This House believes all nations have a right to nuclear weapons
Nuclear weapons are the most destructive weapons ever developed. The right to possess these weapons is an issue of serious contention in the international community. Non-proliferation treaties exist within the United Nations, and between countries, such as between the United States and Russia. The most comprehensive, the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), consists of a pledge by current nuclear weapon states to reduce their nuclear stockpiles and achieve nuclear disarmament in return for non-nuclear weapon states not developing such weapons. While some countries and institutions are eager to see a reduction in nuclear weapon stockpiles, others are eagerly seeking to obtain them. North Korea recently developed their first functional nuclear weapon, and Iran is often accused of attempting to develop their own. Such countries have met with international condemnation. So far, despite the NPT, those who were recognized as nuclear powers have not upheld there side of the bargain and disarmed. This has led to the question of whether other countries should also have a right to nuclear armament. Those that are trying to prevent these regimes gaining nuclear weapons counter that despite slow progress the NPT still applies. They are worried that weapons developed by less wealthy states are more likely to fall into the hands of terrorists, either through a lack of secure facilities or through being sold.
Points For
All countries have a right to defend themselves with nuclear weapons, even when they lack the capacity in conventional weapons
The nation-state is the fundamental building block of the international system, and is recognized as such in all international treaties and organizations. States are recognized as having the right to defend themselves, and this right must extend to the possession of nuclear deterrence. Often states lack the capacity to defend themselves with conventional weapons. This is particularly true of poor and small states. Even wealthy, small states are susceptible to foreign attack, since their wealth cannot make up for their lack of manpower. With a nuclear deterrent, all states become equal in terms of ability to do harm to one another.[1] If a large state attempts to intimidate, or even invade a smaller neighbour, it will be unable to effectively cow it, since the small state will have the power to grievously wound, or even destroy, the would-be invader with a few well-placed nuclear missiles.[2] For example, the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 would likely never have occurred, as Russia would have thought twice when considering the potential loss of several of its cities it would need to exchange for a small piece of Georgian territory. Clearly, nuclear weapons serve in many ways to equalize states irrespective of size, allowing them to more effectively defend themselves. Furthermore, countries will only use nuclear weapons in the vent of existential threat. This is why, for example, North Korea has not used nuclear weapons; for it, like all other states, survival is the order of the day, and using nuclear weapons aggressively would spell its certain destruction. Countries will behave rationally with regard to the use of nuclear weapons, as they have done since their invention and initial proliferation. Weapons in the hands of more people will thus not result in the greater risk of their use.
[1] Jervis, Robert. 2001. “Weapons Without Purpose? Nuclear Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era”. Foreign Affairs.
[2] Mearsheimer, John. 1993. “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent”. Foreign Affairs.
COUNTERPOINT
While states do of course have the right to defend themselves, this does not extend to the possession and use of nuclear weapons. The destructive power of nuclear weapons cannot be contained in either space or time. They have the potential to destroy all civilization and the entire ecosystem of the planet. International humanitarian law prohibits the use of weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian objects and military targets.[1] Indeed, the use of nuclear weapons could well constitute a war crime or a crime against humanity.[2] Just as biological and chemical weapons are banned by international treaty, so too the international community generally acknowledges the dangers of nuclear proliferation, which is why so many treaties are dedicated to non-proliferation.[3] It is unfortunate that nuclear weapons exist, even more so that a few countries are still seeking to develop them. It is better to fight this movement and to prevent their use or acquisition by terrorists and the like. It is also essential for States to fulfil their obligation under Article VI of the NPT ‘to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all aspects under strict and effective international control’.[4] Nuclear weapons cannot lawfully be employed or deployed and there is a legal obligation to negotiate in good faith for, and ensure, their elimination.[5]
[1] International Court of Justice. 1996. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, p 226.
[2] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998.
[3] Shah, Anup. 2009. “Nuclear Weapons”. Global Issues.
[4] International Court of Justice. 1996. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, p 226.
