This House believes the Arab Spring revolutions can create stable democracies.

Many middle eastern states already have institutions that are similar to the representative institutions that a stable democracy needs so can easily become the real thing. Arab dictators have grown adept at holding elections, setting up parliaments; constitutional courts etc. as window dressing to show either to their people or to the outside world that they are reforming and are ‘democratic’. No matter how undemocratic these regimes have been the simple existence of these institutions is useful when there is a revolution as they allow some continuity and the possibility of a transition to democracy.

To take Egypt where protests toppled the Mubarak regime as an example. It has a parliament with the Majilis Al-Sha’ab (People’s Assembly) as its lower house and Majilis Al-Shura (Shura Council) as its upper house. In both houses a majority of the members are directly elected.[1] Egypt held elections for its parliament as recently as November 2010, these elections had very poor turnout and blatant ballot rigging while the main opposition the Muslim Brotherhood have to stand as independents.[2] Egypt also has previously had local elections for 52,000 municipal council seats in some 4,500 towns and cities. These elections are just as fraudulent as those for the national parliament. According to Muslim Brotherhood MP Jamdi Hassan “The ruling party used to allow opposition candidates to run and then simply rig the elections. Now, it has adopted a new strategy to ensure its continued domination: preventing the opposition from fielding any candidates at all.”[3] This may not be the best democratic tradition but at least it is a start. Similarly Egypt has a Supreme Constitutional Court that is supposed to be independent.[4]

While these institutions may have ceased working in a democratic way they could quite easily be changed in to being fully democratic. This would create the necessary checks and balances to sustain democracy over the long term. The people are used to elections and will know what to do when they have the option to vote freely, they would vote in a broad range of candidates. Many of them may be islamist but it would be democratic.

[1] Wikipedia, ‘Parliament of Egypt’, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parliament_of_Egypt accessed 19/05/2011

[2] Egypt hold parliamentary poll, 28/11/2010, BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11855691

[3] Adam Morrow and Khaled Moussa al-Omrani Opposition Squeezed in Local Elections, IPS News, 17/3/08, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=41618

[4] The Supreme Constitutional Court, ‘Historical Overview’, http://hccourt.gov.eg/About/history.asp

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While the presence of pre-existing institutions is an advantage in transitioning to a democracy, that advantage may be compromised when these institutions are largely seen as illegitimate and have not fostered a democratic political culture.  Key to the development of a democratic political culture is confidence in institutions and a willingness to accept the popular will as carried out by those institutions.

The predominance of the Executive over the Legislature is rather reminiscent of the Imperial Russian State Duma (1905-1917) as with Tunisia and Bahrain the lower house was directly elected, although the system was heavily weighted to produce pliant Dumas from 1907 on, and the upper house appointed. There was quite a plurality of parties and the Duma had control over a wide area of legislation but not over areas such as military policy and the Tsar had veto powers.[1] It certainly cannot be said that the Duma’s existence proved to be conducive to the creation of a stable democracy after the fall of the Tsar, or even a stable state of any sort.

The existence of the necessary institutions therefore does not mean anything if those very institutions are not seen as legitimate.

[1] E. A. Goldenweiser, ‘The Russian Duma’,Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Sep., 1914), pp. 408-422

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Egypt as the biggest Arab state and one of only two so far that have had largely peaceful revolutions is perhaps the best example of the progress that has been made. There was a referendum in Egypt in March on amending the constitution that passed with a yes vote of 77.2%. That there was a referendum at all surely counts as progress. It limits the number of presidential terms to two, promises to strengthen the judiciary and abolish some of the emergency laws. A turnout of 41% is not as good as it could have been but it was a great advance compared to other polls in recent Egyptian history. Mohamed Ahmed Attia, the chairman of the supreme judicial committee that supervised the elections, explained its significance as being “the first real referendum in Egypt's history, we had an unprecedented turnout because after Jan. 25 people started to feel that their vote would matter.”[1] Because Egypt has historically been at the center of the Arab world success in Egypt will be vital to show that a stable Arab democracy can be created.

