This House supports the development of a missile defence system

The nation-state is the fundamental building block of the international system, and is recognized as such in all international treaties and organizations (Mearsheimer, 1993). States are recognized as having the right to defend themselves, and this right must extend to the possession of a strategic national missile defense system. The United States has every right to develop such a system if it will furnish a greater measure of defense for its citizens and interests. US military technology is the most advanced and prodigiously financed in the world, which is why it is generally the United States that stands at the forefront of new defense and combat systems. The National Missile Defense program is simply the newest tool in the arsenal of the world’s greatest military, whose purpose is entirely defensive. To shield itself from potential ballistic missile, and even nuclear, attack the United States has the right to build a missile shield to defend itself and its allies under its aegis. There is no principled justification for a country to not pursue defense initiatives that benefit itself and that it wishes to pursue.

It is not always within the right of a state to develop weapons and technology, since international treaties ban, for example, the development of chemical and nuclear weapons. Furthermore, when the development of weapons will be detrimental to the state that builds them, it is in their interest no to do so. In the case of national missile defense, the United States is angering several countries, particularly Russia, and potentially upsetting the balance of mutually assured destruction (Harding, 2007). Clearly more than a right to self-defense must be considered when developing new kinds of armament.

The missile defense shield the United States intends to build is the most effective and complete ballistic missile shield ever devised. When fully armed with a complement of anti-ballistic missiles both within the United States itself, and in allied nations in Europe, the shield will be virtually impregnable to external missile attack. This means the chance of a nuclear attack succeeding against it will be very unlikely, reducing the chance not only of a full-scale nuclear war between the United States and another nuclear power, but also against missiles fired by rogue states or terrorists, the biggest threats in terms of actual use of nuclear weapons (The Economist, 2009). Technologically speaking, anti-ballistic missile missiles have developed by leaps and bounds in recent years. The current system being put into operation by the United States is the Aegis combat system, designed for deployment on US Naval vessels. This new development has served to sidestep the problems associated with ground and space-based missile defense arrays, due to the slow response time of ground missiles, and the still unfeasible orbital deployment. The sea-based defense array, furthermore, lacks the problem of the land-based system in that it does not need to be placed in countries other than the United States in order to be effective (thus avoiding the political problems of the past). Technology and diplomacy have clearly made a national missile defense system highly desirable.

Anti-ballistic missile systems are a largely unproven technology, and still have many problems that do not make them a viable option for strategic defense, at least not at present. Furthermore, there is the excessively high cost of designing and building such a system, which has been in development for 25 years. It has cost billions of dollars over the decades, including $53 billion between 2004 and 2009, the largest single line on the Pentagon’s budget for those years. For all this, only an unproven system of questionable efficacy has been produced. It would be better to stop throwing good money after bad trying to develop a technology that may never be useful. Also, even if the technology were made effective, the same technology could be used as a countermeasure by enemy countries against the interception of their missiles, making the system even less effective, if not useless (Sessler, et al., 2000). Furthermore, the system does not protect the vital interests of the United States because it angers countries like Russia, which has actually begun increasing its conventional force distributions on its Western border with the rest of Europe, and to threaten to deploy short-range nuclear missiles on its border. The political destabilization caused by the missile defense program is not worth its ephemeral benefits.

With a fully functioning missile defense shield deployed, nuclear-armed ballistic missiles become obsolete, unable to ever reach their targets. This means countries’ strategic obsession with second-strike capacity, the ability to return fire with nuclear weapons should they be attacked by them (Mutually Assured Destruction), will cease to be an issue, as first-strikes are destined to be wiped out before they hit a single target. What this means is that countries with missile defense systems can feel secure without the need of retaining massive nuclear arsenals. This will alleviate the pressure to have stockpiles of warheads and will promote disarmament. Mutually Assured Destruction has become a far less secure strategy as nuclear proliferation has occurred to states with different strategic conceptions. This has been seen in the United States, which since its full adoption of the Aegis system has actively pursued a policy of reaching a new accord with Russia on nuclear arms reduction. This culminated in 2010 with the signing of the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), an accord to reduce the number of strategic nuclear missile launchers by half (Associated Press, 2011). This new step toward nuclear disarmament could not be politically possible in the United States without a replacement defense, which only a national missile defense system can provide.

