This house believes that the Egyptian army was right to depose Morsi
On the 30th June 2012, Egypt welcomed its first democratically elected government and first elected President; Mohamed Morsi. Their election was the result of months of protest against the previous President Hosni Mubarak, who had ruled over the country for the past thirty years. There was a great sense of optimism in both the domestic and international community for the first democratically elected president and parliament. It was expected that they would reverse the economic and democratic injustice which Egypt had suffered in recent years.
This was not to be the case, however. Several policies and actions taken by Morsi were poorly received by many in Egypt. When Mohamed Morsi announced in November 2012 that he was enacting a declaration which made him immune from judicial interference. This was perceived by many to be a return to dictatorship, which led to widespread protests. Both anti and pro Morsi supporters took to the street and the Egyptian army gave the President 48 hours to resolve the crisis. When Morsi failed to do so, he was ousted from power on the 3rd July 2013. An interim government was put in place with the support of the army.
This action received a mixed response, some welcomed it stating that Morsi was undermining democratic institutions[1]. Others were less enthusiastic, however, pointing to Morsi’s elected position and the authoritarian way in which the army acted.
Points For
Morsi Undermined Democratic Principles
Separation of powers is a key democratic principle which Morsi undermined with the November 2012 declaration. The underlying idea of the separation of powers is that one branch of government should not have undue power over any other. That is why there are a number of checks and balances set out which allows each branch to constrain the actions of the others to prevent them acting illegally[1]. Morsi’s declaration that he would remove the checks and balances which the judiciary held over the presidency violated this principle. This led many to fear that Morsi was returning the country to a dictatorship where he could force through the Muslim Brotherhood’s agenda[2] , undoing the work of the Arab Spring[3]. The army’s intercession was welcomed by many as maintaining democracy[4].
COUNTERPOINTThe post-Morsi leadership, with the assistance of the military, have arguably continued the trend of undemocratic governing. These actions have given the impression that they are acting hypocritically by removing Morsi. In November 2013 a new law was enacted which banned peaceful protest without prior notification to the police. Believed to be aimed at Morsi’s supporters and the Muslim Brotherhood, this law sought to curb protests being conducted against the Egyptian army’s leadership[1]. As protest is a political right, many human rights groups have had a negative response to this legislation. Defiance of these laws has led to the use of teargas and violence to disperse crowds[2]. The new constitution also places the defence ministry firmly in the hands of the military, giving policy control to an unelected official[3]. The claims of the military backed authorities being anti-democratic illustrate the hypocrisy of removing Morsi.
Failed to gain control of the Egyptian crisis
The official line of argument for the Egyptian army’s intervention was that Morsi’s administration was failing to grasp control of a worsening situation[1]. The response to Morsi’s judicial immunity had been largely negative, with tens of thousands taking to the streets to protest. Soon after, pro-Morsi protestors began their own protests. Muslim Brotherhood supporters were called to defend the palace and the resulting clashes left ten dead[2]. On the 1st July 2013 millions of protestors gathered in Tahrir Square, as well as in Alexandria, Port Said and Suez[3] and the Egyptian army stated it would intervene if the government did not ‘meet the demands of the people’ by restructuring the government to appease protestors[4]. The protestors did not disperse, and there were several ministers who resigned from government. With no clear policy change in sight, Morsi had evidently failed to take control of the situation. General el-Sisi, leader of the coup, claimed that they ‘could not stay silent and blind to the call of the Egyptian masses’[5]. The intervention was necessary as Egypt had become ungovernable.
[4] Abdelaziz & Wederman, 2013
COUNTERPOINTThere have been continued protests and violence since the military coup. The post-Morsi leadership and the Egyptian army have therefore done little to bring the Egyptian crisis under control. The most notable incident was on 14th August 2013, over a month since the military coup removed Morsi, when over one thousand people were killed in a day’s fighting between security forces and protestors. Human Rights Watch declared that this was ‘the most serious incident of mass unlawful killings in modern Egyptian history’.[1] Even after the ban on un-notified protesting there have been continued demonstrations of civil disobedience. Due to the handling of these demonstrations the USA has threatened to cut some of its $1.3 billion military aid to Egypt[2]. This inability to gain control of the situation echoes the reasoning for removing Morsi.