[5] Grief, Nicholas. 2011. “Nuclear Weapons: the Legal Status of Use, Threat and Possession”. Nuclear Abolition Forum, Issue No 1.
Nuclear weapons give states valuable agenda-setting power on the international stage
The issues discussed in international forums are largely set by nuclear powers. The permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council, for example, is composed only of nuclear powers, the same states that had nuclear weapons at the end of World War II. If all countries possess nuclear weapons, they redress the imbalance with regard to international clout, at least to the extent to which military capacity shapes states’ interactions with each other.[1] Furthermore, the current world order is grossly unfair, based on the historical anachronism of the post-World War II era. The nuclear powers, wanting to retain their position of dominance in the wake of the post-war chaos, sought to entrench their position, convincing smaller nations to sign up to non-proliferation agreements and trying to keep the nuclear club exclusive. It is only right, in terms of fairness that states not allow themselves the ability to possess certain arms while denying that right to others. Likewise, it is unfair in that it denies states, particularly those incapable of building large conventional militaries, the ability to defend themselves, relegating them to an inferior status on the world stage.[2] To finally level the international playing field and allow equal treatment to all members of the congress of nations, states must have the right to develop nuclear weapons.
[1] Fearon, James D. 1994. “Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model”. Journal of Conflict Resolution 38(2).
[2] Betts, Richard K. 1987. Nuclear blackmail and nuclear balance. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
COUNTERPOINT
Possessing nuclear weapons will do little to help small and poor nations set the agendas on the international stage. In the present age, economic power is far more significant in international and diplomatic discourse than is military power, particularly nuclear weapon power. States will not be able to have their grievances more rapidly addressed in the United Nations or elsewhere, since they will be unable to use nuclear weapons in an aggressive context as that would seriously threaten their own survival. Possessing nuclear weapons may at best provide some security against neighbouring states, but it creates the greater threat of accidental or unintended use or of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists and rogue states.
Nuclear weapons give states valuable agenda-setting power on the international stage
The issues discussed in international forums are largely set by nuclear powers. The permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council, for example, is composed only of nuclear powers, the same states that had nuclear weapons at the end of World War II. If all countries possess nuclear weapons, they redress the imbalance with regard to international clout, at least to the extent to which military capacity shapes states’ interactions with each other.[1] Furthermore, the current world order is grossly unfair, based on the historical anachronism of the post-World War II era. The nuclear powers, wanting to retain their position of dominance in the wake of the post-war chaos, sought to entrench their position, convincing smaller nations to sign up to non-proliferation agreements and trying to keep the nuclear club exclusive. It is only right, in terms of fairness that states not allow themselves the ability to possess certain arms while denying that right to others. Likewise, it is unfair in that it denies states, particularly those incapable of building large conventional militaries, the ability to defend themselves, relegating them to an inferior status on the world stage.[2] To finally level the international playing field and allow equal treatment to all members of the congress of nations, states must have the right to develop nuclear weapons.
[1] Fearon, James D. 1994. “Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model”. Journal of Conflict Resolution 38(2).
[2] Betts, Richard K. 1987. Nuclear blackmail and nuclear balance. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
COUNTERPOINT
Possessing nuclear weapons will do little to help small and poor nations set the agendas on the international stage. In the present age, economic power is far more significant in international and diplomatic discourse than is military power, particularly nuclear weapon power. States will not be able to have their grievances more rapidly addressed in the United Nations or elsewhere, since they will be unable to use nuclear weapons in an aggressive context as that would seriously threaten their own survival. Possessing nuclear weapons may at best provide some security against neighbouring states, but it creates the greater threat of accidental or unintended use or of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists and rogue states.
