This House supports the Dalai Lama’s ‘third way’ in Tibet.

The Dalai Lama believes complete independence is not a viable solution for the Tibet crisis. Rather, his advocacy is aimed at creating common understanding between the Chinese and the Tibetans. He points to the model of the European Union as an example of a modern supranational political system in which different ethnicities and nationalities can cooperate to achieve an agreed ideal of prosperity.

“Look at the European Union … What is the use of small, small nations fighting each other? Today it's much better for Tibetans to join [China].”[1]

The 'Middle Way' is the most practical and realistic path for Tibet and China, as it bridges the needs of the Tibetan people with and interests of China.

Specifically, the "Middle Way" offers a mutually beneficial course of action, as it avoids the concerns that China has regarding national unity and separation and at the same time it enables the Tibetan people to achieve de-facto equivalent of a right to self-determination.

Acceptance of the 'Middle Way' would work as a signal demonstrating the increasing openness and accountability of Chinese political culture. As it is beneficial for both parties, it can be considered as a practical political course with a great potential to alleviate an ever growing strained situation.[2]

China is more likely to negotiate with Tibetan activists and leaders if their demands are limited to greater political autonomy. Conversely, China is unlikely to give up control of Tibet, as doing so would constitute a grievous blow to the territorial integrity of China itself.

The 'Middle Way' provides the current generation of Chinese leaders with an opportunity to accord greater autonomy to Tibet, without risking their domestic political capital or jeopardising China’s international standing.

A key aspect of the 'Middle Way' is an undertaking by Tibetan leaders not to push for further independence if greater autonomy is granted.

The 'Middle Way' also has the advantage of being in keeping with Tibetan Buddhist beliefs, mirroring the religion’s own ‘middle way’ tradition. The Buddhist 'Middle Way' is the descriptive term that Siddhartha Gautama (the Supreme Buddha) used to describe the character of the path he discovered that led to liberation. It was coined in the very first teaching that he delivered after his enlightenment. In this sutta- known in English as The Setting in Motion of the Wheel of Dharma- the Buddha describes the middle way as a path of moderation between the extremes of sensual indulgence and self-mortification.[3]

The Dalai Lama's “Middle Way” in Tibet is designed, per its name, around these Buddhist principles, and so it has the advantage of being in keeping with the religious beliefs of most of Tibet's population. This adds to its practicality as it would offer a political strategy consistent with the cultural norms of most Tibetans. Therefore, the Dalai Lama's 'Middle Way's is the most practical and realistic path toward rapprochement between Tibet and China.

[1] Liu, Melinda. “Fears and Tears”. The Daily Beast. 19 March 2008. http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/03/19/fears-and-tears.

[2] Gyaltsen, Kelsang. “The Middle-Way approach”. Tibetan Bulletin, July-August 1997. http://tibetoday.com/middle_way_approach.htm

[3] Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta, Samyutta Nikaya, 56:11 http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn56/sn56.011.than.

The 'Middle Way' is no different from the current situation. Although, theoretically, the 'Middle Way' proposition offers the Chinese authorities and ordinary Tibetans a way to harmonise their conflicting interests, it is practically no different from the political accommodation that Tibet currently subscribes to. Under the ‘Middle Way’, the Dalai Lama has expressed willingness to accept socialist rule in Tibet. He has also dropped former Tibetan demands that their homeland be offered a political relationship as expansive as China’s offer in the early-1980s to Taiwan in favour of an insistence on a Hong Kong-style ‘association’ relationship with Beijing. Since the early 2000s, in keeping with the ‘Middle Way’, his hints about a residual international personality have been kept to a minimum. Further, the autonomy arrangement sought is an amalgam of the Hong Kong ‘one country, two systems’ formula and the existing autonomy provisions of the PRC Constitution.[1] This gradual dropping of Tibetan demands under the name of the ‘Middle Way’ means that it offers little improvement from the status quo.