Morsi’s economic and social policies had been ineffective and unpopular
Morsi’s inability to tackle the main issues which faced Egypt was another issue which caused the large-scale protests leading to his removal. One of the major reasons for Egypt’s Lotus Revolution was the lack of economic reform. Rising living costs, unemployment and wage levels were causes of grievance for the majority of Egyptians. The Egyptian population hoped that, once the corruption of the Mubarak regime was replaced by a democratic system, their economic condition would improve. This was not to be the case. The Morsi government planned to reduce its fuel subsidies to entitle the country to a $4.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund[1], raising the living costs of the average citizens. In conjunction with the subsidy cuts, the government failed to tackle unemployment. At the time of Morsi’s ouster from government there were 3.6 million unemployed, an increase of one million since 2010[2]. Analysts linked the lack of jobs to the security of the state claiming that unemployment would lead to greater numbers of rioters and furthering instability[3]. In a poll assessing the Egyptians’ attitude toward their government and their future, 61% felt they were worse off than five years ago[4]. This dissatisfaction then led to dissent.
[4] Zogby Research Services, 2013
COUNTERPOINTThe Morsi government arguably did not have enough time to deal with Egypt’s economic conditions. Tourism and investment had already been in decline prior to Morsi assuming power[1]. The global perception of Egypt as unstable was unavoidable following the revolution which had deposed Mubarak. The ex-dictator had been a symbol of security and stability prior to the Arab Spring. Tourism dropped from 14.7 million people to 9.8 million in the first year post-Mubarak, which led to a loss of revenue[2]. Unemployment had been on the rise prior to the Arab Spring, as was the cost of living. Morsi’s establishment had only been given one year to resolve the economic crisis which was insufficient time to put any economic recovery plan in to full effect.
Morsi was going to implement Islamic policies on a secular country
Another major concern of the anti-Morsi protestors on whose behalf the Egyptian army intervened was the Islamist nature of Morsi[1]. While many supported the Islamic nature of the Muslim brotherhood, there were equally many liberals and Coptic Christians who were afraid of Egypt transforming in to an Islamic state. Mubarak had managed to secure popularity within these groups by exploiting this fear that, should his regime be overthrown, extreme Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood would take control and deprive them of their rights. The Morsi government’s constitution was thus perceived as a threat to minority and secular rights, and thus a security issue. Even if this was not the case, Morsi should have done more to calm the population’s fear rather than allowing discord to materialise.
COUNTERPOINTMorsi maintained relatively moderate rhetoric and did not declare any intention to impose sharia law. When questioned about Islamic society and non-Muslims he stated that he believed Coptic Christians had inherent rights and stated that Islam and sharia law ‘cannot be imposed on the people and it cannot be done from the top’[1]. Morsi’s comments on the respect owed to everyone’s rights and beliefs seem to contradict any notion that he planned on enforcing a strict interpretation of sharia law.
Points Against
Morsi Undermined Democratic Principles
Separation of powers is a key democratic principle which Morsi undermined with the November 2012 declaration. The underlying idea of the separation of powers is that one branch of government should not have undue power over any other. That is why there are a number of checks and balances set out which allows each branch to constrain the actions of the others to prevent them acting illegally[1]. Morsi’s declaration that he would remove the checks and balances which the judiciary held over the presidency violated this principle. This led many to fear that Morsi was returning the country to a dictatorship where he could force through the Muslim Brotherhood’s agenda[2] , undoing the work of the Arab Spring[3]. The army’s intercession was welcomed by many as maintaining democracy[4].
COUNTERPOINTThe post-Morsi leadership, with the assistance of the military, have arguably continued the trend of undemocratic governing. These actions have given the impression that they are acting hypocritically by removing Morsi. In November 2013 a new law was enacted which banned peaceful protest without prior notification to the police. Believed to be aimed at Morsi’s supporters and the Muslim Brotherhood, this law sought to curb protests being conducted against the Egyptian army’s leadership[1]. As protest is a political right, many human rights groups have had a negative response to this legislation. Defiance of these laws has led to the use of teargas and violence to disperse crowds[2]. The new constitution also places the defence ministry firmly in the hands of the military, giving policy control to an unelected official[3]. The claims of the military backed authorities being anti-democratic illustrate the hypocrisy of removing Morsi.