[1] Egyptian Voters Approve Constitutional Changes, New York Times, Mar. 20, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/21/world/middleeast/21egypt.html?_r=1&par...

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The referendum is not an example of progress. It is not hard to see why many of those who demonstrated in Tahrir square were in the no camp for this referendum.  “The president remains extraordinarily powerful. The amendments do nothing about due process and neglect other authoritarian aspects of the state”[1] The referendum was attacked for not dealing with large scale structural issues. Leading opposition figures such as Mohamed El Baradei argue “The referendum deals only with minutiae. It doesn't talk about the imperial power of the president, it doesn't talk about the distortion of the parliament, it doesn't talk about the need to have an independent constituent assembly that represents everybody. So we are going to say no.”[2] This means that the institutional problems that helped create an over-mighty presidency and autocracy have remained in place.

These countries have also not become much more stable. There have been clashes between Christian Copts and Muslims following the burning of two churches on the 7th of May, which have left 180 injured and raises the specter of sectarian violence.[3] Meanwhile in Tunisia the government has re-imposed night time curfews after four days of demonstrations were ended by police firing tear gas.[4] It is difficult to consider such unrest progress.

[1] Steven A. Cook, ‘Interview, Egypt’s Referendum: Nervous Steps Forward’, Council on Foreign Relations, 21^st March 2011, http://www.cfr.org/egypt/egypts-referendum-nervous-steps-forward/p24452 accessed 19/05/11

[2] ‘Large turnout for Egypt's constitutional referendum’ BBC News, Mar. 19, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12793484

[3] Egypt Christians protest in Cairo after church attack, BBC News, May 9., 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13331628

[4] Post-revolution Egypt and Tunisia gripped by unrest May 8, 2011, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-blogs/casbah/post-revolution-egypt-and-tunisia-gripped-unrest

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The economic, social, and political history of the region show there are many obstacles to establishing stable democracies in the Middle East. Many in the West fear that Islam is among these barriers, with claims that Islamist parties like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Ennahda in Tunisia will turn their countries into theocracies like Iran. However, there are majority-Muslim states with Islamist parties that have succeeded in creating stable democracies, including Turkey and Indonesia. Both countries are good case studies that disprove the widespread notion that Islam is incompatible with democracy.

Turkey is most often cited as a good example for the Arab spring to follow. The election of the AKP has shown that an Islamic party can also uphold democracy, so providing a good example for the powerful Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab world. Elections are free and fair and the press is relatively free. The Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has faced down coup threats from the military, again something that may well be necessary given the large role the military has had in the previous regimes. Turkey’s economy is growing briskly and Turkey is following a foreign policy of reaching out to everybody and is touting itself as a model for Arab countries to follow.[1]

In Indonesia in 1998 there was a revolution that ousted President Suharto who had like Mubarak been in power for thirty years. This revolution progressed in a very similar way to the ongoing revolution in Egypt – in both countries the protesters were middle class and young, the president went relatively peacefully and the military helped during the transition.[2] Indonesia is now the largest Muslim democracy in the world and while there are islamist parties in parliament their support is now below 30%.[3] Indonesia can therefore provide a road map for moving from an interim government with the military in control to a fully functioning and successful democracy.

[1] A Muslim Democracy in Action, The Economist, 17^th February 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18185813accessed 20/05/11

[2] Banyan, Remember 1998  The Indonesian Example, The Economist, 7^th February 2011, http://www.economist.com/blogs/asiaview/2011/02/indonesian_example accessed 20/05/11

[3] Thomas Carothers, Egypt and Indonesia, The New Republic, 2^nd February 2011,  http://www.tnr.com/article/world/82650/egypt-and-indonesia accessed 20/05/11

While these examples prove that in some iterations Islam can work with democracy, it is likely that other factors made democracy viable in Inodnesia and Turkey. Indonesia is free of the hostile relationship with the West that often undermines the stability of the Middle East, and has benefitted from a strong trade relationship. While the AKP in Turkey is Islamist, it operates within the Turkish constitution which requires the military to dissolve any government that threatens the secular nature of the state. Without a constitutionally defined commitment to strict secularism, like in Turkey, the Islamist parties in Egypt and Tunisia will resort to undemocratic practices. 