Nuclear capability has historically created more stable international relations between countries, as described in the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). The United States and Russia never engaged one another in open conflict during the whole span of the Cold War, for example, for fear of setting off a nuclear cataclysm neither could survive (Waltz, 1981). MAD breaks down, however, with the advent of national missile defense systems. This is due to the fact that when a state cannot guarantee its second-strike, or even first-strike capability it becomes vulnerable. Countries without missile defense systems will be defenseless against those that have them. Furthermore, as the technology is disseminated and more countries possess missile defense systems, stability decreases as it will become a gamble as to which country can more successfully counteract the offensive and defensive missile systems of the enemy. Missile defense makes the world less, not more safe.

An operational national missile defense system renders nuclear weapons, and intercontinental ballistic missiles generally, obsolete. When a country can shoot down all enemy missiles, those weapons lose their power. The future of war, once countries have access to the technology to build missile shields, will no longer be marked by fingers held over the proverbial red button. Rather, the incentive for conflict between states armed with effective missile defenses will be to seek diplomatic solutions to problems. The technology will likely be in the hands of many nations very soon, as the United States has already provided the technology to Japan and Australia, and will be building defense batteries in Romania from 2015 (McMichael, 2009). Furthermore, even should war break out, they will necessarily be far less destructive, as they will not feature the city-leveling power of nuclear missiles. With missile defense, war will be less likely and, should it occur, less destructive.

Conventional war is a nasty thing, and can be just as destructive as nuclear war, if not as immediate. The threat of war is only increased with the breaking down of MAD, as countries will be able to engage one another without fear of the existential threat of nuclear holocaust. Furthermore, if many countries have access to missile defense systems they will likely be able to employ countermeasures against their enemies’ systems, bringing the chance of nuclear weapons deployment back to the fore.

The nation-state is the fundamental building block of the international system, and is recognized as such in all international treaties and organizations (Mearsheimer, 1993). States are recognized as having the right to defend themselves, and this right must extend to the possession of a strategic national missile defense system. The United States has every right to develop such a system if it will furnish a greater measure of defense for its citizens and interests. US military technology is the most advanced and prodigiously financed in the world, which is why it is generally the United States that stands at the forefront of new defense and combat systems. The National Missile Defense program is simply the newest tool in the arsenal of the world’s greatest military, whose purpose is entirely defensive. To shield itself from potential ballistic missile, and even nuclear, attack the United States has the right to build a missile shield to defend itself and its allies under its aegis. There is no principled justification for a country to not pursue defense initiatives that benefit itself and that it wishes to pursue.

It is not always within the right of a state to develop weapons and technology, since international treaties ban, for example, the development of chemical and nuclear weapons. Furthermore, when the development of weapons will be detrimental to the state that builds them, it is in their interest no to do so. In the case of national missile defense, the United States is angering several countries, particularly Russia, and potentially upsetting the balance of mutually assured destruction (Harding, 2007). Clearly more than a right to self-defense must be considered when developing new kinds of armament.

The missile defense shield the United States intends to build is the most effective and complete ballistic missile shield ever devised. When fully armed with a complement of anti-ballistic missiles both within the United States itself, and in allied nations in Europe, the shield will be virtually impregnable to external missile attack. This means the chance of a nuclear attack succeeding against it will be very unlikely, reducing the chance not only of a full-scale nuclear war between the United States and another nuclear power, but also against missiles fired by rogue states or terrorists, the biggest threats in terms of actual use of nuclear weapons (The Economist, 2009). Technologically speaking, anti-ballistic missile missiles have developed by leaps and bounds in recent years. The current system being put into operation by the United States is the Aegis combat system, designed for deployment on US Naval vessels. This new development has served to sidestep the problems associated with ground and space-based missile defense arrays, due to the slow response time of ground missiles, and the still unfeasible orbital deployment. The sea-based defense array, furthermore, lacks the problem of the land-based system in that it does not need to be placed in countries other than the United States in order to be effective (thus avoiding the political problems of the past). Technology and diplomacy have clearly made a national missile defense system highly desirable.