Failed to gain control of the Egyptian crisis
The official line of argument for the Egyptian army’s intervention was that Morsi’s administration was failing to grasp control of a worsening situation[1]. The response to Morsi’s judicial immunity had been largely negative, with tens of thousands taking to the streets to protest. Soon after, pro-Morsi protestors began their own protests. Muslim Brotherhood supporters were called to defend the palace and the resulting clashes left ten dead[2]. On the 1st July 2013 millions of protestors gathered in Tahrir Square, as well as in Alexandria, Port Said and Suez[3] and the Egyptian army stated it would intervene if the government did not ‘meet the demands of the people’ by restructuring the government to appease protestors[4]. The protestors did not disperse, and there were several ministers who resigned from government. With no clear policy change in sight, Morsi had evidently failed to take control of the situation. General el-Sisi, leader of the coup, claimed that they ‘could not stay silent and blind to the call of the Egyptian masses’[5]. The intervention was necessary as Egypt had become ungovernable.
[4] Abdelaziz & Wederman, 2013
COUNTERPOINTThere have been continued protests and violence since the military coup. The post-Morsi leadership and the Egyptian army have therefore done little to bring the Egyptian crisis under control. The most notable incident was on 14th August 2013, over a month since the military coup removed Morsi, when over one thousand people were killed in a day’s fighting between security forces and protestors. Human Rights Watch declared that this was ‘the most serious incident of mass unlawful killings in modern Egyptian history’.[1] Even after the ban on un-notified protesting there have been continued demonstrations of civil disobedience. Due to the handling of these demonstrations the USA has threatened to cut some of its $1.3 billion military aid to Egypt[2]. This inability to gain control of the situation echoes the reasoning for removing Morsi.
Morsi’s economic and social policies had been ineffective and unpopular
Morsi’s inability to tackle the main issues which faced Egypt was another issue which caused the large-scale protests leading to his removal. One of the major reasons for Egypt’s Lotus Revolution was the lack of economic reform. Rising living costs, unemployment and wage levels were causes of grievance for the majority of Egyptians. The Egyptian population hoped that, once the corruption of the Mubarak regime was replaced by a democratic system, their economic condition would improve. This was not to be the case. The Morsi government planned to reduce its fuel subsidies to entitle the country to a $4.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund[1], raising the living costs of the average citizens. In conjunction with the subsidy cuts, the government failed to tackle unemployment. At the time of Morsi’s ouster from government there were 3.6 million unemployed, an increase of one million since 2010[2]. Analysts linked the lack of jobs to the security of the state claiming that unemployment would lead to greater numbers of rioters and furthering instability[3]. In a poll assessing the Egyptians’ attitude toward their government and their future, 61% felt they were worse off than five years ago[4]. This dissatisfaction then led to dissent.
[4] Zogby Research Services, 2013
COUNTERPOINTThe Morsi government arguably did not have enough time to deal with Egypt’s economic conditions. Tourism and investment had already been in decline prior to Morsi assuming power[1]. The global perception of Egypt as unstable was unavoidable following the revolution which had deposed Mubarak. The ex-dictator had been a symbol of security and stability prior to the Arab Spring. Tourism dropped from 14.7 million people to 9.8 million in the first year post-Mubarak, which led to a loss of revenue[2]. Unemployment had been on the rise prior to the Arab Spring, as was the cost of living. Morsi’s establishment had only been given one year to resolve the economic crisis which was insufficient time to put any economic recovery plan in to full effect.
Morsi was going to implement Islamic policies on a secular country
Another major concern of the anti-Morsi protestors on whose behalf the Egyptian army intervened was the Islamist nature of Morsi[1]. While many supported the Islamic nature of the Muslim brotherhood, there were equally many liberals and Coptic Christians who were afraid of Egypt transforming in to an Islamic state. Mubarak had managed to secure popularity within these groups by exploiting this fear that, should his regime be overthrown, extreme Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood would take control and deprive them of their rights. The Morsi government’s constitution was thus perceived as a threat to minority and secular rights, and thus a security issue. Even if this was not the case, Morsi should have done more to calm the population’s fear rather than allowing discord to materialise.