While Indonesia’s revolution superficially looks similar it should be remembered that no two revolutions are really the same. They are different in almost every respect, culturally, geographically, economically. Indonesian Minister Natalegawa argues “I think the lesson form us is that it is possible for the democratization process to return to the military to it must be its original function.”[2]However this really shows a difference. In Indonesia the military never stepped in to take over the government as they have done in Egypt. If the key is reducing the role of the military Egypt has barely begun.

[1] Wolfango Piccoli, Full steam ahead on Turkish Constitutional reform, ForeignPolicy.com, 29^th May 2011, http://eurasia.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/05/19/turkey_full_steam_ahead_on_constitutional_reform accessed 20/05/11

[2] Julia Simon, Reformasis and Revolutions, Asia Calling, 17^th April 2011, http://www.asiacalling.org/ur/news/others/1966-reformasis-and-revolutions accessed 20/05/11

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Many middle eastern states already have institutions that are similar to the representative institutions that a stable democracy needs so can easily become the real thing. Arab dictators have grown adept at holding elections, setting up parliaments; constitutional courts etc. as window dressing to show either to their people or to the outside world that they are reforming and are ‘democratic’. No matter how undemocratic these regimes have been the simple existence of these institutions is useful when there is a revolution as they allow some continuity and the possibility of a transition to democracy.

To take Egypt where protests toppled the Mubarak regime as an example. It has a parliament with the Majilis Al-Sha’ab (People’s Assembly) as its lower house and Majilis Al-Shura (Shura Council) as its upper house. In both houses a majority of the members are directly elected.[1] Egypt held elections for its parliament as recently as November 2010, these elections had very poor turnout and blatant ballot rigging while the main opposition the Muslim Brotherhood have to stand as independents.[2] Egypt also has previously had local elections for 52,000 municipal council seats in some 4,500 towns and cities. These elections are just as fraudulent as those for the national parliament. According to Muslim Brotherhood MP Jamdi Hassan “The ruling party used to allow opposition candidates to run and then simply rig the elections. Now, it has adopted a new strategy to ensure its continued domination: preventing the opposition from fielding any candidates at all.”[3] This may not be the best democratic tradition but at least it is a start. Similarly Egypt has a Supreme Constitutional Court that is supposed to be independent.[4]

While these institutions may have ceased working in a democratic way they could quite easily be changed in to being fully democratic. This would create the necessary checks and balances to sustain democracy over the long term. The people are used to elections and will know what to do when they have the option to vote freely, they would vote in a broad range of candidates. Many of them may be islamist but it would be democratic.

[1] Wikipedia, ‘Parliament of Egypt’, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parliament_of_Egypt accessed 19/05/2011

[2] Egypt hold parliamentary poll, 28/11/2010, BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11855691

[3] Adam Morrow and Khaled Moussa al-Omrani Opposition Squeezed in Local Elections, IPS News, 17/3/08, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=41618

[4] The Supreme Constitutional Court, ‘Historical Overview’, http://hccourt.gov.eg/About/history.asp

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While the presence of pre-existing institutions is an advantage in transitioning to a democracy, that advantage may be compromised when these institutions are largely seen as illegitimate and have not fostered a democratic political culture.  Key to the development of a democratic political culture is confidence in institutions and a willingness to accept the popular will as carried out by those institutions.

