of them. Blasphemy prosecutions would offer only the most cursory and indirect forms of redress to alleged victims of blasphemy. Moreover, discussions over the handling of blasphemy prosecutions would likely produce division with religious communities. Many believers might be reluctant to see the blasphemous statements that caused an official offensive reaction repeated in court.

As Timothy Garton ash points out in his commentary on principle 7, there is a supervening value at work in any system of law or social values that obliges religions to demonstrate tolerance for one another and for non-believers. More than a mere value, this supervening idea is identified as a “higher good”. We are told that limitations to religion are necessary in order to prevent free speech from becoming a conduit for conflict. Principle 7 appeals to a universal understanding of risk and safety. It asks us to understand that we risk less conflict in society if we tolerate the existence and pronouncements of other religions. This statement contains that corollary principle that people who wish to see free speech remain a legitimate social force, untroubled by conflict and claims to absolute supremacy, should endeavor to ensure that debates on the fundamental elements of any religion- the existence of God, the divinity (or otherwise) of Jesus, the nature of the revelations received by Mohammed- should be conducted in an open, respectful and structured fashion.

Freedom to engage in a nuanced and calm debate on the nature of a religion is not equivalent to a right to mix the sacred with the taboo, with the specific objective of provoking an outraged reaction. It is revealing that the intended audience for- for example- art works such as “piss Christ” is largely secular and middle class. These are the individuals among whom artists and writers who oppose blasphemy laws wish to encourage debate. But this narrow minded approach does not consider the large numbers of believers who feel shocked and insulted by such images, and who are given the impression that their faith is under attack. If compelled to live in an environment in which unconstrained free speech is given fiat over religious tolerance, religious believers will be less likely to engage in discussions with members of other faiths or non-believers.

Finally, it should be noted that the existence of a state-supervised prosecution process will greatly reduce the possibility that members of a community offended by a blasphemous statement will decide to take action against that statement- be it protest or physical violence- themselves. It also ensures that members of religions that are targeted by blasphemous statements will not feel obliged to become involved in disorganised or violent protest activities.

Blasphemy laws can be used to enforce oppressive and exclusionary practices within religions. The proposition side have gone out of their way to highlight the harm that can be done to religions by actors external to the religious group. However, this analysis does not fit so comfortably with the problems that occur when a member of a religious community wishes to make controversial and divisive statements about their own religion.

Dissenters within a religious group may often face exclusion from their communities and hostility from friends and family. The current law of western liberal democracies ensures that social disapproval does not transform into threats or violent conduct directed at these individuals. In this way, liberal democratic states recognise the right to speak freely without fear of violent or disproportionate repercussions, irrespective of the social and cultural standards enforced by the community that an individual might belong to.

By criminalising blasphemy, proposition run the risk of discouraging religious dissent within religious communities. Heterodox thinkers who want to share their views on their religion with other believers, must now run the dual risks of effective exile from a social environment that they consider to be their home and prosecution by the state. Anti-blasphemy laws would give communities the ability to indirectly harm and intimidate anyone holding controversial opinions, by directing state power- in the form of prosecutors and the police- against them. Further, anti-blasphemy laws might simply discourage free expression of this type, the prospect of prosecution being sufficient to discourage controversial statements and discussions.

Religions- even if based on divine revelation- develop through human debate, thought and discussion. The proposition position would harm the development of religions if it were realised. It would balance the environment of collective discourse within a religion in favour of conservative and reactionary thinkers.

It should also be noted that it is the state which drafts the law and its organs then apply it, deciding which cases will or will not be prosecuted. It might be enforced unevenly by the government, thus favouring certain religions and victimizing others. It could be used to limit the expression of unpopular ideas, which are the ones that need the most protection, as has happened in the past with the work of artists criticizing the social and political mores of the time with previous cases showing their books being banned from libraries or their paintings from art galleries. Take for example the banning of Salman Rushdie’s novel The Satanic Verses in numerous states around the world. (Bald, M. 2006)

While it is true that blasphemy laws could be open to misuse, this is also true of many other laws that are currently overseen by the state. Liberal democratic legal systems operate safeguards to ensure that laws cannot be abused or used for purposes at odds with fundamental democratic freedoms. On the whole the majority of countries around the world are fair and liberal place that maintain strict separation of judicial, legislative and executive competence. Their courts are capable of recognising vexatious claims and ensuring equality-of-arms between the state and defendants through mechanisms such as legal aid. 

In totalitarian nations such as those described by the opposition if blasphemy laws did not exist, authoritarian states would simply find different ways in which to censor that which it deems unfit. In China where religious freedom is severely curtailed, free speech remains subject to significant limitations. It is misleading, then, to associate the intrinsic failings of a political system with a law that might attract opportunistic litigants. On the whole blasphemy law in liberal nations would be handled in a fair judicial manner.