The background in terms of political events that led to a proposition of a "Middle Way" sheds more light into the fact that his strategy is just a new name on the board for the same as the provisions currently existing within the PRC constitution.[2]  If the PRC sees that the ‘middle way’ is slowly reducing the demands for more freedom for Tibet then they are unlikely to embrace it as they can equally wait for more concessions. Despite all these concessions to the PRC position there are still things that China will never accept such as any idea that Tibet will be transformed into a ‘zone of peace and non-violence’ or that there should be a popularly elected legislature – it would inevitably mean others in China would believe they should have more democracy. By giving away so many concessions before negotiations but still making it impossible for the PRC to accept the Dalai Lama makes it unlikely that his middle way will get anywhere in negotiations so it is not really ‘realistic’.

[1] Gupta, Sourabh. “The Dalai Lama’s Middle-Way approach needs re-adjustment”. EastAsiaForum. 8 March  2010. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/03/08/the-dalai-lamas-middle-way-approach-and-the-need-for-re-adjustment/

[2] ChinaDaily. “What is Dalai Lama's 'Middle Way'”. ChinaDaily.com.cn 26 July 2007. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-07/26/content_649545.htm

The USA, the most powerful nation in the world, has been vocal in its support for the 'Middle Way' strategy. Concurrently, the US has not given any indication that it would support complete Tibetan independence – nor is it likely to. America is unlikely to jeopardise trade relations with China over the Tibetan issue by giving political legitimacy to those advocating complete independence.[1]

The European Parliament and the Scottish Parliament have also both passed motions advocating for the 'Middle Way' as a solution in Tibet.[2][3] Such international support for the 'Middle Way' should be compared to the fact that no country in the world has ever recognised Tibetan independence.[4]

Only the involvement of international actors and inter-governmental organisations can guarantee that Tibet and China will be able to attain a peaceful and equitable equilibrium with each other. International support means that the international community would accept any change when it occurs and gives China a further incentive to negotiate for some form of the ‘Middle Way’ as it would positively benefit its international relations.

[1] Valdes, Manuel. “Dalai Lama to begin 6-day U.S. visit in Seattle to discuss compassion amid turmoil in Tibet”. Associated Press. 10 April 2008. http://legacy.signonsandiego.com/news/state/20080410-0236-dalailama.html

[2] TibetCustom. “European Parliament Discusses Current Situation of Tibet”. TibetCustom. 26 March 2010. http://www.tibetcustom.com/article.php/20100326083417443

[3] Australia Tibet Council. “Sino-Tibetan Dialogue Presented to Scottish Parliament”. Australia Tibet Council. 2011. http://www.atc.org.au/content/view/263/91/

[4] The Economist. “Britain's suzerain remedy”. The Economist. 6 November 2008. http://www.economist.com/node/12570571?story_id=12570571

The opinions of foreign governments and the international community have frequently failed to have any real impact upon the situation 'on the ground' in Tibet. For example, The US joined most other UN members in condemning the Chinese 'aggression' and 'invasion' of Tibet in 1950, however the Chinese exerted their authority there anyway.[1] The international community will therefore acquiesce with whatever is decided between Tibet and China – they will applaud any deal or condemn any repression but this will not affect the positions of either side. Rather, what matters is what the Tibetan population support, and there is good reason to believe that the 'Middle Way' does not satisfy them. Many younger Tibetans would prefer that the Dalai Lama push for total independence, an regret that he did not pursue a more confrontational path with China over the 2008 Olympics.[2]

[1] The Office of Tibet, New York. “Historical Overview”. The Office of Tibet, New York. http://tibetoffice.org/tibet-info/historical-overview

[2] Bell, Thomas. “Tibetans criticise Dalai Lama's 'middle way'”. The Telegraph. 18 March 2008. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1582113/Tibetans-criticise-Dalai-Lamas-middle-way.html

The Chinese government has a right to protect the unity of China against Tibetan separatism. US President Abraham Lincoln, in justifying efforts to maintain the union in the face of an imminent civil war, said in 1858, “A house divided cannot stand”.[1] Unity was argued to be essential to the integrity and future of the union if the United States as a much more decentralized federal union cannot sanction such a division then a much more centralized China cannot. China can put forth the same rationale as Lincoln for forcing Tibet to remain part of China, for example when it notes argues that the concept of an independent Tibet has historically been used by what it calls ‘foreign imperialists’ to interfere in China internally and split it up so that it can more easily be controlled from abroad. As an example of this, the CIA’s support for Tibetan separatists during the Cold War is cited.[2][3]