The predominance of the Executive over the Legislature is rather reminiscent of the Imperial Russian State Duma (1905-1917) as with Tunisia and Bahrain the lower house was directly elected, although the system was heavily weighted to produce pliant Dumas from 1907 on, and the upper house appointed. There was quite a plurality of parties and the Duma had control over a wide area of legislation but not over areas such as military policy and the Tsar had veto powers.[1] It certainly cannot be said that the Duma’s existence proved to be conducive to the creation of a stable democracy after the fall of the Tsar, or even a stable state of any sort.

The existence of the necessary institutions therefore does not mean anything if those very institutions are not seen as legitimate.

[1] E. A. Goldenweiser, ‘The Russian Duma’,Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Sep., 1914), pp. 408-422

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Egypt as the biggest Arab state and one of only two so far that have had largely peaceful revolutions is perhaps the best example of the progress that has been made. There was a referendum in Egypt in March on amending the constitution that passed with a yes vote of 77.2%. That there was a referendum at all surely counts as progress. It limits the number of presidential terms to two, promises to strengthen the judiciary and abolish some of the emergency laws. A turnout of 41% is not as good as it could have been but it was a great advance compared to other polls in recent Egyptian history. Mohamed Ahmed Attia, the chairman of the supreme judicial committee that supervised the elections, explained its significance as being “the first real referendum in Egypt's history, we had an unprecedented turnout because after Jan. 25 people started to feel that their vote would matter.”[1] Because Egypt has historically been at the center of the Arab world success in Egypt will be vital to show that a stable Arab democracy can be created.

[1] Egyptian Voters Approve Constitutional Changes, New York Times, Mar. 20, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/21/world/middleeast/21egypt.html?_r=1&par...

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The referendum is not an example of progress. It is not hard to see why many of those who demonstrated in Tahrir square were in the no camp for this referendum.  “The president remains extraordinarily powerful. The amendments do nothing about due process and neglect other authoritarian aspects of the state”[1] The referendum was attacked for not dealing with large scale structural issues. Leading opposition figures such as Mohamed El Baradei argue “The referendum deals only with minutiae. It doesn't talk about the imperial power of the president, it doesn't talk about the distortion of the parliament, it doesn't talk about the need to have an independent constituent assembly that represents everybody. So we are going to say no.”[2] This means that the institutional problems that helped create an over-mighty presidency and autocracy have remained in place.

These countries have also not become much more stable. There have been clashes between Christian Copts and Muslims following the burning of two churches on the 7th of May, which have left 180 injured and raises the specter of sectarian violence.[3] Meanwhile in Tunisia the government has re-imposed night time curfews after four days of demonstrations were ended by police firing tear gas.[4] It is difficult to consider such unrest progress.

[1] Steven A. Cook, ‘Interview, Egypt’s Referendum: Nervous Steps Forward’, Council on Foreign Relations, 21^st March 2011, http://www.cfr.org/egypt/egypts-referendum-nervous-steps-forward/p24452 accessed 19/05/11

[2] ‘Large turnout for Egypt's constitutional referendum’ BBC News, Mar. 19, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12793484

[3] Egypt Christians protest in Cairo after church attack, BBC News, May 9., 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13331628

[4] Post-revolution Egypt and Tunisia gripped by unrest May 8, 2011, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-blogs/casbah/post-revolution-egypt-and-tunisia-gripped-unrest

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The economic, social, and political history of the region show there are many obstacles to establishing stable democracies in the Middle East. Many in the West fear that Islam is among these barriers, with claims that Islamist parties like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Ennahda in Tunisia will turn their countries into theocracies like Iran. However, there are majority-Muslim states with Islamist parties that have succeeded in creating stable democracies, including Turkey and Indonesia. Both countries are good case studies that disprove the widespread notion that Islam is incompatible with democracy.

