This House Believes that the War in Iraq was Worth the Cost

It's important to be clear that this debate is looking at the results of the Iraq war and, by any definition Iraq is in a much more stable and secure position than it was in 2003 when American, British and other international troops arrived in the country.

Whatever one thinks of the initial justifications for the war there is no doubt that the country, the region and the world are better and safer places without Saddam Hussein[i]. It is easy to criticize the allies but it is worth bearing in mind that the alternative was leaving in power a man who had committed genocide was a vicious and brutal dictator under whose regime extra-judicial execution and detention, mass-murder and torture were commonplace[ii].

[i] Richard Miniter. “Was the Iraq War Worth It?”. Hudson New York. 2 September 2010.

[ii] Interview with Donald Rumsfeld. Inside Politics. NPR. 14 February 2011.

In the unlikely event that something resembling a democratic government survives in Iraq after the international troops leave then that would, of course, be welcome.

However, some context is required to establish whether the price was worth paying. Over a trillion dollars, 4,000 American dead, tens of thousands of Iraqis, US reputation destroyed in the region to establish a puppet government whose only real chance of survival is a continued American presence in the country.

The alternatives are all unpleasant – a theocratic regime allied to a nuclear Iran, a simple meltdown of the state or the emergence of a new strongman along the lines of Saddam's regime.

Assuming the US can't sign up in perpetuity then one of these outcomes seems likely and those lives and resources will have been squandered for no reason whatsoever[i].

[i] Francis Fukuyama. “Iraq May Be Stable, But The War Was Still A Mistake”. Wall Street Journal. 15 August 2008.

Without intervention there is little doubt that Saddam or one of his still more murderous sons would be running Iraq. Even though there were no WMDs, it seems reasonable to assume that neither Saddam nor his sons would have ignored Iran’s attempts to secure fissile material and develop a bomb. Iraq had attempted to build a nuclear reactor in the 1970’s but it was destroyed by Israel in 1981[i] and Iraq and Iran had fought a far for most of the 1980s for political dominance in the Gulf and the Shi’ite, Sunni religious divide.[ii]So we would now be watching an arms race in the Middle East between the two with Israel on a hair trigger.

This wasn’t just about removing one tyrant; the regime had dynastic ambitions, and a failure to act would have created the equivalent of North Korea. However, this particular hermit kingdom would have been sitting on top of the second largest reserves of oil in the world. It would, therefore, have the capacity to create the sort of fear and chaos Kim Jong Il can only dream of.

[i] BBC On This Day, ‘1981: Israel bombs Baghdad nuclear reactor’.

[ii] Pipes, Daniel, ‘A Border Adrift: Origins of the Iraq-Iran War’, The Iraq-Iran War: Old Conflict, New Weapons, 1983

There is little evidence that the Ba’ath Party would have tolerated a handover of power to Saddam’s sons. Even in North Korea, the issue of Kim Il Sung’s succession became fraught, and hotly contested amongst the North Korean political elite.. However, the issue of who should run Iraq was and should remain a matter for the Iraqi people. The current puppet regime has little power outside Baghdad and, frankly, not that much inside, this lack of central control is as damaging as too much would be as is shown by the failure of Somalia and resulting civil war and piratical attacks.[i]

In many ways the war has encouraged the world’s rogue states to pursue nuclear weapons as, in an era of ‘pre-emptive defense, they are the only surety against invasion and overthrow[ii]. Iran is continuing to persue nuclear weapons even without the threat of Iraq on its borders, instead it is worried about Israel and the United States. One more threatening state would therefore have made little difference.[iii]

If the aim of the war was to insure against future threats then leaving a nation bitter and resentful, where barely a family has not lost someone to the conflict, a radicalized younger generation, emboldened militant clerics and a weak central government seems a very strange way to go about doing it. The West will almost certainly have to return to Iraq within a generation, if not a decade.

[i] Blair, David, ‘Somalia: Analysis of a failed state’, The Telegraph, 18 November 2008

[ii] Francis Fukuyama. “Iraq May Be Stable, But The War Was Still A Mistake”. Wall Street Journal. 15 August 2008.

[iii] BBC News, ‘Q&A: Iran nuclear issue’, 23 January 2012

The Middle East is a tinder box at the best of times. Having an unpredictable megalomaniac sitting in the middle of it was dangerous, not only for Iraqis but for other peoples in the region. Hussain was a danger to the Middle East as he had proved many times, through his invasion of Iran[i] which was followed only a couple of years later in 1990 by an invasion of Kuwait which sparked the Gulf War[ii] and his use of scud missiles on Israel which was otherwise uninvolved in the conflict.[iii]

It was better to remove this threat than risk being drawn into a multi-player conflict when he next attacked a neighbor.