Anti-ballistic missile systems are a largely unproven technology, and still have many problems that do not make them a viable option for strategic defense, at least not at present. Furthermore, there is the excessively high cost of designing and building such a system, which has been in development for 25 years. It has cost billions of dollars over the decades, including $53 billion between 2004 and 2009, the largest single line on the Pentagon’s budget for those years. For all this, only an unproven system of questionable efficacy has been produced. It would be better to stop throwing good money after bad trying to develop a technology that may never be useful. Also, even if the technology were made effective, the same technology could be used as a countermeasure by enemy countries against the interception of their missiles, making the system even less effective, if not useless (Sessler, et al., 2000). Furthermore, the system does not protect the vital interests of the United States because it angers countries like Russia, which has actually begun increasing its conventional force distributions on its Western border with the rest of Europe, and to threaten to deploy short-range nuclear missiles on its border. The political destabilization caused by the missile defense program is not worth its ephemeral benefits.

With a fully functioning missile defense shield deployed, nuclear-armed ballistic missiles become obsolete, unable to ever reach their targets. This means countries’ strategic obsession with second-strike capacity, the ability to return fire with nuclear weapons should they be attacked by them (Mutually Assured Destruction), will cease to be an issue, as first-strikes are destined to be wiped out before they hit a single target. What this means is that countries with missile defense systems can feel secure without the need of retaining massive nuclear arsenals. This will alleviate the pressure to have stockpiles of warheads and will promote disarmament. Mutually Assured Destruction has become a far less secure strategy as nuclear proliferation has occurred to states with different strategic conceptions. This has been seen in the United States, which since its full adoption of the Aegis system has actively pursued a policy of reaching a new accord with Russia on nuclear arms reduction. This culminated in 2010 with the signing of the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), an accord to reduce the number of strategic nuclear missile launchers by half (Associated Press, 2011). This new step toward nuclear disarmament could not be politically possible in the United States without a replacement defense, which only a national missile defense system can provide.

Nuclear capability has historically created more stable international relations between countries, as described in the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). The United States and Russia never engaged one another in open conflict during the whole span of the Cold War, for example, for fear of setting off a nuclear cataclysm neither could survive (Waltz, 1981). MAD breaks down, however, with the advent of national missile defense systems. This is due to the fact that when a state cannot guarantee its second-strike, or even first-strike capability it becomes vulnerable. Countries without missile defense systems will be defenseless against those that have them. Furthermore, as the technology is disseminated and more countries possess missile defense systems, stability decreases as it will become a gamble as to which country can more successfully counteract the offensive and defensive missile systems of the enemy. Missile defense makes the world less, not more safe.

An operational national missile defense system renders nuclear weapons, and intercontinental ballistic missiles generally, obsolete. When a country can shoot down all enemy missiles, those weapons lose their power. The future of war, once countries have access to the technology to build missile shields, will no longer be marked by fingers held over the proverbial red button. Rather, the incentive for conflict between states armed with effective missile defenses will be to seek diplomatic solutions to problems. The technology will likely be in the hands of many nations very soon, as the United States has already provided the technology to Japan and Australia, and will be building defense batteries in Romania from 2015 (McMichael, 2009). Furthermore, even should war break out, they will necessarily be far less destructive, as they will not feature the city-leveling power of nuclear missiles. With missile defense, war will be less likely and, should it occur, less destructive.

Conventional war is a nasty thing, and can be just as destructive as nuclear war, if not as immediate. The threat of war is only increased with the breaking down of MAD, as countries will be able to engage one another without fear of the existential threat of nuclear holocaust. Furthermore, if many countries have access to missile defense systems they will likely be able to employ countermeasures against their enemies’ systems, bringing the chance of nuclear weapons deployment back to the fore.

Nuclear weapons create stability, as described in the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Countries with nuclear weapons have no incentive to engage in open military conflict with one another; all recognize that they will suffer destruction if they choose the path of war (Waltz, 1981). If countries have nuclear weapons, fighting simply becomes too costly. This serves to defuse conflicts, and reduce the likelihood of the outbreak of war. When states have nuclear weapons they cannot fight, making the world a more peaceful place. Furthermore, armed with a nuclear deterrent, all states become equal in terms of ability to do harm to one another (Jervis, 2001). If a large state attempts to intimidate or to invade a smaller neighbor, it will be unable to effectively subdue it, since the small state will have the power to seriously injure, or even destroy, the would-be invader with a few well-placed nuclear missiles (Mearsheimer, 1993). The dynamics created by MAD are entirely lost when national missile defense systems are brought into the equation. Anti-ballistic missile missiles effectively eliminate the surety of MAD; it becomes a gamble of whether one’s nuclear arsenal will be able to penetrate the missile shield of the enemy. This increases the chance of a nuclear war, since an aggressor state can count on its missile shield to deflect the second-strike attempted by its opponent. Furthermore, in the case where both states in a conflict have missile defense arrays, as will likely occur as the technology is disseminated, the outbreak of war is also more likely, since each will try to race the other to the ability to counter each other’s offensive and defensive missiles. Clearly, the technology will only destabilize world relations, not offer greater security.