Turkey is most often cited as a good example for the Arab spring to follow. The election of the AKP has shown that an Islamic party can also uphold democracy, so providing a good example for the powerful Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab world. Elections are free and fair and the press is relatively free. The Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has faced down coup threats from the military, again something that may well be necessary given the large role the military has had in the previous regimes. Turkey’s economy is growing briskly and Turkey is following a foreign policy of reaching out to everybody and is touting itself as a model for Arab countries to follow.[1]

In Indonesia in 1998 there was a revolution that ousted President Suharto who had like Mubarak been in power for thirty years. This revolution progressed in a very similar way to the ongoing revolution in Egypt – in both countries the protesters were middle class and young, the president went relatively peacefully and the military helped during the transition.[2] Indonesia is now the largest Muslim democracy in the world and while there are islamist parties in parliament their support is now below 30%.[3] Indonesia can therefore provide a road map for moving from an interim government with the military in control to a fully functioning and successful democracy.

[1] A Muslim Democracy in Action, The Economist, 17^th February 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18185813accessed 20/05/11

[2] Banyan, Remember 1998  The Indonesian Example, The Economist, 7^th February 2011, http://www.economist.com/blogs/asiaview/2011/02/indonesian_example accessed 20/05/11

[3] Thomas Carothers, Egypt and Indonesia, The New Republic, 2^nd February 2011,  http://www.tnr.com/article/world/82650/egypt-and-indonesia accessed 20/05/11

While these examples prove that in some iterations Islam can work with democracy, it is likely that other factors made democracy viable in Inodnesia and Turkey. Indonesia is free of the hostile relationship with the West that often undermines the stability of the Middle East, and has benefitted from a strong trade relationship. While the AKP in Turkey is Islamist, it operates within the Turkish constitution which requires the military to dissolve any government that threatens the secular nature of the state. Without a constitutionally defined commitment to strict secularism, like in Turkey, the Islamist parties in Egypt and Tunisia will resort to undemocratic practices. 

While Indonesia’s revolution superficially looks similar it should be remembered that no two revolutions are really the same. They are different in almost every respect, culturally, geographically, economically. Indonesian Minister Natalegawa argues “I think the lesson form us is that it is possible for the democratization process to return to the military to it must be its original function.”[2]However this really shows a difference. In Indonesia the military never stepped in to take over the government as they have done in Egypt. If the key is reducing the role of the military Egypt has barely begun.

[1] Wolfango Piccoli, Full steam ahead on Turkish Constitutional reform, ForeignPolicy.com, 29^th May 2011, http://eurasia.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/05/19/turkey_full_steam_ahead_on_constitutional_reform accessed 20/05/11

[2] Julia Simon, Reformasis and Revolutions, Asia Calling, 17^th April 2011, http://www.asiacalling.org/ur/news/others/1966-reformasis-and-revolutions accessed 20/05/11

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Since the 1970s, Arab state governments have become especially corrupt and oppressive, and have failed to provide essential social services on a consistent basis. Over the past forty years, people in the region have had to become increasingly reliant on informal networks and institutions in order to ensure personal and familial security and livlihood. This has degraded hopes of a relationship of trust between the state and people, causing people to committ themselves to differing factions, gangs, tribes, and parties in order to sustain themselves. It is apparent that the resulting factionalism may stand as a barrier to democracy, as parties hold fast to ideological committments and interest groups instead of political compromise and power-sharing. 

This is especially rampant in post-conflict states, as is the case in Iraq. The current Iraqi government took 249 days to form.[1] The conditions for creating a stable government in Iraq seem to be based more on appeasing all the relevant groups than creating a working government. Lebanon, perhaps the most democratic Arab country also has its problems, the national unity government collapsed this month after 11 ministers from Hezbollah and its allies resigned.[2]^,[3] The third example of an emerging democracy is of course Palestine. President Mahmoud Abbas, elected in 2005, continues in office despite his term having expired in January 2009. He extended his term, which opponents say breached the Palestinian Basic Law.[4] In 2007 clashes broke out between Fatah and Hamas, the two most prominent political parties, as a result of over a year of attempted political sabotage after Hamas won the election and Fatah refused to form a coalition in order to govern. These examples show that in environments where there are high levels of violence and conflict, factionalism takes hold over democratic governance. When law and order become difficult to establish under normal means, these regimes tend to seek security through autocracy and de-facto martial law, as has been happening under Maliki in Iraq or under Hamas and Fatah in the Occupied Territories.