Mongolia provides a striking precedent for for Chinese worries about Tibetan independence, as it gained independence through Soviet backing and subsequently came under effective control of the USSR.[4] If Tibet were to achieve independence, both China and Tibet would be weaker, with less geopolitical strength and with greater tensions and opportunities for conflict. This is especially true in light of the history of foreign attempts to interfere with China internally, as noted above. The Dalai Lama made a similar argument himself when he stated: “Look at the European Union … What is the use of small, small nations fighting each other? Today it's much better for Tibetans to join [China].”[5] In 2008 the Foreign Minister of Cyprus similarly argued that the ‘One China’ policy, including Tibet, was necessary to safeguard China’s territorial integrity.[6] The government of Fiji has offered similar support.[7] The 'Middle Way' accounts for this need of China's whilst also offering greater autonomy to the Tibetan people, thus respecting the rights of both parties.

[1] Abraham Lincoln Online. “House Divided Speech”. Abraham Lincoln Online. http://showcase.netins.net/web/creative/lincoln/speeches/house.htm

[2] Xinhua News report Xinhua News Report. Xinhua News. http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2002-11/15/content_630888.htm

[3] Wonacott, Peter. "Revolt of the Monks: How a Secret CIA Campaign Against China 50 Years Ago Continues to Fester; A Role for Dalai Lama's Brother". Wall Street Journal. 30 August 2008. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122005956740185361.html?mod=googlenews_wsj

[4] Xinhua News report Xinhua News Report. Xinhua News. http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2002-11/15/content_630888.htm

[5] Liu, Melinda. “Fears and Tears”. The Daily Beast. 19 March 2008. http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/03/19/fears-and-tears.html

[6] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus. “Cyprus supports the principle of a ‘single’ China”. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus. 20 March 2008/ . http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/5B640E57BE973A1FC22574120050A086?OpenDocument

[7] Fijilive. “Fiji backs China’s action in Tibet”. Fijilive. 24 March 2008. http://www.fijilive.com/news_new/index.php/news/show_news/3075

China's supposed strategic interests in Tibet are also why the promised autonomy under the 'Middle Way' will never truly emerge. If China's need to hold onto Tibet is really so important as made out, China will always need to keep tight control over all happenings in Tibet so as to further guarantee its security. This of course assumes China really does have vital strategic interests in controlling Tibet (as the Chinese Government claims, and as is argued opposite), however it is not entirely clear exactly what these strategic interests are. The 'Middle Way' is just a smokescreen for perpetuating the predominance of China's security interests as the most important issue in Tibet. Thus, if China does have vital strategic interests in Tibet, it will never allow it true autonomy (and so the Middle Way is hopeless), and if it has no vital strategic interests in controlling Tibet then Chinese rule there is unjustified -and independence, not the ‘Middle Way’ should be adopted.

The Dalai Lama believes complete independence is not a viable solution for the Tibet crisis. Rather, his advocacy is aimed at creating common understanding between the Chinese and the Tibetans. He points to the model of the European Union as an example of a modern supranational political system in which different ethnicities and nationalities can cooperate to achieve an agreed ideal of prosperity.

“Look at the European Union … What is the use of small, small nations fighting each other? Today it's much better for Tibetans to join [China].”[1]

The 'Middle Way' is the most practical and realistic path for Tibet and China, as it bridges the needs of the Tibetan people with and interests of China.

Specifically, the "Middle Way" offers a mutually beneficial course of action, as it avoids the concerns that China has regarding national unity and separation and at the same time it enables the Tibetan people to achieve de-facto equivalent of a right to self-determination.

Acceptance of the 'Middle Way' would work as a signal demonstrating the increasing openness and accountability of Chinese political culture. As it is beneficial for both parties, it can be considered as a practical political course with a great potential to alleviate an ever growing strained situation.[2]

China is more likely to negotiate with Tibetan activists and leaders if their demands are limited to greater political autonomy. Conversely, China is unlikely to give up control of Tibet, as doing so would constitute a grievous blow to the territorial integrity of China itself.

