This House supports the use of truth and reconciliation commissions

Countries emerging from violent pasts, involving repression, civil war and political violence may attempt to come to terms with their histories in three ways.

Firstly, they can attempt to ignore the past, allowing those guilty of atrocities to go unpunished and perhaps even prosper under the new system. This approach leaves victims' families bitter and communities divided, entrenching resentments and potentially distorted accounts of individuals’ involvement in violent activities. Such a situation makes renewed violence all the more likely.

Secondly, post conflict states can set up war crimes courts (as in the Balkans, Rwanda and Sierra Leone), but these may be seen as victor's justice, or as an imposition by a distant opaque international body. Those threatened by such courts may refuse to lay down their arms, jeopardising any chance of a lasting peace settlement - as with Joseph Kony's long-running rebellion in Northern Uganda.

Finally and often best, they can set up a form of Truth and Reconciliation Commission. This requires the whole country to face up to its past, to acknowledge that violence was done by all parties and that the victims were many, and to seek reconciliation through forgiveness at both personal and national levels.

Terrible crimes deserve appropriate punishments. Ignoring the past may not be a good idea, but war criminals (especially the leaders of violent groups) should be brought to justice in public trials.

This approach is the only way to ensure that dangerous men are not allowed to continue to act in and influence vulnerable societies.  Such individuals are often opportunistic, using periods of peace to re-arm and refresh political sympathies, before resuming campaigns of violence. Indeed, the notorious Ugandan warlord Joseph Kony took advantage of peace negotiations initiated in early 2008 to rearm his followers and to forcibly recruit child soldiers for communities in south Sudan and Congo[i].

Adversarial justice also allows punishment to be proportionate, distinguishing between individuals who planned violence and repression, and those who followed their orders, rather than granting all the same amnesty.

Most importantly, treating communal and political violence as a crime sends a message to other would-be warlords and dictators, both at home and abroad, that justice will not be denied; the easy assumption of amnesties will only encourage future violence.

[i] “Lord’s Resistance Army uses truce to rearm and spread fear in Uganda”, The Times, 16 December 2008. http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/207/39842.html

It is important to uncover the real truth of what happened during periods of violence and/or repression. Uncertainty as to the fate of loved ones, the identity of informants or the motives for certain actions can maintain the grip of a conflict over the minds of its victims for many years[i]. The unreason and capriciousness of certain actions can undermine an individual’s identity and capacity to trust. A victory is supposed to bring rapprochement, reason and stability to a conflict zone – but it is unable to have this effect on individuals without some method of rationalising a conflict[ii].

This result can only ever be achieved with the cooperation of those responsible; the individuals who had access to relevant documents or even participated in violent acts[iii]. Without this collective revelation of grief and guilt, the families of the victims will never know the truth about their suffering, and so will not be able to mourn them with dignity. The nation must also confront its past so that those who did not commit violence themselves, but who supported violent groups or repressive regimes, even if only passively, can no longer claim, "I did not know" but must acknowledge their part too and commit themselves to building a better society.

[i] National Healing and Reconciliation in Zimbabwe: Challenges and Opportunities. P 9. 2010, Pamela Machakanja. http://www.ijr.org.za/publications/pdfs/IJR%20AP%20Monograph%201%20Zimbabwe%20WEB.pdf

[ii] Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Volume one. pp 1, 54-58. 1998, The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/index.htm

[iii] Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Volume one. pp 142-143. 1998, The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/index.htm

Even the best Truth and Reconciliation process can only arrive at a partial version of the truth. This may take so many years that political development is halted while society relives the trauma through commission proceedings.

Truth and reconciliation commissions also impose a particular form of morality upon both their participants and the post conflict society they serve. This moral perspective draws upon specifically Christian traditions of confession, absolution and forgiveness that may be alien to victims and perpetrators alike. Even in an almost completely Christian South Africa, many victims' families rejected the process for this reason; it is even less well suited to other societies and cultures.

It is no coincidence that the truth and reconciliation process is so heavily promoted by European and American think tanks, government and NGOs. It fits into a decidedly Christian niche and presents western donors and aid givers with an image of progress that they can understand an easily approve of. However, without closer ties to the cultural contexts in which past political violence took place, reconciliation commissions run the risk of obstructing political and social reform in the very societies that they are intended to protect.

Countries emerging from violent pasts, involving repression, civil war and political violence may attempt to come to terms with their histories in three ways.

