This house believes that civil society should be granted a wider participation in Africa’s political

The involvement of civil society in political life is all the more crucial in Africa, where newborn democracies need to be strengthened and consolidated. Active CSOs function as a watchdog for political power and as alternative channels for citizens’ political participation, thus strengthening democratic accountability. Indeed, several scholars highlight that a ‘prostrate civil society’ is to be identified as a fundamental factor in determining the region’s democratic instability (Scott, 1998, as quoted in Lewis, 2002: 576). ‘Civil society is a hitherto (missing key) to sustained political reform, legitimate states and governments, improved governance, viable state-society and state-economy relations, and prevention of the kind of political decay that undermined new African governments a generation ago’(Harberson, 1994: 1-2). The sustainability of African democracies thus depends on the promotion of a more active and participative civil society.

There is no consensus on the assumption that CSOs may function as alternative channels of accountability. This, in fact, would require CSOs to be democratically accountable themselves. Yet, this is not the case. There is no form of direct accountability between Civil Society Organizations and the communities they claim to represent. In other words, no one ‘elects Oxfam’ [1]. Moreover, CSOs are not even representative of the people they are supposed to give voice to. In fact, wealthy and highly educated men are overrepresented in CSOs[2]. It is therefore hard to understand how civil society can guarantee or increase democratic accountability in African countries.

[1] The Economist, 23rd September 2000, p. 129

[2]   Talberg and Uhlin (2011) ‘Civil society and global democracy. An assessment’, in Archibugi, Koenig Archibugi and Marchetti,   Global Democracy: Normative and Empirical Perspectives, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press

There is increasing evidence that a more active and involved Civil Society is good for economic development[1]. Specifically, CSOs are believed to have a crucial role for African development prospects. The Local Economic Development Network of Africa argues that ‘In particular, they often know what are the employment and income generation needs of different groups within the population and what could stimulate better outcomes for them. It is very important, therefore, that they are involved and consulted’ (LEDNA, 2013). In addition CSOs autonomously implement development programmes. Only to give an example, in Nepal CSOs in the Education for Income Generation program have played a crucial role in building up workers skills resulting in 80% being in employment many striking out entrepreneurially on their own5. It is therefore necessary for African governments to guarantee such organizations and grant them a wider participation.

[1]  Panth, Sabina, (25 February 2011) ‘What Role Does Civil Society Play in Economic Development?’, blogs.worldbank.org

We may agree that an active civil society may be good for the economy. However, there is no need for African governments to ensure CSOs have a wider participation in the political life of the country to do this. As long as the government respects and protects the existence of such organizations, their positive economic by-products are preserved. Societal actors can work autonomously and independently of the political system. 

Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has stated that ‘good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development’[1]. It is therefore impossible to ignore the claim that CSOs involvement in political life is crucial to promote good governance practices. Civil Society is able to create additional pressure on the government to ensure good governance, as well as to contribute ideas about what good governance practices should entail in the specific local context, and to ‘bridge the gap between the law and its actual implementation’(Zivanovic, 2007). “Good governance in Africa is ultimately going to come from civil society in the countries themselves”, declared Jendayi Frazer, former U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs[2]. An article in The Guardian shows how CSO’s can help: ‘In the Ileje district of southern Tanzania, expectant mothers about to give birth had to cross a crocodile-infested river into Malawi because a local medical centre did not have enough money to pay for a midwife.

It took a campaign by civil society organisations and citizens to uncover that there was money available, but that it had somehow been diverted’[3].  CSOs involvement ultimately permitted the solution of the issue.

[1]  Kofi Annan, Partnerships for Global Community: Annual Report on the Work of the Organisation (UN, 1998)

[2] Cannon, H. Brevy, (4 May 2009), ‘Diplomat: Civil Society Is Key To Good Governance in Africa’, UVA Today

[3] Kilonzo, Semkae, (30 September 2013) ‘Tanzania has shown how civil society can contribute to economic justice’, theguardian.com

The idea that CSO’s involvement in political life equals good governance is essentially an oversimplification. In extremely corrupt semi-democracies, there is no guarantee that societal actors will not be co-opted within the system and become corrupted themselves[1]. This would result in a legitimation of the non-democratic powers in the public eye, rather than a promotion of better practices and good governance. We could say that a wider role for civil society is desirable only for those countries that are well ahead in the path of democratisation. The risk is, otherwise, to trigger a counterproductive reaction.