MAD is not an effective means of maintaining world security. It relies upon states being too afraid to ever attack one another with nuclear weapons, but the risk of one doing so remains, irrespective of the doctrine. In terms of deterring conventional warfare, that assumes that the state being attacked would chose mutual destruction over potential, transitory subjugation. MAD has too many inherent risks and raises the very real chance, as weapons amass and proliferate, of their being used (Sagan, 1993). National missile defense systems provide a very real defense against not only full-scale attacks by other states, but against nuclear-capable rogue states, such as North Korea, which is seeking to develop intercontinental ballistic missile technology of its own. Should North Korea ever be able to attack the United States or its allies with nuclear weapons, the world will need the ability to counter it. National missile defense is simply a strategic necessity of the modern world in which nuclear weapons may fall into the hands of unstable, aggressive states who might actually try to use them.

Many countries look upon the national missile defense program of the United States as a serious threat to their security. Russia stands at the forefront of this group, and has for several years actively opposed the development of an anti-ballistic missile technology. If the program is a success and only the United States and its close strategic allies possess the ability to develop such defenses, they will have a marked advantage over all other countries in terms of fighting ability, as the United States would be able to use its own ballistic missiles to intimidate and attack its opponents while being effectively immune to retaliation. Fears over the development of the system have led Russia to make extremely threatening postures on its European border; when the United States planned to deploy a battery of interceptor missiles in Poland in 2008, Russia responded by increasing troop numbers along its European borders and even threatened to deploy its own battery of short-range nuclear missiles on the border (Harding, 2007). This sort of conflict is extremely dangerous, and raises the chance of international conflict escalating into war. Such an outcome is extremely undesirable, and the defensive capabilities of a missile shield are not enough to warrant such risks. Furthermore, the United Nations has sought to end research into anti-ballistic missile technology, and has on several occasions called on the United States to stop its testing (Reuters, 1999). Much of the international community fears the instability that might arise from the breaking down of the current world order of nuclear deterrence between states.

The United States has rarely bent the knee to international pressure with regard to issues directly affecting its security, nor should it. Not only does the United States have a right, as do all states, to defend itself against any potential foreign aggression, it is also the primary purveyor of the public good of international security, policing the sea lanes and serving as the United Nations’ primary peacekeeper (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2008). This role places the United States in particular danger because it means it often contends with, and gains the enmity of, some of the most dangerous groups in the world. North Korea, for example, has been at odds with the United States for many years. Furthermore, the United States’ development of a missile defense shield has allowed it to feel safer. It is thus more willing to engage in dialogue concerning and implementation of nuclear arms reduction programs, as occurred with the recent New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) with Russia (Associated Press, 2011). This reduction is in compliance with the wishes of the United Nations, and is arguably more important for international security. Additionally, in the case of Russia, the United States has been able to reach a compromise by which Russia will not oppose its sea-based missile defenses, so long as they are not built on land on the Russian frontier.

Research and development of effective strategic defense systems has been ongoing since the Reagan administration, to little lasting benefit. The US government has spent hundreds of billions of dollars in the past two decades on developing missile defense technology, including nearly $60 billion in the past five years, and still it is incomplete and its effectiveness questionable. Many scientists have attested to the ineffectiveness of missile defense, as it currently stands. It is very difficult to hit a flying missile with another missile, and test-runs of the technology have been patchy at best (Sessler et. al., 2000). The dream of an effective missile defense shield that can successfully intercept enemy intercontinental ballistic missiles has yet to come to fruition. It would be better to stop throwing good money after bad and to fold up the project entirely.

While missile defense technology still has problems that need to be worked out, its future is very promising. The most recent technology, Aegis, is far more effective in testing than its predecessors and has been deployed on a number of Navy warships and in Japan and Australia (McMichael, 2009). The technology will with time become extremely effective at stopping enemy missiles. In a world with more and more countries developing nuclear weapons, many who oppose the United States and its allies, it is imperative that the United States has an effective defense against them. A missile defense system is the most promising such defense.