Nuclear weapons serve to defuse international conflicts and force compromise
Nuclear weapons create stability, described in the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Countries with nuclear weapons have no incentive to engage in open military conflict with one another; all recognize that they will suffer destruction if they choose the path of war.[1] If countries have nuclear weapons, fighting simply becomes too costly. This serves to defuse conflicts, and reduce the likelihood of the outbreak of war. For example, the conflict between India and Pakistan was defused by the acquisition of nuclear weapons by both sides. Before they obtained nuclear weapons, they fought three wars that claimed millions of lives. Relations between the two states, while still far from cordial, have never descended into open war. The defusing of the immediate tension of war, has given the chance for potential dialogue.[2]A similar dynamic has been played out a number of times in the past, and as of yet there has never been a war between two nuclear powers. When states have nuclear weapons they cannot fight, making the world a more peaceful place.
[1] Waltz, Kenneth. 1981. “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better”. Adelphi Papers 171. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.
[2] Nizamani, Haider K. 2000. The Roots of Rhetoric: Politics of Nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan. Westport: Praeger.
COUNTERPOINT
The nuclear peace theory only holds when all nuclear-armed states behave rationally. This cannot be guaranteed, as rogue states exist whose leaders may not be so rational, and whose governments may not be capable of checking the power of individual, erratic tyrants. Also, international conflicts might well be exacerbated in the event that terrorists or other dissidents acquire nuclear weapons or dirty bombs, leading to greater fear that nuclear weapons will be used. A better situation is one in which nuclear weapons are reduced and ultimately eliminated, rather than increased in number. Furthermore, MAD can break down in some cases, when weapon delivery systems are improved. For example, Pakistan’s military has developed miniaturized nuclear warheads for use against tanks and other hard targets on the Indian border, that will leave little nuclear fallout and thus be more likely to be employed in the event of a border skirmish. This development could well cause escalation in future conflict.[1] In addition to the risk of such smaller weapons is the risk of pre-emptive nuclear strikes, as some countries with nuclear weapons might lack second-strike capability. Clearly, possession of nuclear weapons will not guarantee peace, and if war does occur, it will be far more ghastly than any conventional war.
[1] The Economist. 2011. “The World’s Most Dangerous Border”. The Economist.
Public acknowledgement of the right to nuclear deterrence will benefit the public regulation of nuclear weapons generally
When nuclear deterrence is an acknowledged right of states, they will necessarily be less concealing of their capability, as the deterrent effect works only because it is visible and widely known. Knowledge of states’ nuclear capability allows greater regulation and cooperation in development of nuclear programs from developed countries with more advanced nuclear programs.[1] Developed countries can help construct and maintain the nuclear weapons of other countries, helping to guarantee the safety protocols of countries’ programs are suitably robust. This will cause a diminution in clandestine nuclear weapons programs, and will reduce the chances of weapons-grade material falling into the hands of terrorists. Thus, greater openness and freedom in the development of nuclear weapons will increase the security of nuclear stockpiles.
[1] Sagan, Scott D. 1993. The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
COUNTERPOINT
It is very unlikely that many states will invite their neighbours to help them in the development of their weapons and in securing them, as doing so would open the risk to sabotage and would disclose potential weakness in their defences. Furthermore, terrorists will not be substantially deterred by greater openness in weapons development, as there will be more potential suppliers of weapons.
Points Against
All countries have a right to defend themselves with nuclear weapons, even when they lack the capacity in conventional weapons
The nation-state is the fundamental building block of the international system, and is recognized as such in all international treaties and organizations. States are recognized as having the right to defend themselves, and this right must extend to the possession of nuclear deterrence. Often states lack the capacity to defend themselves with conventional weapons. This is particularly true of poor and small states. Even wealthy, small states are susceptible to foreign attack, since their wealth cannot make up for their lack of manpower. With a nuclear deterrent, all states become equal in terms of ability to do harm to one another.[1] If a large state attempts to intimidate, or even invade a smaller neighbour, it will be unable to effectively cow it, since the small state will have the power to grievously wound, or even destroy, the would-be invader with a few well-placed nuclear missiles.[2] For example, the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 would likely never have occurred, as Russia would have thought twice when considering the potential loss of several of its cities it would need to exchange for a small piece of Georgian territory. Clearly, nuclear weapons serve in many ways to equalize states irrespective of size, allowing them to more effectively defend themselves. Furthermore, countries will only use nuclear weapons in the vent of existential threat. This is why, for example, North Korea has not used nuclear weapons; for it, like all other states, survival is the order of the day, and using nuclear weapons aggressively would spell its certain destruction. Countries will behave rationally with regard to the use of nuclear weapons, as they have done since their invention and initial proliferation. Weapons in the hands of more people will thus not result in the greater risk of their use.