The 'Middle Way' provides the current generation of Chinese leaders with an opportunity to accord greater autonomy to Tibet, without risking their domestic political capital or jeopardising China’s international standing.

A key aspect of the 'Middle Way' is an undertaking by Tibetan leaders not to push for further independence if greater autonomy is granted.

The 'Middle Way' also has the advantage of being in keeping with Tibetan Buddhist beliefs, mirroring the religion’s own ‘middle way’ tradition. The Buddhist 'Middle Way' is the descriptive term that Siddhartha Gautama (the Supreme Buddha) used to describe the character of the path he discovered that led to liberation. It was coined in the very first teaching that he delivered after his enlightenment. In this sutta- known in English as The Setting in Motion of the Wheel of Dharma- the Buddha describes the middle way as a path of moderation between the extremes of sensual indulgence and self-mortification.[3]

The Dalai Lama's “Middle Way” in Tibet is designed, per its name, around these Buddhist principles, and so it has the advantage of being in keeping with the religious beliefs of most of Tibet's population. This adds to its practicality as it would offer a political strategy consistent with the cultural norms of most Tibetans. Therefore, the Dalai Lama's 'Middle Way's is the most practical and realistic path toward rapprochement between Tibet and China.

[1] Liu, Melinda. “Fears and Tears”. The Daily Beast. 19 March 2008. http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/03/19/fears-and-tears.

[2] Gyaltsen, Kelsang. “The Middle-Way approach”. Tibetan Bulletin, July-August 1997. http://tibetoday.com/middle_way_approach.htm

[3] Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta, Samyutta Nikaya, 56:11 http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn56/sn56.011.than.

The 'Middle Way' is no different from the current situation. Although, theoretically, the 'Middle Way' proposition offers the Chinese authorities and ordinary Tibetans a way to harmonise their conflicting interests, it is practically no different from the political accommodation that Tibet currently subscribes to. Under the ‘Middle Way’, the Dalai Lama has expressed willingness to accept socialist rule in Tibet. He has also dropped former Tibetan demands that their homeland be offered a political relationship as expansive as China’s offer in the early-1980s to Taiwan in favour of an insistence on a Hong Kong-style ‘association’ relationship with Beijing. Since the early 2000s, in keeping with the ‘Middle Way’, his hints about a residual international personality have been kept to a minimum. Further, the autonomy arrangement sought is an amalgam of the Hong Kong ‘one country, two systems’ formula and the existing autonomy provisions of the PRC Constitution.[1] This gradual dropping of Tibetan demands under the name of the ‘Middle Way’ means that it offers little improvement from the status quo.

The background in terms of political events that led to a proposition of a "Middle Way" sheds more light into the fact that his strategy is just a new name on the board for the same as the provisions currently existing within the PRC constitution.[2]  If the PRC sees that the ‘middle way’ is slowly reducing the demands for more freedom for Tibet then they are unlikely to embrace it as they can equally wait for more concessions. Despite all these concessions to the PRC position there are still things that China will never accept such as any idea that Tibet will be transformed into a ‘zone of peace and non-violence’ or that there should be a popularly elected legislature – it would inevitably mean others in China would believe they should have more democracy. By giving away so many concessions before negotiations but still making it impossible for the PRC to accept the Dalai Lama makes it unlikely that his middle way will get anywhere in negotiations so it is not really ‘realistic’.

[1] Gupta, Sourabh. “The Dalai Lama’s Middle-Way approach needs re-adjustment”. EastAsiaForum. 8 March  2010. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/03/08/the-dalai-lamas-middle-way-approach-and-the-need-for-re-adjustment/

[2] ChinaDaily. “What is Dalai Lama's 'Middle Way'”. ChinaDaily.com.cn 26 July 2007. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-07/26/content_649545.htm

The USA, the most powerful nation in the world, has been vocal in its support for the 'Middle Way' strategy. Concurrently, the US has not given any indication that it would support complete Tibetan independence – nor is it likely to. America is unlikely to jeopardise trade relations with China over the Tibetan issue by giving political legitimacy to those advocating complete independence.[1]

The European Parliament and the Scottish Parliament have also both passed motions advocating for the 'Middle Way' as a solution in Tibet.[2][3] Such international support for the 'Middle Way' should be compared to the fact that no country in the world has ever recognised Tibetan independence.[4]

Only the involvement of international actors and inter-governmental organisations can guarantee that Tibet and China will be able to attain a peaceful and equitable equilibrium with each other. International support means that the international community would accept any change when it occurs and gives China a further incentive to negotiate for some form of the ‘Middle Way’ as it would positively benefit its international relations.

