This house would abolish the security council veto

Purported U.N. actions that would clearly antagonise a member of the P5 never even reach the Security Council; such is the awareness that the veto would stall its progress. The statistics of the numbers of vetoes passed at any particular point in UN history does not reveal the true defect of the institutional arrangement. In an attempt to circumvent this, countries and military alliances are forced to act unilaterally. NATO initiated military action against Yugoslavia, under the imprimatur of the United States and the United Kingdom, without receiving Security Council authorisation. It had become evident that any UN military involvement would be vetoed by both China and Russia. Furthermore, the silence of the Security Council whilst Russia launched a relentless and brutal campaign against Chechnya was deafening. Nevertheless, there is little that can be done such is the absolute power of the veto that Russia and the other P5 members have.

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The Security Council is a unifying force, regardless of its veto powers. Its history of mandating U.N. interventions to prevent humanitarian disasters is on the record and clear. Though many point to the Srebrenica massacre in the former Yugoslavia, few recall the success of the U.N. mission in bringing that conflict to a peaceful resolution. Furthermore, unilateral actions, undertaken without recourse to the Security Council, are often eventually rectified through the Council anyway. The legality of the NATO action in both Yugoslavia and Kosovo was subsequently scheduled for consideration by another organ of the UN, the International Court of Justice. Following the conflict NATO and Russia sought and achieved Security Council endorsement of the campaign. The Council then authorised the deployment of a peacekeeping force in order to police Kosovo. The Security Council thus proved to be a unifying force despite the presence of the veto power.

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In the rare recent circumstances in which the veto power has been utilised, it has been hijacked by ideological demands and petty national interests. The P5 are able to use their veto powers not to enforce legality, justice and transparency in the international environment, but rather appease their allies and punish their enemies. China prevented peacekeeping operations proceeding in Guatemala and Macedonia on account of the engagement of those countries with Taiwan¹. The veto is no longer applied for the maintenance of collective security, but the substantiation of internal security.
¹ He, Yin, 'China's Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations', Institute for Security & Development Policy, July 2007,

The veto is not wielded as an ideological tool, but rather a tool of national interest like any other diplomatic tool. The recent case of Libya, whereby the veto power was not used by any of the P5, demonstrated the ability of the Security Council to align themselves to the cause of civilian protection. For this reason, it should also be noted that collective security is often indistinguishable from the national interests of the P5. The military might of each of the P5 members individually, and within separate groups, notably the UK and US axis within NATO, is such that the avoidance of disagreement is crucial to international peace. Even if the P5 did cast their vetoes for reasons of ideological self-interest, this cost is outweighed by the maintenance of unity that becomes ever more critical in the post-Cold War multipolar world.

The permanent five (P5) were given this privilege for two reasons that have no application in the post-Cold War world. Firstly, the Allied powers, with the addition of China, sought to bind themselves to the UN organisation that was designed to prevent the depredations of the Second World War ever recurring. Secondly, the P5 held unrivalled strategic might through their possession of nuclear weapon technology or imminent nuclear capacity. Yet, the UN is no longer in any danger of imminent collapse. The P5 will abandon neither the organisation nor the cause of global peace by loss of the veto power. Moreover, the global power balance has shifted dramatically since 1945; the P5 'do not reflect the geopolitical realities of today'¹. Nuclear proliferation has accelerated in the past decade, such that inter alia India, Pakistan, North Korea, Egypt, Iraq and Iran are developing inter-continental ballistic capacity.
¹ Kafala, T. (2003, September 17). The veto and how to use it. Retrieved May 13, 2011, from BBC News

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The veto power is still as relevant as it ever was. As the opposition notes, the veto power was granted to ensure the victors in World War II that they could prevent the escalation to world war that had so ravaged their lands and populations. The maintenance of the 'long peace' over the subsequent half-century can be at least partially attributed to the effectiveness of the Security Council veto; the P5 are tempted away from military solutions towards diplomatic feuds due to their ability to bring overbearing political power to bear on rivals. For example, fears of Iran's acquirement of a nuclear weapon have been abetted by US-sponsored efforts to impose sanctions on the regime. Without the veto power, the Security Council would not remain in its current, useful form and may not have prevented a resort to war in this case.