[1] Jervis, Robert. 2001. “Weapons Without Purpose? Nuclear Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era”. Foreign Affairs.
[2] Mearsheimer, John. 1993. “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent”. Foreign Affairs.
COUNTERPOINT
While states do of course have the right to defend themselves, this does not extend to the possession and use of nuclear weapons. The destructive power of nuclear weapons cannot be contained in either space or time. They have the potential to destroy all civilization and the entire ecosystem of the planet. International humanitarian law prohibits the use of weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian objects and military targets.[1] Indeed, the use of nuclear weapons could well constitute a war crime or a crime against humanity.[2] Just as biological and chemical weapons are banned by international treaty, so too the international community generally acknowledges the dangers of nuclear proliferation, which is why so many treaties are dedicated to non-proliferation.[3] It is unfortunate that nuclear weapons exist, even more so that a few countries are still seeking to develop them. It is better to fight this movement and to prevent their use or acquisition by terrorists and the like. It is also essential for States to fulfil their obligation under Article VI of the NPT ‘to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all aspects under strict and effective international control’.[4] Nuclear weapons cannot lawfully be employed or deployed and there is a legal obligation to negotiate in good faith for, and ensure, their elimination.[5]
[1] International Court of Justice. 1996. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, p 226.
[2] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998.
[3] Shah, Anup. 2009. “Nuclear Weapons”. Global Issues.
[4] International Court of Justice. 1996. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, p 226.
[5] Grief, Nicholas. 2011. “Nuclear Weapons: the Legal Status of Use, Threat and Possession”. Nuclear Abolition Forum, Issue No 1.
Nuclear weapons give states valuable agenda-setting power on the international stage
The issues discussed in international forums are largely set by nuclear powers. The permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council, for example, is composed only of nuclear powers, the same states that had nuclear weapons at the end of World War II. If all countries possess nuclear weapons, they redress the imbalance with regard to international clout, at least to the extent to which military capacity shapes states’ interactions with each other.[1] Furthermore, the current world order is grossly unfair, based on the historical anachronism of the post-World War II era. The nuclear powers, wanting to retain their position of dominance in the wake of the post-war chaos, sought to entrench their position, convincing smaller nations to sign up to non-proliferation agreements and trying to keep the nuclear club exclusive. It is only right, in terms of fairness that states not allow themselves the ability to possess certain arms while denying that right to others. Likewise, it is unfair in that it denies states, particularly those incapable of building large conventional militaries, the ability to defend themselves, relegating them to an inferior status on the world stage.[2] To finally level the international playing field and allow equal treatment to all members of the congress of nations, states must have the right to develop nuclear weapons.
[1] Fearon, James D. 1994. “Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model”. Journal of Conflict Resolution 38(2).
[2] Betts, Richard K. 1987. Nuclear blackmail and nuclear balance. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
COUNTERPOINT
Possessing nuclear weapons will do little to help small and poor nations set the agendas on the international stage. In the present age, economic power is far more significant in international and diplomatic discourse than is military power, particularly nuclear weapon power. States will not be able to have their grievances more rapidly addressed in the United Nations or elsewhere, since they will be unable to use nuclear weapons in an aggressive context as that would seriously threaten their own survival. Possessing nuclear weapons may at best provide some security against neighbouring states, but it creates the greater threat of accidental or unintended use or of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists and rogue states.