Libya may face this same challenge after its July 2012 election, as tensions remain high after the country was divided between Qaddafi loyalists and the patchwork rebel network. Egypt also faces the risk of the military seizing power from the civilian government, as SCAF has already given itself additional powers and intends to create a shadow council that would allow it to veto parliamentary decisions. 

[1] Ranj Alaaldin, The Iraqi government’s patchwork alliance may struggle to survive, guardian.co.uk, 24^th December 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/dec/24/iraq-government-maliki?INTCMP=SRCH accessed 19/05/11

[2] Hezbollah and allies topple Lebanese unity government, BBC News 12^th January 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12170608 accessed 19/05/11

[3] Lebanon is the most democratic Arab country, ranks 86^th Globally, iloubnan.info, 25^th December 2010, http://www.iloubnan.info/business/actualite/id/53574/titre/Lebanon-is-the-most-democratic-Arab-country,-ranks-86th-Globally accessed 19/05/11

[4] Khaled Abu Toameh, Hamas challenges Abbas term extension, The Jerusalem Post, 29th September 2008, http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=115988 Accessed 19/05/11

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The question is as much whether once a democracy has been established it can sustain itself as a system through multiple changes in government without reverting to dictatorship by coup. Notionally at least Lebanon has been a democracy continually since 1932, if the interruption of the brutal civil war is ignored. While that event shows that it can hardly be called stable in the general sense, it has been in the way that democracy survived even that cataclysm. Such ethnic tensions are hardly conducive to stable government even in Western Europe.[2] When Belgium’s current political quagmire is looked at next to Lebanon the differences between Flemish and Walloon seem insignificant compared those which a Lebanese government must bridge, so even if its effectiveness may be questioned Lebanon’s democracy surely holds out hope for all, particularly for countries that are much less divided. 

There are excessively high hopes for Arab democracy this early, given that democracy has only been the prominent governing system in the West for the past century or so, and only without widespread violence since the end of World War II. It may take more than a few months for the Middle East to establish durable democratic systems, but the first steps are certainly established. 

[2] Belgium: Still No Government, Mar., 1. 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/02/world/europe/02briefs-Belgium.html

Fincial and diplomatic engagement with the international community is essential for democracy to take hold. Tensions turn to conflict when governments are unable to provide basic services to the people, as was the case in Gaza when Hamas was elected in 2006 and the US and EU immediatey froze nearly all the funds and resources that were reaching the occupied territory. Furthermore, support from the West is necessary to provide the financial resources to rebuild after the revolutions damaged business and scared tourists away.

However the West’s does not support democracy unless the ruling party is guaranteed to act in the interests of the West. Throughout the latter half of the 20th century, the United States has either directly aided or executed the overthrow of over thirty foreign governments, many of which were popularly elected.^a  The US has in the past warned that aid to Lebanon could be jeopardized if Hezbollah was dominant in the government.[1] The US has a history of confrontation with the party that is the main political representation for the Shia element of Lebanese society which has eroded rather than supported Lebanese stability.[2] The victory of Hamas in the 2006 Palestinian elections, winning 76 of 132 seats, did not result in any rapprochement with the Bush administration despite their professed desire to see democracy in the Middle East.[3] The result was that aid from Europe and the US was reduced to humanitarian aid only, rather than as before being a major element of Palestinian government income and expenditure.[4] The result being that in 2007 the ‘country’ was rent in two as Hamas seized control of Gaza. Of course another Middle Eastern state that holds democratic elections, Iran, is the very model of a pariah state from the western point of view. It seems that the west is less concerned about democracy in the middle east and more about stability.

a. Wikipedia, 'Covert United States foreign regime change actions;, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Covert_United_States_foreign_regime_change_actions

[1] ‘U.S. warns on ties with Hezbollah-backed Lebanon gov’t’, Reuters, 25 January 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/25/us-lebanon-government-usa-idUS...