COUNTERPOINTMorsi maintained relatively moderate rhetoric and did not declare any intention to impose sharia law. When questioned about Islamic society and non-Muslims he stated that he believed Coptic Christians had inherent rights and stated that Islam and sharia law ‘cannot be imposed on the people and it cannot be done from the top’[1]. Morsi’s comments on the respect owed to everyone’s rights and beliefs seem to contradict any notion that he planned on enforcing a strict interpretation of sharia law.
Most Egyptians still supported Morsi
A poll conducted in November 2013 illustrated that the majority of Egyptians still supported Morsi. The Egyptian army’s claim that they were acting in the name of the people is therefore invalid. The poll, conducted by Zogby Research Services LLC, found that 51% of Egyptians believed that it was wrong to depose Morsi[1]. The fact that the army were acting to the contrary of the wishes of a sizeable proportion of the population therefore exemplifies that the army were not acting ‘for the people’ as a whole.
COUNTERPOINTWhile just over half of respondents to the poll thought that deposing Morsi was wrong, 46% of Egyptians felt it was the correct move[1]. This shows that there was still a large amount of support for the Egyptian army’s actions. 51% of the population is not an overwhelming figure. In addition to this, the poll which produced these results only interviewed 1,405 people. With a population of over 84 million, it is possible that majority of the population actually supported the Army.
Mohamed Morsi had been democratically elected
It was wrong to depose Morsi as he had been chosen to serve as the first democratically elected president in Egypt. Morsi was elected as president with 51.7% of the vote. Having won the 2011-2 elections, Morsi and the Freedom and Justice party had a democratic mandate which they should have been able to fulfil. The military coup which removed them from power was therefore a violation of the democracy which Egypt had fought to establish.
COUNTERPOINTThe Morsi government had acted to monopolise their power within the government, hence undermining their democratic position. To begin with, Morsi’s cabinet had consisted of about 25% candidates from his own party, with the rest belonging to the opposition parties. This by 2013 this had dropped to roughly 1/3 Morsi supporters. This, in combination with Morsi’s extra judicial powers implied that the president was attempting to extend his political power. Many liberals feared that this would be done to enforce the Muslim Brotherhood’s agenda in Egypt[1]. To preserve the democratic integrity of the Egyptian government, the army had to intervene.
The army has no place in a modern democracy
The army should not have a position of influence in democratic, civilian politics. It is generally accepted that the military’s responsibility is to the state[1]. This means that they cannot become involved in the governing of said state, as this is a breach of the civil-military relationship. According to Huntington, ‘Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism’[2]. It is important, therefore, that civilian supremacy is maintained and that the military is subservient to the civilian government. In modern democracies it is expected that the government is held to account at the polls, as long as they act legally, rather than military whims. There is also a tendency for military figures to feel more inclined towards intervention in civil society after their initial attempt, as demonstrated by the most recent military coup as the military had previously taken charge between the fall of Mubarak and Morsi’s election. For this reason, the overthrow of the civilian government at the hands of the Egyptian military is flawed.
[2] Huntington, 1957 pg. 16
COUNTERPOINTThe army should not have a position of influence in democratic, civilian politics. It is generally accepted that the military’s responsibility is to the state[1]. This means that they cannot become involved in the governing of said state, as this is a breach of the civil-military relationship. According to Huntington, ‘Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism’[2]. It is important, therefore, that civilian supremacy is maintained and that the military is subservient to the civilian government. In modern democracies it is expected that the government is held to account at the polls, as long as they act legally, rather than military whims. There is also a tendency for military figures to feel more inclined towards intervention in civil society after their initial attempt, as demonstrated by the most recent military coup as the military had previously taken charge between the fall of Mubarak and Morsi’s election. For this reason, the overthrow of the civilian government at the hands of the Egyptian military is flawed.
[2] Huntington, 1957 pg. 16
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