[i] Pipes, Daniel, ‘A Border Adrift: Origins of the Iraq-Iran War’, The Iraq-Iran War: Old Conflict, New Weapons, 1983

[ii] BBC on this day, ‘1990: Iraq invades Kuwait’.

[iii] CBC Digital Archives, ‘Scud vs. Patriot missiles’, 19 January 1991

By empowering the Shi’a majority, the outcome of the war has provided an obvious link to Iran, an equally obvious threat to Israel and has implication for nations “from Lebanon to Pakistan.[i]”

The weakness of this government represents a far greater threat to security and regional stability than any dictator, however bloodthirsty. Iraq looks set to join the other lawless regions of Asia such as the Pashtun Valley as an obvious place for terrorists and Criminals to base themselves.

[i] Vali Nasr. “Regional Implications of Shi’a Revival in Iraq”. The Washington Quarterly • 27:3 pp. 7–24. The Centre for International and Strategic Studies and the Massachusetts Institute for Technology. Summer 2004.

It's important to be clear that this debate is looking at the results of the Iraq war and, by any definition Iraq is in a much more stable and secure position than it was in 2003 when American, British and other international troops arrived in the country.

Whatever one thinks of the initial justifications for the war there is no doubt that the country, the region and the world are better and safer places without Saddam Hussein[i]. It is easy to criticize the allies but it is worth bearing in mind that the alternative was leaving in power a man who had committed genocide was a vicious and brutal dictator under whose regime extra-judicial execution and detention, mass-murder and torture were commonplace[ii].

[i] Richard Miniter. “Was the Iraq War Worth It?”. Hudson New York. 2 September 2010.

[ii] Interview with Donald Rumsfeld. Inside Politics. NPR. 14 February 2011.

In the unlikely event that something resembling a democratic government survives in Iraq after the international troops leave then that would, of course, be welcome.

However, some context is required to establish whether the price was worth paying. Over a trillion dollars, 4,000 American dead, tens of thousands of Iraqis, US reputation destroyed in the region to establish a puppet government whose only real chance of survival is a continued American presence in the country.

The alternatives are all unpleasant – a theocratic regime allied to a nuclear Iran, a simple meltdown of the state or the emergence of a new strongman along the lines of Saddam's regime.

Assuming the US can't sign up in perpetuity then one of these outcomes seems likely and those lives and resources will have been squandered for no reason whatsoever[i].

[i] Francis Fukuyama. “Iraq May Be Stable, But The War Was Still A Mistake”. Wall Street Journal. 15 August 2008.

Without intervention there is little doubt that Saddam or one of his still more murderous sons would be running Iraq. Even though there were no WMDs, it seems reasonable to assume that neither Saddam nor his sons would have ignored Iran’s attempts to secure fissile material and develop a bomb. Iraq had attempted to build a nuclear reactor in the 1970’s but it was destroyed by Israel in 1981[i] and Iraq and Iran had fought a far for most of the 1980s for political dominance in the Gulf and the Shi’ite, Sunni religious divide.[ii]So we would now be watching an arms race in the Middle East between the two with Israel on a hair trigger.

This wasn’t just about removing one tyrant; the regime had dynastic ambitions, and a failure to act would have created the equivalent of North Korea. However, this particular hermit kingdom would have been sitting on top of the second largest reserves of oil in the world. It would, therefore, have the capacity to create the sort of fear and chaos Kim Jong Il can only dream of.

[i] BBC On This Day, ‘1981: Israel bombs Baghdad nuclear reactor’.

[ii] Pipes, Daniel, ‘A Border Adrift: Origins of the Iraq-Iran War’, The Iraq-Iran War: Old Conflict, New Weapons, 1983

There is little evidence that the Ba’ath Party would have tolerated a handover of power to Saddam’s sons. Even in North Korea, the issue of Kim Il Sung’s succession became fraught, and hotly contested amongst the North Korean political elite.. However, the issue of who should run Iraq was and should remain a matter for the Iraqi people. The current puppet regime has little power outside Baghdad and, frankly, not that much inside, this lack of central control is as damaging as too much would be as is shown by the failure of Somalia and resulting civil war and piratical attacks.[i]

In many ways the war has encouraged the world’s rogue states to pursue nuclear weapons as, in an era of ‘pre-emptive defense, they are the only surety against invasion and overthrow[ii]. Iran is continuing to persue nuclear weapons even without the threat of Iraq on its borders, instead it is worried about Israel and the United States. One more threatening state would therefore have made little difference.[iii]

If the aim of the war was to insure against future threats then leaving a nation bitter and resentful, where barely a family has not lost someone to the conflict, a radicalized younger generation, emboldened militant clerics and a weak central government seems a very strange way to go about doing it. The West will almost certainly have to return to Iraq within a generation, if not a decade.