[2] Nicholas Noe, Lebanese government collapse: a history of missed opportunities, guardian.co.uk, 14^th January 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jan/14/lebanese-government-collapse-us-policy accessed 19/05/11

[3] Scott Wilson, Hamas Sweeps Palestinian Elections, Complicating Peace Efforts in Mideast, Washington Post Foreign Service, 27^th January 2006,  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/26/AR2006012600372.html accessed 19/5/11

[4] Palestinian Parliamentary Elections 2006, GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/palestine/pa-elections2006.htm accessed 19/5/11

The western reaction to victories by Hamas or Hizbollah while on one level hypocritical do not show that the west would be unsupportive of Arab democracy. Both parties are opposed because they are perceived to be both anti-democratic in nature and, through their opposition to Israel, agents of instability. Opposition to Hamas was always qualified, according to Tony Blair former British PM “Of course, we recognize the mandate for Hamas because the people have spoken in a particular way in the Palestinian Authority. But I think it is also important for Hamas to understand that there comes a point, and that point is now following that strong showing, where they have to decide between a path of democracy or a path of violence.”[1] Certainly when it comes to more moderate parties like Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP)’s victory in 2002 was cautiously welcomed by the United States despite the party’s islamist roots. With State Department spokesman Richard Boucher saying immediately after its electoral victory “Let's not speculate on the future of the Turkish government, but let us at this point congratulate the Justice and Development Party on its electoral success.[2] Although the press tended to present the party’s islamist leanings as a problem this was balanced by some in the western media welcoming the opportunity to marry Islam with liberal democracy, and the example that Turkey could show.[3] It has to be remembered that there is a great deal of religion in US politics, to dismiss any parties that had Islamic roots would be seriously hypocritical. It has to be assumed that democrats in Muslim nations would express piety in order to connect with the general population, if politicians did not reflect the views of their constituents they would not be very good democrats.

[1] Bush: no change in US policy on Hamas, The Independent, Jan., 26, 2006, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/bush-no-change-in-us-policy-on-hamas-524616.html

[2] Michael Rubin ‘Green Money, Islamist Politics in Turkey’, Middle East Quarterly Winter 2005, http://www.michaelrubin.org/933/green-money-islamist-politics-in-turkey

[3] Christian Christensen, ‘Pocketbooks or Prayer Beads? : U.S./U.K. Newspaper Coverage of the 2002 Turkish Elections’, The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 2005 10: 109, pp.120-1

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Oil creates interdependence between the producing states in the Middle East and the consumers in Asia and the West. Although rising prices are good for producers they can also threaten the world economy and create inflation that in turn will damage the producers by reducing demand.[1] The consumers have to listen to Saudi Arabia and the other Arab regimes who provide their oil whereas they often don’t for poor countries in Africa who would otherwise be no different.  Oil is the main reason for external interest in Arab regimes some of the strongest alliances in the Middle East are built with oil as their foundations.[2] Saudi Arabia is a US ally due to it being a major supplier while Egypt is an ally due to its vital position controlling a major trade route – the Suez canal. In neither case would any external powers such as the EU nor the U.S. really want a long an unstable transition to a democracy making a strong man a much easier option. This is shown by how the Obama administration has always been behind events, being unwilling to call for democracy in Egypt and President Mubarak to go. Instead the administration made statements such as that by Secretary of State Hilary Clinton “Our assessment is that the Egyptian government is stable and is looking for ways to respond to the legitimate needs and interests of the Egyptian people”.[3] Many previous administrations would probably have been even more supportive of Mubarak.