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Funding contributions to the United Nations should directly relate to the influence that member organizations thereafter have on its actions; with the veto in place, this is no longer the case. The Permanent Five, as the group of nations granted the most constitutional power in the United Nations, should contribute a proportional amount of resources to the institution. Initially, this was the case – however, by 2004, Japan was contributing 19 per cent of the UN budget, second only to that of the United States [1]. In third place, contributing 8 per cent, was Germany, another state lacking a veto power and any ability to overrule the interests of P5 nations, all bar one of whom contributed less to the UN budget [2]. Furthermore, India and Brazil, whilst not contributing financially to the degree of Japan and Germany, have permitted large swathes of their armed forces to join U.N. peacekeeping operations to fulfil the mandates handed down by the Security Council. Despite these financial and military contributions, the states concerned get no greater say in the interests and actions of the organization. A fairer, more equitable model would insist on a greater proportionality between one’s contribution to the United Nations and one’s ability to influence its actions. 

[1] Blum, 2005

[2] ibid

The efficacy of the United Nations Security Council is dependent on the participation of the world's most powerful states, which is in large part due to the possession of the veto power. Removing the veto, or granting it only to those who contribute their fair share to the United Nations budget risks undermining the very structures that have made the Security Council the platform for co-ordinated international action. For example, whilst China is not one of the top contributors to the budget of the organization, it's economic and military strength are enormous and if the Security Council is to remain relevant, China must be encouraged to remain at the table. The veto power ensures unilateralism is a secondary thought.

improve this

Purported U.N. actions that would clearly antagonise a member of the P5 never even reach the Security Council; such is the awareness that the veto would stall its progress. The statistics of the numbers of vetoes passed at any particular point in UN history does not reveal the true defect of the institutional arrangement. In an attempt to circumvent this, countries and military alliances are forced to act unilaterally. NATO initiated military action against Yugoslavia, under the imprimatur of the United States and the United Kingdom, without receiving Security Council authorisation. It had become evident that any UN military involvement would be vetoed by both China and Russia. Furthermore, the silence of the Security Council whilst Russia launched a relentless and brutal campaign against Chechnya was deafening. Nevertheless, there is little that can be done such is the absolute power of the veto that Russia and the other P5 members have.

improve this

The Security Council is a unifying force, regardless of its veto powers. Its history of mandating U.N. interventions to prevent humanitarian disasters is on the record and clear. Though many point to the Srebrenica massacre in the former Yugoslavia, few recall the success of the U.N. mission in bringing that conflict to a peaceful resolution. Furthermore, unilateral actions, undertaken without recourse to the Security Council, are often eventually rectified through the Council anyway. The legality of the NATO action in both Yugoslavia and Kosovo was subsequently scheduled for consideration by another organ of the UN, the International Court of Justice. Following the conflict NATO and Russia sought and achieved Security Council endorsement of the campaign. The Council then authorised the deployment of a peacekeeping force in order to police Kosovo. The Security Council thus proved to be a unifying force despite the presence of the veto power.

improve this

In the rare recent circumstances in which the veto power has been utilised, it has been hijacked by ideological demands and petty national interests. The P5 are able to use their veto powers not to enforce legality, justice and transparency in the international environment, but rather appease their allies and punish their enemies. China prevented peacekeeping operations proceeding in Guatemala and Macedonia on account of the engagement of those countries with Taiwan¹. The veto is no longer applied for the maintenance of collective security, but the substantiation of internal security.
¹ He, Yin, 'China's Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations', Institute for Security & Development Policy, July 2007,

The veto is not wielded as an ideological tool, but rather a tool of national interest like any other diplomatic tool. The recent case of Libya, whereby the veto power was not used by any of the P5, demonstrated the ability of the Security Council to align themselves to the cause of civilian protection. For this reason, it should also be noted that collective security is often indistinguishable from the national interests of the P5. The military might of each of the P5 members individually, and within separate groups, notably the UK and US axis within NATO, is such that the avoidance of disagreement is crucial to international peace. Even if the P5 did cast their vetoes for reasons of ideological self-interest, this cost is outweighed by the maintenance of unity that becomes ever more critical in the post-Cold War multipolar world.