Firstly, they can attempt to ignore the past, allowing those guilty of atrocities to go unpunished and perhaps even prosper under the new system. This approach leaves victims' families bitter and communities divided, entrenching resentments and potentially distorted accounts of individuals’ involvement in violent activities. Such a situation makes renewed violence all the more likely.

Secondly, post conflict states can set up war crimes courts (as in the Balkans, Rwanda and Sierra Leone), but these may be seen as victor's justice, or as an imposition by a distant opaque international body. Those threatened by such courts may refuse to lay down their arms, jeopardising any chance of a lasting peace settlement - as with Joseph Kony's long-running rebellion in Northern Uganda.

Finally and often best, they can set up a form of Truth and Reconciliation Commission. This requires the whole country to face up to its past, to acknowledge that violence was done by all parties and that the victims were many, and to seek reconciliation through forgiveness at both personal and national levels.

Terrible crimes deserve appropriate punishments. Ignoring the past may not be a good idea, but war criminals (especially the leaders of violent groups) should be brought to justice in public trials.

This approach is the only way to ensure that dangerous men are not allowed to continue to act in and influence vulnerable societies.  Such individuals are often opportunistic, using periods of peace to re-arm and refresh political sympathies, before resuming campaigns of violence. Indeed, the notorious Ugandan warlord Joseph Kony took advantage of peace negotiations initiated in early 2008 to rearm his followers and to forcibly recruit child soldiers for communities in south Sudan and Congo[i].

Adversarial justice also allows punishment to be proportionate, distinguishing between individuals who planned violence and repression, and those who followed their orders, rather than granting all the same amnesty.

Most importantly, treating communal and political violence as a crime sends a message to other would-be warlords and dictators, both at home and abroad, that justice will not be denied; the easy assumption of amnesties will only encourage future violence.

[i] “Lord’s Resistance Army uses truce to rearm and spread fear in Uganda”, The Times, 16 December 2008. http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/207/39842.html

It is important to uncover the real truth of what happened during periods of violence and/or repression. Uncertainty as to the fate of loved ones, the identity of informants or the motives for certain actions can maintain the grip of a conflict over the minds of its victims for many years[i]. The unreason and capriciousness of certain actions can undermine an individual’s identity and capacity to trust. A victory is supposed to bring rapprochement, reason and stability to a conflict zone – but it is unable to have this effect on individuals without some method of rationalising a conflict[ii].

This result can only ever be achieved with the cooperation of those responsible; the individuals who had access to relevant documents or even participated in violent acts[iii]. Without this collective revelation of grief and guilt, the families of the victims will never know the truth about their suffering, and so will not be able to mourn them with dignity. The nation must also confront its past so that those who did not commit violence themselves, but who supported violent groups or repressive regimes, even if only passively, can no longer claim, "I did not know" but must acknowledge their part too and commit themselves to building a better society.

[i] National Healing and Reconciliation in Zimbabwe: Challenges and Opportunities. P 9. 2010, Pamela Machakanja. http://www.ijr.org.za/publications/pdfs/IJR%20AP%20Monograph%201%20Zimbabwe%20WEB.pdf

[ii] Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Volume one. pp 1, 54-58. 1998, The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/index.htm

[iii] Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Volume one. pp 142-143. 1998, The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/index.htm

Even the best Truth and Reconciliation process can only arrive at a partial version of the truth. This may take so many years that political development is halted while society relives the trauma through commission proceedings.

Truth and reconciliation commissions also impose a particular form of morality upon both their participants and the post conflict society they serve. This moral perspective draws upon specifically Christian traditions of confession, absolution and forgiveness that may be alien to victims and perpetrators alike. Even in an almost completely Christian South Africa, many victims' families rejected the process for this reason; it is even less well suited to other societies and cultures.

It is no coincidence that the truth and reconciliation process is so heavily promoted by European and American think tanks, government and NGOs. It fits into a decidedly Christian niche and presents western donors and aid givers with an image of progress that they can understand an easily approve of. However, without closer ties to the cultural contexts in which past political violence took place, reconciliation commissions run the risk of obstructing political and social reform in the very societies that they are intended to protect.

The United Nations, the ICC and other international bodies have great experience and expertise in dealing with post-conflict situations, including running war crimes trials. They can draw upon the lessons to be learnt from other countries and apply them in partnership with local politicians and lawyers.