[1] Valdes, Manuel. “Dalai Lama to begin 6-day U.S. visit in Seattle to discuss compassion amid turmoil in Tibet”. Associated Press. 10 April 2008. http://legacy.signonsandiego.com/news/state/20080410-0236-dalailama.html

[2] TibetCustom. “European Parliament Discusses Current Situation of Tibet”. TibetCustom. 26 March 2010. http://www.tibetcustom.com/article.php/20100326083417443

[3] Australia Tibet Council. “Sino-Tibetan Dialogue Presented to Scottish Parliament”. Australia Tibet Council. 2011. http://www.atc.org.au/content/view/263/91/

[4] The Economist. “Britain's suzerain remedy”. The Economist. 6 November 2008. http://www.economist.com/node/12570571?story_id=12570571

The opinions of foreign governments and the international community have frequently failed to have any real impact upon the situation 'on the ground' in Tibet. For example, The US joined most other UN members in condemning the Chinese 'aggression' and 'invasion' of Tibet in 1950, however the Chinese exerted their authority there anyway.[1] The international community will therefore acquiesce with whatever is decided between Tibet and China – they will applaud any deal or condemn any repression but this will not affect the positions of either side. Rather, what matters is what the Tibetan population support, and there is good reason to believe that the 'Middle Way' does not satisfy them. Many younger Tibetans would prefer that the Dalai Lama push for total independence, an regret that he did not pursue a more confrontational path with China over the 2008 Olympics.[2]

[1] The Office of Tibet, New York. “Historical Overview”. The Office of Tibet, New York. http://tibetoffice.org/tibet-info/historical-overview

[2] Bell, Thomas. “Tibetans criticise Dalai Lama's 'middle way'”. The Telegraph. 18 March 2008. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1582113/Tibetans-criticise-Dalai-Lamas-middle-way.html

The Chinese government has a right to protect the unity of China against Tibetan separatism. US President Abraham Lincoln, in justifying efforts to maintain the union in the face of an imminent civil war, said in 1858, “A house divided cannot stand”.[1] Unity was argued to be essential to the integrity and future of the union if the United States as a much more decentralized federal union cannot sanction such a division then a much more centralized China cannot. China can put forth the same rationale as Lincoln for forcing Tibet to remain part of China, for example when it notes argues that the concept of an independent Tibet has historically been used by what it calls ‘foreign imperialists’ to interfere in China internally and split it up so that it can more easily be controlled from abroad. As an example of this, the CIA’s support for Tibetan separatists during the Cold War is cited.[2][3]

Mongolia provides a striking precedent for for Chinese worries about Tibetan independence, as it gained independence through Soviet backing and subsequently came under effective control of the USSR.[4] If Tibet were to achieve independence, both China and Tibet would be weaker, with less geopolitical strength and with greater tensions and opportunities for conflict. This is especially true in light of the history of foreign attempts to interfere with China internally, as noted above. The Dalai Lama made a similar argument himself when he stated: “Look at the European Union … What is the use of small, small nations fighting each other? Today it's much better for Tibetans to join [China].”[5] In 2008 the Foreign Minister of Cyprus similarly argued that the ‘One China’ policy, including Tibet, was necessary to safeguard China’s territorial integrity.[6] The government of Fiji has offered similar support.[7] The 'Middle Way' accounts for this need of China's whilst also offering greater autonomy to the Tibetan people, thus respecting the rights of both parties.