The permanent five (P5) were given this privilege for two reasons that have no application in the post-Cold War world. Firstly, the Allied powers, with the addition of China, sought to bind themselves to the UN organisation that was designed to prevent the depredations of the Second World War ever recurring. Secondly, the P5 held unrivalled strategic might through their possession of nuclear weapon technology or imminent nuclear capacity. Yet, the UN is no longer in any danger of imminent collapse. The P5 will abandon neither the organisation nor the cause of global peace by loss of the veto power. Moreover, the global power balance has shifted dramatically since 1945; the P5 'do not reflect the geopolitical realities of today'¹. Nuclear proliferation has accelerated in the past decade, such that inter alia India, Pakistan, North Korea, Egypt, Iraq and Iran are developing inter-continental ballistic capacity.
¹ Kafala, T. (2003, September 17). The veto and how to use it. Retrieved May 13, 2011, from BBC News

improve this

The veto power is still as relevant as it ever was. As the opposition notes, the veto power was granted to ensure the victors in World War II that they could prevent the escalation to world war that had so ravaged their lands and populations. The maintenance of the 'long peace' over the subsequent half-century can be at least partially attributed to the effectiveness of the Security Council veto; the P5 are tempted away from military solutions towards diplomatic feuds due to their ability to bring overbearing political power to bear on rivals. For example, fears of Iran's acquirement of a nuclear weapon have been abetted by US-sponsored efforts to impose sanctions on the regime. Without the veto power, the Security Council would not remain in its current, useful form and may not have prevented a resort to war in this case.

improve this

Funding contributions to the United Nations should directly relate to the influence that member organizations thereafter have on its actions; with the veto in place, this is no longer the case. The Permanent Five, as the group of nations granted the most constitutional power in the United Nations, should contribute a proportional amount of resources to the institution. Initially, this was the case – however, by 2004, Japan was contributing 19 per cent of the UN budget, second only to that of the United States [1]. In third place, contributing 8 per cent, was Germany, another state lacking a veto power and any ability to overrule the interests of P5 nations, all bar one of whom contributed less to the UN budget [2]. Furthermore, India and Brazil, whilst not contributing financially to the degree of Japan and Germany, have permitted large swathes of their armed forces to join U.N. peacekeeping operations to fulfil the mandates handed down by the Security Council. Despite these financial and military contributions, the states concerned get no greater say in the interests and actions of the organization. A fairer, more equitable model would insist on a greater proportionality between one’s contribution to the United Nations and one’s ability to influence its actions. 

[1] Blum, 2005

[2] ibid

The efficacy of the United Nations Security Council is dependent on the participation of the world's most powerful states, which is in large part due to the possession of the veto power. Removing the veto, or granting it only to those who contribute their fair share to the United Nations budget risks undermining the very structures that have made the Security Council the platform for co-ordinated international action. For example, whilst China is not one of the top contributors to the budget of the organization, it's economic and military strength are enormous and if the Security Council is to remain relevant, China must be encouraged to remain at the table. The veto power ensures unilateralism is a secondary thought.