The involvement of inter-governmental bodies is important because conflicts are rarely entirely domestic, often spilling over into neighbouring states, as in the Balkans, South-East Asia and West Africa. International courts can also avoid the suspicion of bias and corruption which an entirely national process can suffer.

Post conflict societies are often lack a stable professional class. Access and cooperation with lawyers, clergy and academics is often necessary to ensure that a reconciliation commission can run effectively and can verify the testimony that it hears. The international community can provide skilled individuals of this type.

A Truth and Reconciliation process provides a national forum for facing up to the past. It places responsibility for resolving the tensions latent in post conflict scenarios in the hands of the parties to that conflict[i]. The ICC, by contrast, represents an international intrusion into the moral discourses of post conflict societies.

War crimes tribunals for the Balkans and Rwanda have taken years to achieve a very small number of convictions. They can often appear to have been hijacked by international bodies such as NATO or the UN, in an attempt to impose a solution from outside (to salve consciences in the west) without providing a real understanding of the particular circumstances of the individual nation.

[i] “The voice of ‘Prime Evil’”, BBC News Online, 28 October 1998. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/special_report/1998/10/98/truth_and_reconciliation/143668.stm

Truth and Reconciliation commissions are a mask, behind which political bargains can be made that allow the guilty to go free[i]. Power is traded in return for amnesty. People may be required to confess to their crimes (although in South Africa middle-ranking bureaucrats were the main scapegoats, while their political masters mostly escaped close scrutiny), but they will not be punished for them[ii].

South Africa is a unique exception to the rule that reconciliation commissions do nothing more than legitimatise dealings between equally dubious and unaccountable elites where violence was often committed by agents of the state for purely political reasons, and where the end of repression was negotiated rather than brought about through victory for one side. Elsewhere political and criminal or economic violence are hard to separate (e.g. Sierra Leone, Cambodia), and violence was ended by victory for one party, often with external help (e.g. Sierra Leone, Cambodia, again, but also Rwanda).

[i] “’I cannot betray Kony’ – Museveni”, The Daily Monitor, 16 August 2006, http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/165/29608.html

[ii] Apartheid did not die. 1998, John Pilger, johnpilger.com. http://www.johnpilger.com/videos/apartheid-did-not-die

Compromise is essential to achieving peace and stability after years of conflict. This often has to be negotiated, as in South Africa, and has to survive for long enough for trust to grow. A Truth and Reconciliation process allows for such compromises to be made, favouring no side over another and helping a move to peaceful democratic politics. It does not seek retributive justice but restorative justice, which gives value to the victims of conflict and requires their oppressors to address their sufferings.

The amnesties offered by truth and reconciliation commissions are not easily obtained, but have to be applied for individually, through a complete and truthful disclosure of past crimes. If information is withheld, or the crimes are found not to be politically motivated, then prosecution and punishment are still possible.

Frequently cited as the most successful post conflict restorative justice programme in recent history, South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation process has failed in a number of ways.

Polls show that different races are more polarised after its work, rather than less[i], so reconciliation seems to be failing[ii]. As the journalist Peter Storey comments, “some have decried the absence of repentance in many amnesty applications [made to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission]. Apart from the fact that this is a further damning judgment on perpetrators, the legislation does not require repentance, only the truth.”

Storey notes that “The issue of amnesty has been… controversial. Some victims’ families challenged these provisions in South Africa’s highest court[s].”[iii]

The South African Reconciliation Commission also promised financial redress for victims and their families, but this has largely failed to appear.

[i] Ubu and the Truth Commission. Director’s note. 2007, Jane Taylor, University of Cape Town press

[ii] “Antonette’s story”, BBC News Online, 29 October 1998. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/special_report/1998/10/98/truth_and_reconciliation/203132.stm

[iii] “A Different Kind of Justice: Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa”, The Christian Century, 10 September 1997. http://gbgm-umc.org/NWO/99ja/different.html

Financial compensation was only part of the South African Commission's work. Although it has been slow to arrive it is continuing to be distributed. More will be done over time, and the impact of reconciliation on polls is also a long-term process.

The economies of states recovering from war and dictatorship are typically unproductive and undeveloped, so it is unreasonable to expect immediate results in this area. Lengthy war crimes trials deal with only a fraction of the abuses committed, and typically cost tens of millions of dollars (mostly in legal costs, mostly obtained from foreign donors) more than a Truth and Reconciliation process, so they are even harder to justify.