[1] Mogalakwe and Sebudubudu (2006) ‘Trends in state-civil society relations in Botswana’, Journal of African Elections, 5:2, pp. 207-224

The involvement of civil society in political life is all the more crucial in Africa, where newborn democracies need to be strengthened and consolidated. Active CSOs function as a watchdog for political power and as alternative channels for citizens’ political participation, thus strengthening democratic accountability. Indeed, several scholars highlight that a ‘prostrate civil society’ is to be identified as a fundamental factor in determining the region’s democratic instability (Scott, 1998, as quoted in Lewis, 2002: 576). ‘Civil society is a hitherto (missing key) to sustained political reform, legitimate states and governments, improved governance, viable state-society and state-economy relations, and prevention of the kind of political decay that undermined new African governments a generation ago’(Harberson, 1994: 1-2). The sustainability of African democracies thus depends on the promotion of a more active and participative civil society.

There is no consensus on the assumption that CSOs may function as alternative channels of accountability. This, in fact, would require CSOs to be democratically accountable themselves. Yet, this is not the case. There is no form of direct accountability between Civil Society Organizations and the communities they claim to represent. In other words, no one ‘elects Oxfam’ [1]. Moreover, CSOs are not even representative of the people they are supposed to give voice to. In fact, wealthy and highly educated men are overrepresented in CSOs[2]. It is therefore hard to understand how civil society can guarantee or increase democratic accountability in African countries.

[1] The Economist, 23rd September 2000, p. 129

[2]   Talberg and Uhlin (2011) ‘Civil society and global democracy. An assessment’, in Archibugi, Koenig Archibugi and Marchetti,   Global Democracy: Normative and Empirical Perspectives, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press

There is increasing evidence that a more active and involved Civil Society is good for economic development[1]. Specifically, CSOs are believed to have a crucial role for African development prospects. The Local Economic Development Network of Africa argues that ‘In particular, they often know what are the employment and income generation needs of different groups within the population and what could stimulate better outcomes for them. It is very important, therefore, that they are involved and consulted’ (LEDNA, 2013). In addition CSOs autonomously implement development programmes. Only to give an example, in Nepal CSOs in the Education for Income Generation program have played a crucial role in building up workers skills resulting in 80% being in employment many striking out entrepreneurially on their own5. It is therefore necessary for African governments to guarantee such organizations and grant them a wider participation.

[1]  Panth, Sabina, (25 February 2011) ‘What Role Does Civil Society Play in Economic Development?’, blogs.worldbank.org

We may agree that an active civil society may be good for the economy. However, there is no need for African governments to ensure CSOs have a wider participation in the political life of the country to do this. As long as the government respects and protects the existence of such organizations, their positive economic by-products are preserved. Societal actors can work autonomously and independently of the political system. 

Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has stated that ‘good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development’[1]. It is therefore impossible to ignore the claim that CSOs involvement in political life is crucial to promote good governance practices. Civil Society is able to create additional pressure on the government to ensure good governance, as well as to contribute ideas about what good governance practices should entail in the specific local context, and to ‘bridge the gap between the law and its actual implementation’(Zivanovic, 2007). “Good governance in Africa is ultimately going to come from civil society in the countries themselves”, declared Jendayi Frazer, former U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs[2]. An article in The Guardian shows how CSO’s can help: ‘In the Ileje district of southern Tanzania, expectant mothers about to give birth had to cross a crocodile-infested river into Malawi because a local medical centre did not have enough money to pay for a midwife.

It took a campaign by civil society organisations and citizens to uncover that there was money available, but that it had somehow been diverted’[3].  CSOs involvement ultimately permitted the solution of the issue.

[1]  Kofi Annan, Partnerships for Global Community: Annual Report on the Work of the Organisation (UN, 1998)

[2] Cannon, H. Brevy, (4 May 2009), ‘Diplomat: Civil Society Is Key To Good Governance in Africa’, UVA Today

[3] Kilonzo, Semkae, (30 September 2013) ‘Tanzania has shown how civil society can contribute to economic justice’, theguardian.com

The idea that CSO’s involvement in political life equals good governance is essentially an oversimplification. In extremely corrupt semi-democracies, there is no guarantee that societal actors will not be co-opted within the system and become corrupted themselves[1]. This would result in a legitimation of the non-democratic powers in the public eye, rather than a promotion of better practices and good governance. We could say that a wider role for civil society is desirable only for those countries that are well ahead in the path of democratisation. The risk is, otherwise, to trigger a counterproductive reaction.