improve this

There is no requirement in the UN Charter for the veto power to be distributed according to geopolitical realities. Whilst democracy and equality are the principles that direct the General Assembly, they were never intended to apply to the Security Council. The Security Council was conceived as the 'hegemonic' organ, designed to be responsible and effective. As such, the veto power was a tool to ensure the Security Council would not be encumbered by democracy. Therefore, the privileges of the P5 'appear as rights bestowed upon them' by the states who ratified the UN Charter in 1945¹. As a consequence, the non-permanent members of the UN Security Council have little to complain about when they themselves are responsible for their 'diminished status' under the Charter¹. The price paid for their diminished status is the effectiveness of the Security Council.
¹ Fassbender, B. (1998). UN Security Council Reform and the Right to Vote: A Constitutional Perspective. Hague: Kluwer Law International, p.264

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Treaties do not confer permanent and inalienable rights; they should be constantly subject to reform when their dictates conflict with the wishes of their voters. In an institution like the United Nations, which espouses self-determination, the existence of a power which is immune from reform is not a source of pride. If the veto powers had a right to the veto when they were first introduced, that right has now been lost in the chorus of disapproval found among the very same U.N. member states that granted them that right. In a political environment, if an elected official loses the will of their voters, the elected official does not get to choose whether they keep those elected powers. The power remains with they who grant the powers, the voters.

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The veto power has been wielded with increasing success both during and since the Cold War. Between 1945 and 1990, 240 vetoes were cast¹. Yet between 1990 and 1999 the power was utilised on only 7 occasions, whilst more than 20 peacekeeping operations were mandated. This figure exceeds the total number of operations undertaken in the entirety of the preceding 45 years. The prodigious use of the veto during the Cold War period might have saved the world from the realisation of nuclear war. Now, increasing nuclear proliferation is a reason for maintaining the unity of the P5 by means of the veto. The current rhetoric concerns 'rogue states' gaining possession of nuclear weapons. These are states whose potential deployment of arms is unpredictable and with whom there is limited international dialogue. If the P5 is split on a matter of international security, any one or more of its members could become equally 'rogue'.
¹ Global Policy Forum. (n.d.). Changing Patterns in the Use of the Veto in the Security Council. Retrieved May 13, 2011, from Global Policy Forum:

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Only the abolishment of the veto power would enable global action free from the political motives and inherent power politics of the veto powers. Absent of the veto, motions would be considered and passed on merit, not on the self-interest and political motives of the veto powers.As Tarik Kafala argues, 'the majority view at the Council would prevail and we might expect more resolutions passed, more situations identified as threats to world security, more cases of states being reprimanded and sanctions being imposed'¹. Far from destabilising the world order, the removal of veto power would merely enshrine self-determination within the organization that purports to carry that principle to the world.
¹ Kafala, T. (2003, September 17). The veto and how to use it. Retrieved May 13, 2011, from BBC News

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The abolition of the power of veto is simply impossible to imagine. The P5 will not willingly cede their pre-eminent position in international politics. And unsurprisingly, each member would have the constitutional power of veto over any proposal to remove the veto. Articles 108 and 109 of the United Nations Charter grants the P5 veto over amendments to the charter, requiring them to approve stripping away their own veto powers. Given the influence wielded by a veto-bearing state, it is unlikely that any of the P5 would agree to give up this privilege. Therefore, this whole debate is undermined by the sheer impossibility of it being removed, without the wholesale destruction of the United Nations as an organization or, at best, as a relevant organization.

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Constitutional change within the UN is possible and thus worthy of full discussion. As Richard Butler has observed, a proper debate about the defects of the veto might at the least yield a more constructive interpretation of the nature of the veto and its application¹. An informed public awareness of the potential for the Security Council to be bypassed or hijacked might lead to pressure for exercise of the power in accordance with the Charter aims. Notably, China was persuaded or compelled not to cast the veto in respect of the Council measures on Kosovo. This reasonable approach prevailed in spite of vocal Chinese opposition to the bombing campaign, and the destruction of the Chinese embassy by NATO forces.
¹ Butler, R. (1999, August 19). Bewitched, Bothered and Bewildered. Retrieved May 13, 2011, from Chicago Tribune:

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