Nuclear weapons give states valuable agenda-setting power on the international stage
The issues discussed in international forums are largely set by nuclear powers. The permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council, for example, is composed only of nuclear powers, the same states that had nuclear weapons at the end of World War II. If all countries possess nuclear weapons, they redress the imbalance with regard to international clout, at least to the extent to which military capacity shapes states’ interactions with each other.[1] Furthermore, the current world order is grossly unfair, based on the historical anachronism of the post-World War II era. The nuclear powers, wanting to retain their position of dominance in the wake of the post-war chaos, sought to entrench their position, convincing smaller nations to sign up to non-proliferation agreements and trying to keep the nuclear club exclusive. It is only right, in terms of fairness that states not allow themselves the ability to possess certain arms while denying that right to others. Likewise, it is unfair in that it denies states, particularly those incapable of building large conventional militaries, the ability to defend themselves, relegating them to an inferior status on the world stage.[2] To finally level the international playing field and allow equal treatment to all members of the congress of nations, states must have the right to develop nuclear weapons.
[1] Fearon, James D. 1994. “Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model”. Journal of Conflict Resolution 38(2).
[2] Betts, Richard K. 1987. Nuclear blackmail and nuclear balance. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
COUNTERPOINT
Possessing nuclear weapons will do little to help small and poor nations set the agendas on the international stage. In the present age, economic power is far more significant in international and diplomatic discourse than is military power, particularly nuclear weapon power. States will not be able to have their grievances more rapidly addressed in the United Nations or elsewhere, since they will be unable to use nuclear weapons in an aggressive context as that would seriously threaten their own survival. Possessing nuclear weapons may at best provide some security against neighbouring states, but it creates the greater threat of accidental or unintended use or of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists and rogue states.
Nuclear weapons serve to defuse international conflicts and force compromise
Nuclear weapons create stability, described in the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Countries with nuclear weapons have no incentive to engage in open military conflict with one another; all recognize that they will suffer destruction if they choose the path of war.[1] If countries have nuclear weapons, fighting simply becomes too costly. This serves to defuse conflicts, and reduce the likelihood of the outbreak of war. For example, the conflict between India and Pakistan was defused by the acquisition of nuclear weapons by both sides. Before they obtained nuclear weapons, they fought three wars that claimed millions of lives. Relations between the two states, while still far from cordial, have never descended into open war. The defusing of the immediate tension of war, has given the chance for potential dialogue.[2]A similar dynamic has been played out a number of times in the past, and as of yet there has never been a war between two nuclear powers. When states have nuclear weapons they cannot fight, making the world a more peaceful place.
[1] Waltz, Kenneth. 1981. “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better”. Adelphi Papers 171. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.
[2] Nizamani, Haider K. 2000. The Roots of Rhetoric: Politics of Nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan. Westport: Praeger.
COUNTERPOINT
The nuclear peace theory only holds when all nuclear-armed states behave rationally. This cannot be guaranteed, as rogue states exist whose leaders may not be so rational, and whose governments may not be capable of checking the power of individual, erratic tyrants. Also, international conflicts might well be exacerbated in the event that terrorists or other dissidents acquire nuclear weapons or dirty bombs, leading to greater fear that nuclear weapons will be used. A better situation is one in which nuclear weapons are reduced and ultimately eliminated, rather than increased in number. Furthermore, MAD can break down in some cases, when weapon delivery systems are improved. For example, Pakistan’s military has developed miniaturized nuclear warheads for use against tanks and other hard targets on the Indian border, that will leave little nuclear fallout and thus be more likely to be employed in the event of a border skirmish. This development could well cause escalation in future conflict.[1] In addition to the risk of such smaller weapons is the risk of pre-emptive nuclear strikes, as some countries with nuclear weapons might lack second-strike capability. Clearly, possession of nuclear weapons will not guarantee peace, and if war does occur, it will be far more ghastly than any conventional war.