[1] Mogalakwe and Sebudubudu (2006) ‘Trends in state-civil society relations in Botswana’, Journal of African Elections, 5:2, pp. 207-224

The idea that CSOs involvement in political life would have positive consequences has been generated by a western-centric literature. However, there is no evidence that the same results would materialize in a completely different context such as the African one. Maina (1998), for example, claims that relations of class and ethnicity are so important in Africa that it is hard to imagine civil society would work in the same way it has in the west. CSOs could form along ethnic or religious lines, thus damaging the fabric of society and jeopardising the stability of divided countries. Ashutosh Varshney (2001), for example, analysed how CSOs formed exclusively along ethnic lines in certain areas in India, thus causing an increase in ethnic violence and political instability. We must therefore be very careful in applying western paradigms to non-western countries, the risk being otherwise to do more harm than good. 

Despite the arguments underlining the differences between Western and African contexts, there is evidence that civil society may play in Africa the same crucial and positive role it had in Western political history. Indeed, the EU commissioner for development, Andris Piebalgs, has issued a press release specifically analysing the role civil society may play in African politics[1]. The conclusions highlight that a wider involvement of civil society in Africa’s political life is crucial for the prospects of democratization and development in the continent.

[1] Piebalgs, Andris, (24 October 2013), ‘Civil Society Organisations, a key role to play in Africa-EU relations’, Europa.eu

CSOs involvement in the political life does have positive and relevant consequences, but only if the state is strong and the political power is stable. In the African context, several scholars argue, an excessively active civil society may instead increase political instability and paralyze an already weak state. Blair (1997), for example, affirms that CSOs may advance so many different claims and interests that the result is a political paralysis. A weaker state, rather than a deeper democracy, results.  Similarly, Foley and Edwards (1996), analysing the ‘paradox of civil society’, point out that conflicts may arise among groups in civil society. ‘These conflicts, in the absence of specifically political settlements, may spill over into civil disruption and violence’ (1996: 40). The example of India reported above is extremely relevant in this regard.  In addition, several scholars argue that Trade Unions and CSOs in general have represented an obstacle for both economic development and political stability in Latin America. African states must stabilize and consolidate before integrating civil society in their political life

The opposite may actually be the case. Several authors in fact claim that an active civil society can improve political stability. A weak state consolidates its power by democratising and acquiring legitimacy. Civil society is crucial in this regard. ‘Civil society contributes directly to stability by encouraging citizens to address their concerns through democratic political processes, including elections. It also challenges abuses of power that fuel instability ’, Freedom House reports ^[1]. Indeed, the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) (2000)[2] identified an increased participation of Civil Society in African states as essential to promote stability in the continent.  A wider involvement of CSOs in the political life must therefore be pursued all the most in the African context, where the political power needs both consolidation and democratization.

[1] Calingaert, Daniel, (11 July 2013), ‘Resisting the Global Crackdown on Civil Society’, Freedom House

[2] OHCHR, ‘Compilation of documents…’, ohchr.org

CSOs in Africa are constituted by western NGOs or funded by western actors. It has even been argued that the involvement of western actors in African civil society cannot be avoided, since western NGOs need to function as intermediaries between funders and local groups[1]. In addition, western NGOs are easily co-opted by western governments, and tend to promote western interests and values rather than local ones[2]. In short, CSOs’ wider involvement in African political life would result in an increased western influence on African affairs. Sseremba, A journalist from Uganda, even claims that western NGOs are ‘indoctrinating young African politicians to serve western interests’[3].  It is therefore necessary to find another way to ensure African citizens are actively involved in the policy making process.

[1] INTRAC, (2012), ‘Supporting civil society in Africa’, baringfoundation.org.uk

[2] Talberg and Uhlin (2011) ‘Civil society and global democracy. An assessment’, in Archibugi, Koenig Archibugi and Marchetti,   Global Democracy: Normative and Empirical Perspectives, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

[3] Sseremba, Yahya, (10 May 2012), ‘THE NEXT PUPPETS: How NGOs are indoctrinating young African politicians to serve western interests’, The Campus Journal

Two crucial counterpoints can be opposed to the above argument. First of all, we may agree that western NGOs organize, support or fund African CSOs. However, this does not mean that African civil society is not independent in its action and able to defend its own interests and values. Secondly, even if we accept that western actors may interfere with the activity of African CSOs, we must consider if this is the worst of evils. Someone may argue, and we certainly do, that it is still worth ensuring civil society has a voice in African politics, even if this brings the risk of western interference.