[1] Daniel Yergin, The Prize The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power (New York, N.Y., 1993), p.703.

[2] Eric Watkins, ‘The Unfolding US Policy in the Middle East’, International Affairs, Vol.73, No.1 (Jan., 1997), pp.1-14, p.1

[3] John Barry, Inside the White House’s Egypt scramble, Newsweek, 30/1/2011, http://www.newsweek.com/2011/01/30/inside-the-white-house-s-egypt-scramb...

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In the Libyan case the dictator remains (as of 20th April 2011) but cannot sell oil even if he retakes the refineries. The rebels cannot sell oil either (legally) even though they control most of the infrastructure. The sanctions imposed against Gaddafi apply to the whole of the country.[1] Therefore the desire for oil pushes for further support of the rebels in this case as the sanction regime is only likely to be deconstructed following a rebel victory. Should Gaddafi remain in power the west may have to cut itself off from Libyan oil for years to come.

Obviously the above case represents a regime in flux. Once a regime is toppled then anything can happen. There is then no reason why outside actors should want to encourage another dictatorship rather than a democracy. A dictatorship may bring stability faster but a democracy is much more stable in the long run. Countries ideas of their strategic interests can be very divergent. An example is the Suez crisis. Prime Minister Eden considered it “an obvious truth that safety of transit through the canal…[is] a matter of survival [however] world opinion seemed to be that Nasser was within his rights in nationalising the Canal Company.”[2] As Nasser promised “freedom of navigation would not be affected by nationalisation” reducing the matter in the view of the US Secretary of Defence to “a ripple”.[3]So while Britain was still willing to fight for control over the Suez canal the US condemned that very action forcing a withdrawal.

[1] Libya oil stuck in legal limbo as UN panel shunned, Reuters Africa, 20^th April 2011, http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE73J04Q20110420 accessed 19/5/11

[2] Sir Anthony Eden, Full Circle: The Memoirs (Cambridge, 1960), p.533.

[3] Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace 1956-1961 (New York, N.Y., 1965), pp.39, 41-3.

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Most economies in the middle east are oligarchic with the wealth in the hands of a few. Oil has created rentier economies. These economies rely upon systems of patronage relying upon kinship groups, merchant communities and patron-client relationships, economic considerations become subservient to political considerations.[1] This occurred because of the small size of Middle Eastern private sectors forced the creation of state centred development programs.[2] While it remains the case there is a very small group of people in each Arab country that need to keep political power in order to perpetuate their economic power. As they already have the economic power and are often the best educated they are the most capable of forming any new government. In such an oligarchic society it would be very risky for these people to allow the creation of a democracy that may well wish to redistribute resources more equally.

[1] Michel Chatelus and Yves Scehmeil, ‘Towards a New Political Economy of State Industrialisation in the Arab Middle East’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2 (May, 1984), pp.251-265, pp.261-262

[2] Timur Kuran, ‘Why the Middle East is Economically Underdeveloped: Historical Mechanisms of Institutional Stagnation’, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.18, No.3 (Summer, 2004), pp.71-90, p.87.

For these states perpetuating the resources that give their regime its legitimacy, as a provider, is absolutely vital, the regime needs to be able to fulfill its side of the bargain with the people.[1] This is exactly what Egypt and other Middle Eastern states have been failing to do for the last couple of decades. Increasing food prices sparking riots shows that this is the case. Instead they have to rely more and more on force.

Once a rentier system has begun to break down there may well be an opportunity for a more democratic system to take hold and better redistribute the economic resources of the state that have previously been so concentrated in a few hands.

[1] Gerd Nonneman, ‘Rentiers and Autocrats, Monarchs and Democrats, State and Society: The Middle East between Globalisation, Human “Agency”, and Europe’, International Affairs, Vol.77, No.1 (Jan., 2001), pp.141-162, pp.146-147.