[1] The Economist. 2011. “The World’s Most Dangerous Border”. The Economist.
Public acknowledgement of the right to nuclear deterrence will benefit the public regulation of nuclear weapons generally
When nuclear deterrence is an acknowledged right of states, they will necessarily be less concealing of their capability, as the deterrent effect works only because it is visible and widely known. Knowledge of states’ nuclear capability allows greater regulation and cooperation in development of nuclear programs from developed countries with more advanced nuclear programs.[1] Developed countries can help construct and maintain the nuclear weapons of other countries, helping to guarantee the safety protocols of countries’ programs are suitably robust. This will cause a diminution in clandestine nuclear weapons programs, and will reduce the chances of weapons-grade material falling into the hands of terrorists. Thus, greater openness and freedom in the development of nuclear weapons will increase the security of nuclear stockpiles.
[1] Sagan, Scott D. 1993. The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
COUNTERPOINT
It is very unlikely that many states will invite their neighbours to help them in the development of their weapons and in securing them, as doing so would open the risk to sabotage and would disclose potential weakness in their defences. Furthermore, terrorists will not be substantially deterred by greater openness in weapons development, as there will be more potential suppliers of weapons.
The right of self-defence must be exercised in accordance with international law.
There can be no right to such terribly destructive weapons; their invention is one of the great tragedies of history, giving humanity the power to destroy itself. Even during the Cold War, most people viewed nuclear weapons at best as a necessary defence during that great ideological struggle, and at worst the scourge that would end all life on Earth. Nuclear war has never taken place, though it very nearly has on several occasions, such as during the Cuban Missile Crisis. And in 1983 a NATO war game, the Able Archer exercise simulating the full release of NATO nuclear forces, was interpreted by the Soviet Union as a prelude to a massive nuclear first-strike. Oleg Gordievsky, the KGB colonel who defected to the West, has stated that during Able Archer, without realising it, the world came ‘frighteningly close’ to the edge of the nuclear abyss, ‘certainly closer than at any time since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962’.[1]Soviet forces were put on immediate alert and an escalation was only avoided when NATO staff realised what was happening and scaled down the exercise.[2] Cooler heads might not prevail in future conflicts between nuclear powers; when there are more nuclear-armed states, the risk of someone doing something foolish increases. After all, it would take only one such incident to result in the loss of millions of lives.[3] Furthermore, in recent years positive steps have finally begun between the two states with the largest nuclear arsenals, the United States and Russia, in the strategic reduction of nuclear stockpiles. These countries, until recently the greatest perpetrators of nuclear proliferation, have now made commitments toward gradual reduction of weapon numbers until a tiny fraction of the warheads currently active will be usable.[4] All countries, both with and without nuclear weapons, should adopt this lesson. They should contribute toward non-proliferation, thus making the world safer from the threat of nuclear conflict and destruction. Clearly, the focus should be on the reduction of nuclear weapons, not their increase.
[1] Andrew, Christopher and Gordievsky, Oleg. 1991. “KGB: The Inside story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev”. New York: Harper Collins Publishers.
[2] Rogers, Paul. 2007. “From Evil Empire to Axis of Evil”. Oxford Research Group.
[3] Jervis, Robert. 1989. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
[4] Baker, Peter. 2010. “Twists and Turns on Way to Arms Pact With Russia”. The New York Times.
COUNTERPOINT
All parties recognize the risk of their total destruction as a result of starting a nuclear conflict. This is exactly why no full scale war has broken out between nuclear powers. Supposing that states will be unable to handle the responsibility of nuclear weapons does not change the fact that many states have them, and also that many other states are incapable of defending themselves from aggressive neighbours without a nuclear deterrent.