[1] Abraham Lincoln Online. “House Divided Speech”. Abraham Lincoln Online. http://showcase.netins.net/web/creative/lincoln/speeches/house.htm

[2] Xinhua News report Xinhua News Report. Xinhua News. http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2002-11/15/content_630888.htm

[3] Wonacott, Peter. "Revolt of the Monks: How a Secret CIA Campaign Against China 50 Years Ago Continues to Fester; A Role for Dalai Lama's Brother". Wall Street Journal. 30 August 2008. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122005956740185361.html?mod=googlenews_wsj

[4] Xinhua News report Xinhua News Report. Xinhua News. http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2002-11/15/content_630888.htm

[5] Liu, Melinda. “Fears and Tears”. The Daily Beast. 19 March 2008. http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/03/19/fears-and-tears.html

[6] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus. “Cyprus supports the principle of a ‘single’ China”. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus. 20 March 2008/ . http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/5B640E57BE973A1FC22574120050A086?OpenDocument

[7] Fijilive. “Fiji backs China’s action in Tibet”. Fijilive. 24 March 2008. http://www.fijilive.com/news_new/index.php/news/show_news/3075

China's supposed strategic interests in Tibet are also why the promised autonomy under the 'Middle Way' will never truly emerge. If China's need to hold onto Tibet is really so important as made out, China will always need to keep tight control over all happenings in Tibet so as to further guarantee its security. This of course assumes China really does have vital strategic interests in controlling Tibet (as the Chinese Government claims, and as is argued opposite), however it is not entirely clear exactly what these strategic interests are. The 'Middle Way' is just a smokescreen for perpetuating the predominance of China's security interests as the most important issue in Tibet. Thus, if China does have vital strategic interests in Tibet, it will never allow it true autonomy (and so the Middle Way is hopeless), and if it has no vital strategic interests in controlling Tibet then Chinese rule there is unjustified -and independence, not the ‘Middle Way’ should be adopted.

The Dalai Lama's 'Middle Way' is far from popular amongst the Tibetan population. Many ordinary Tibetans have criticised the Dalai Lama's conciliatory approach to China. His refusal to call for a boycott of the Beijing Olympic Games is symbolic of this conciliatory approach where the majority of the Tibetan population, particularly the young disagreed with him. "China does not deserve to host the Olympics. It's evident that they do not deserve the Olympics," said Tsewang Rigzin, the leader of the Tibetan Youth Congress, at Dharamshala in 2008.[1]

Tsewang Rigzin also stated “There is a growing frustration within the Tibetan community, especially in the [younger] generation... I certainly hope the Middle Way approach will be reviewed. As we can see from the protests here and all over the world, the Tibetan people remain committed to achieving independence.”[2]

The (sometimes violent) 2008 protests made it clear that many Tibetans don't support the Dalai Lama's peaceful, non-revolutionary, non-independence 'Middle Way'. The Dalai Lama even had to threaten to resign if violent protests continued. Clearly, these protests showed that the Dalai Lama's  'Middle Way' lacks support amongst the young of Tibet – the individuals who will comprise successive generations of political, religious and business leaders.[3]

Within Tibet, pro-independence protesters have recently had more leverage than 'Middle Way' voices. The 'Middle Way' is a nuanced approach to the Tibetan issue and, therefore, is a less potent rallying for Tibetans who have been marginalised or excluded by Chinese policies in the region. Calls for Tibetan Independence mobilise more support among grass-roots activists in other areas of the world.[4]This is valuable, and is an argument in favour of, at least, continuing to call for Tibetan Independence, not merely the 'Middle Way'; it has a greater impact.

In this situation, it makes no sense for the Dalai Lama to alienate so many of his young people, so many of the most dedicated to the Tibetan cause, by preaching his 'Middle Way' when he should be calling for what his people truly want and need -Tibetan independence.