[i] Blair, David, ‘Somalia: Analysis of a failed state’, The Telegraph, 18 November 2008

[ii] Francis Fukuyama. “Iraq May Be Stable, But The War Was Still A Mistake”. Wall Street Journal. 15 August 2008.

[iii] BBC News, ‘Q&A: Iran nuclear issue’, 23 January 2012

The Middle East is a tinder box at the best of times. Having an unpredictable megalomaniac sitting in the middle of it was dangerous, not only for Iraqis but for other peoples in the region. Hussain was a danger to the Middle East as he had proved many times, through his invasion of Iran[i] which was followed only a couple of years later in 1990 by an invasion of Kuwait which sparked the Gulf War[ii] and his use of scud missiles on Israel which was otherwise uninvolved in the conflict.[iii]

It was better to remove this threat than risk being drawn into a multi-player conflict when he next attacked a neighbor.

[i] Pipes, Daniel, ‘A Border Adrift: Origins of the Iraq-Iran War’, The Iraq-Iran War: Old Conflict, New Weapons, 1983

[ii] BBC on this day, ‘1990: Iraq invades Kuwait’.

[iii] CBC Digital Archives, ‘Scud vs. Patriot missiles’, 19 January 1991

By empowering the Shi’a majority, the outcome of the war has provided an obvious link to Iran, an equally obvious threat to Israel and has implication for nations “from Lebanon to Pakistan.[i]”

The weakness of this government represents a far greater threat to security and regional stability than any dictator, however bloodthirsty. Iraq looks set to join the other lawless regions of Asia such as the Pashtun Valley as an obvious place for terrorists and Criminals to base themselves.

[i] Vali Nasr. “Regional Implications of Shi’a Revival in Iraq”. The Washington Quarterly • 27:3 pp. 7–24. The Centre for International and Strategic Studies and the Massachusetts Institute for Technology. Summer 2004.

Events from the Arab Spring have demonstrated, more graphically than anything else could have done, that Arab peoples are more than capable of dealing with their own dictators and do not need to be patronized by fading imperial powers.

Imagine what the situation in Iraq would be now following a genuinely democratic uprising rather than the imposition of yet another puppet regime by the West. Since the creation of the state of Iraq as a modern state by the British in 1932, a succession of rulers, of various stripes of dictatorial ruthlessness, have been brought in to ensure that the oil wealth continues to flow to Washington, London and other foreign capitals.

The allies were never interested in Iraqi freedom, this was yet another grab for oil and the results look set to be the same round of misery and tyranny for the people of Iraq.

The sands of Iraq are as soaked in blood as they are in oil. For once the Iraqis have actually got something out of their mineral wealth, which has otherwise served as a curse for over a century.

There has been a functioning civilization around the Tigis-Euphrates Valleys for at least ten thousand years it was only with the discovery of oil and the importation of the Industrial Age that this began to function as a curse.

For once their oil wealth has worked to their advantage, leading to the removal of a dictator rather than the imposition of one. As the troops step back it seems likely that Iraq has the opportunity to become that rarest of things; a Middle Eastern, oil producing state that is democratic and stable. As a result they can negotiate with oil consuming nations on an even footing.

The aftermath of the war has been to create an entire people with no reason to love the West and more than100,000 reasons to hate it as a result of an estimated 105-115000 dead.[i] The country is teetering on the brink of civil war, with the leader of the sunni block having said Iraq is heading towards a “sectarian autocracy that carries with it the threat of devastating civil war”[ii] unemployment is rife and the reputation of the ‘liberators’ lies in tatters[iii].

It is not hard to see how this combination is likely to lead to chaos in Iraq and insecurity for the West. Millions of young people with a perfectly justifiable grudge, little education, no job and a desire to do something to make things right.[iv]

It is difficult to imagine a situation more likely to produce violence, terrorism and instability.

[i] Iraq Body Count

[ii] Loney, Jim, ‘Iraq on the brink of ‘devastating civil war’: Former PM Allawi’, National Post, 28 December 2011

[iii] Malou Innocent. “The Iraq War: Still a Massive Mistake.” Christian Science Monitor. 5 April 2010.

[iv] Benmelech, Efraim et al., ‘Economic Conditions and the Quality of Suicide Terrorism’, Journal of Politics, Vol. 74, No. 1, January 2012, pp. 113-128

Iraq now has a professionally trained army and police force accountable to a democratically elected government and, through them, to the people.

Unusually among Arab nations the security forces should now act as upholders of the law rather than the personal armies of local and national strong men used to settle grudges and silence dissent.

The torture chambers are closed and the courts are functioning. There is, of course, work still to be done in terms of creating jobs but at least those jobs will go to people on the basis of ability rather than political loyalty.

Iraq still faces problems but is better equipped to deal with them than it has been in a century and more.