[1] Bell, Thomas. “Tibetans criticise Dalai Lama's 'middle way'”. The Telegraph. 18 March 2008. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1582113/Tibetans-criticise-Dalai-Lamas-middle-way.html

[2] Bell, Thomas. “Tibetans criticise Dalai Lama's 'middle way'”. The Telegraph. 18 March 2008. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1582113/Tibetans-criticise-Dalai-Lamas-middle-way.html

[3] The Economist. “Trashing the Beijing Road”. The Economist. 19 March 2008. http://www.economist.com/node/10875823?story_id=10875823&CFID=1092371&CFTOKEN=80120804

[4] The Economist. “A flaming row”. 9 Arpil 2008. http://www.economist.com/node/11003821?story_id=11003821

The average Tibetan does not actually want independence from China. For example, Dr. Lobsang Sangay, who was born in a refugee camp in India in 1968 and was named Prime Minister of the Cental  Tibetan Administration (Tibetan exiles) on April 27, 2011, was once a militant of the Tibetan Youth Congress, a group that unequivocally supports Tibetan independence, but who now says he has matured and now supports the Middle Way Approach.[1] Certainly, many Tibetans want independence- of a type different to that proposed by the Dalai Lama- and some protest in favour of it. The Tibetan exile population is particularly vocal in this regard, but this should not be taken to mean that a majority of Tibetans want complete independence from China. Most Tibetans like everybody else would be happy with more freedoms within China rather than full independence. This is reflected in the views of the Dalai Lama, who seeks only greater freedoms and autonomy, but not independence, under the 'Middle Way'.[2]

[1] Editorial Board of The Tibetan Political Review. “Investigating the Candidates on the Middle Way”. The Tibetan Political Review. 15 March 2011. http://sites.google.com/site/tibetanpoliticalreview/project-updates/investigatingthecandidatesonthemiddleway

[2] Barnett, Robert. “Seven Questions: What Tibetans Want”. Foreign Policy. 26 March 2008. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2008/03/25/seven_questions_what_tibetans_want

The Dalai Lama's influence and significance in the debate over Tibet’s future has been fading; he has resigned from all ‘formal authority’ and handed over his political role[1], and his support for the 'Middle Way' strategy- over attempts to secure full independence- may well have reduced his influence. During the 2008 riots and protests in Lhasa in favour of Tibetan independence, a feeling of incongruity between the Dalai Lama and the desires of the Tibetan people was vocalized. A Tibetan teacher at the protests stated “We are demanding a peace dialogue between His Holiness and the Chinese. But at the moment, Dalai Lama is out of the picture. It's a Tibetan people's movement.”[2] Tibet appears to have moved beyond the 'Middle Way', but the Dalai Lama has not. For a new generation of Tibetans the Middle Way is considered to be an ineffective negotiation strategy, one that will not allow them to obtain the rights and political equality that they seek.

Many activists operating within Tibet itself believe that violent confrontations comparable to the Palestinian intifada will be more effective in extracting concessions from the Chinese than the non-violent protests advocated by the Dalai Lama.[3]

The Dalai Lama himself has recognized that the 'Middle Way' may become a redundant aspect of the Tibet debate. In 2003, he told a French reporter: “If no results can be achieved in two or three years of negotiations, I would find it hard to explain to the young that the 'middle way' is more effective than seeking independence... If I fail, these young people would raise torches and cry for independence”.[4]

Events on the ground are simply the Dalai Lama's own prediction coming true, as he become less relevant and less in touch. The Chinese government has also tried to discredit Dalai Lama. The Beijing authorities have released a documentary portraying the Dalai Lama as exploiting the Tibetan people to further his own political agenda. The documentary also emphasized the increased pace of economic development in the region.[5]

Quite simply, Tibet has moved beyond the Dalai Lama and his 'Middle Way', and both are increasingly irrelevant to Tibet's youth and future. The 'Middle Way' continues to be followed mostly out of a nostalgic fascination with the Dalai Lama, or out of the international community's desire for a single, moderate Tibetan voice, even if he does not represent the Tibetan people.

[1] Banyan, ‘The Dalai Lama resigns So long, farewell’, The Economist, 14 March 2011, http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2011/03/dalai_lama_resigns

[2] Bell, Thomas. “Tibetans criticise Dalai Lama's 'middle way'”. The Telegraph. 18 March 2008. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1582113/Tibetans-criticise-Dalai-Lamas-middle-way.html

[3] Sonam, Tenzing. “Until the Last Tibetan”. Tibet Writes. 26 December 2007. http://www.tibetwrites.org/?Until-the-last-Tibetan

[4] ChinaDaily. “What is Dalai Lama's 'Middle Way'”. ChinaDaily.com.cn 26 July 2007. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-07/26/content_649545.htm

[5] Little, Matthew. “CCTV-4 Steps up Propaganda Against Dalai Lama”. Epoch Times. 10 April 2008. http://en.epochtimes.com/news/8-4-10/68958.html

The Dalai Lama is the only solution for Tibet. His political advocacy as a leader and religious figure is imperative for the problem of Tibet. His commitment for non-violence and cohabitation and cooperation serves the peaceful interests of Tibet while accommodating for moderate changes. His 'Middle Way' platform is the bridge between China Tibet and world-wide international consensus on the Tibetans' right to self-determination. If resistance to China becomes more violent, as it did in 2008, then the Dalai Lama’s third way will become much more relevant as a solution that both sides can potentially sign up to. It may become the only way forward towards a compromise.

Irrespective of some discontent, the Dalai Lama still enjoys the loyalty and respect of most Tibetans.[1] During the 2008 protests in Tibet, the protesters regularly chanted the Dalai Lama's name, displayed his picture and recited a "long life" prayer for him.[2]  He remains the undisputed moral leader of Tibetan people, and as such his 'Middle Way' path still has weight.

[1] The Economist. “A colonial uprising”. The Economist. 19 March 2008. http://www.economist.com/node/10880709?story_id=10880709&CFID=1092371&CFTOKEN=80120804

[2] Bell, Thomas. “Tibetans criticise Dalai Lama's 'middle way'”. The Telegraph. 18 March 2008. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1582113/Tibetans-criticise-Dalai-Lamas-middle-way.html

The Chinese government manipulates people every day, and it is clear how Beijing is manipulating the good intentions of the Dalai Lama and his 'Middle Way'. The Middle Path is therefore not only hopeless, but also dangerous.

Henry Kissinger once said that in politics, one never pays for goods that have already been delivered. True to form, China is using the moderate stance of Tibet’s leadership-in-exile to extort concessions while giving nothing of substance in return. For example, Beijing spread false rumours that the Dalai Lama would be invited to China to prevent demonstrations when Hu Jintao visited the U.S. The 'Middle Way' policy is sapping momentum from the Tibet movement, depriving it of focus, and obscuring its goals. People are drifting away from a movement that appears to be drifting itself; political fervour can be difficult to sustain – especially when the Tibetan government-in-exile actually asks its supporters to behave in a passive a non-confrontational fashion.[1]

By asking Beijing for an official agreement to grant autonomous status to Tibet, the Tibetan government-in-exile will be surrendering many of the rights they are now entitled to and locking the entire Tibetan people into a constricted and precarious situation from which they cannot withdraw. Chinese restrictions will remain on the practice of Tibetan religion, culture and traditions within "autonomous" Tibet, the promotion of Tibetan culture, religion and traditions abroad will either be prohibited or restricted as it concerns foreign affairs, and all foreign travel will be controlled and restricted by the Chinese.[2] Accepting the Dalai Lama's 'Middle Way' will forever close the door on independence but leave Tibet still victim to China's cultural repression and control, and so it should not be supported.

[1] Dondup, Ketsun Lobsang. “Independence as Tibet’s Only Option: Why the ‘Middle Path’ is a Dead End”. Phayul.com. 25 January 2007. http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?article=%E2%80%9CIndependence+as+Tibet%E2%80%99s+Only+Option%3A+Why+the+%E2%80%98Middle+Path%E2%80%99+is+a+Dead+End%E2%80%9D&id=15428

[2] Shakabpa, Tsoltim N. “The Case Against Autonomy for Tibet”. Tibet Writes. 2 January 2008. http://www.tibetwrites.org/?The-Case-Against-Autonomy-for

China will simply never accept independence for Tibet, and so it is not a reasonable alternative to hold up against the 'Middle Way'. Rather, whatever gains can be made by adopting the 'Middle Way' should be embraced, as the alternative is not independence but rather unchanged Chinese dominance and control.