The threat of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of rogue states and terrorists increases as more countries possess them
There are many dangerous dictators and tyrants, many of who covet the possession of nuclear weapons not just for the purpose of defence, but also for that of intimidating their neighbours.[1] Such leaders should not possess nuclear weapons, nor should they ever be facilitated in their acquisition. For example, Iran has endeavoured for years on a clandestine nuclear weapons program that, were it recognized as a legitimate pursuit, could be increased in scale and completed with greater speed. The result of such an achievement could well destabilize the Middle East and would represent a major threat to the existence of a number of states within the region, particularly Israel. Furthermore, the risk of nuclear weapons, or at least weapons-grade material, falling into the hands of dissidents and terrorists increases substantially when there are more of them and larger numbers of countries possess them. Additionally, many countries in the developing world lack the capacity to safely secure weapons if they owned them, due to lack of technology, national instability, and government corruption.[2] Recognizing the rights of these countries to hold nuclear weapons vastly increases the risk of their loss or misuse.
[1] Slantchev, Branislav. 2005. “Military Coercion in Interstate Crises”. American Political Science Review 99(4).
[2] Sagan, Scott D. 1993. The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
COUNTERPOINT
Government legitimacy is defined in its most limited form as the ability to provide security and stability within its jurisdiction. It seems fair to say that international institutions and states with a stake in international order, as most do, will have an interest in keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of failing and failed states, which do not retain the same legitimacy of states that can provide the baseline of security to their people. Furthermore, the openness created by the public recognition of the right to nuclear weapons will allow advanced countries to offer assistance in security and protection of nuclear stockpiles, making it less likely that nuclear weapons will fall into the hands of terrorists.
Humanitarian intervention becomes impossible in states that possess nuclear weapons
It has often proven to be necessary for the UN, the United States, and various international coalitions to stage humanitarian interventions into states fighting civil wars, committing genocide, or otherwise abusing the human rights of their citizens.[1] An example of such an intervention is the recent contributions by many states to the rebels in Libya. Were all countries permitted to possess nuclear weapons, such interventions would become next to impossible. Were, for example, countries to try and contribute to the Libyan rebels, they would find themselves the targets of Libyan nuclear warheads. The cost of intervention thus becomes too high for virtually any country to tolerate, in terms of both human and political costs. The world would be a worse place if tyrants were allowed to perpetrate whatever crimes they saw fit upon their people, while the international community could do nothing for fear of nuclear retaliation.
[1] Slantchev, Branislav. 2005. “Military Coercion in Interstate Crises”. American Political Science Review 99(4).
COUNTERPOINT
Powerful states often couch their imperial ambitions and desires to further their own aims on the world stage in the language of humanitarian intervention.[1] Such interventions are rarely due solely to the abuses, real and imagined, committed by leaders upon their people, but are driven by geopolitical considerations. This is why interventions have been staged in the Middle East, as in Iraq where there were substantial oil reserves, while not in Sudan where civil war has been rife, but which possesses little in the way of strategic or economic significance. Recognizing the right of all states to possess nuclear weapons serves to diminish the number of political power plays of strong states against weaker ones, and entrenches the concept of national self-determination as an ideal that should not be infringed by strong nations against the weak.
[1] Walsh, John. 2011. “Libya and the Hypocrisy of Humanitarian Intervention”. Daily Paul.
Possessing nuclear weapons will be counter to the peaceful interests of states
Most states will not benefit at all from possessing nuclear weapons. Developing a nuclear deterrent is seen in the international community as a sign of belligerence and a warlike character. Such an image does not suit the vast majority of states who would be better suited focusing on diplomacy, trade, and economic interdependence.[1] The loss of such diplomatic and economic relations in favour of force can seriously harm the citizens of would-be nuclear powers, as has occurred to the North Koreans, who have been isolated in international relations by their government’s decision to develop nuclear weapons. If the right to nuclear weapons were recognized for all states, only those states that currently want them for strategic reasons will develop them, and they will do so more brazenly and with greater speed. These countries might try to develop them even if proliferation is outlawed, but giving them license increases the likelihood that they will succeed. Furthermore, when countries develop nuclear weapons, their neighbours may feel more vulnerable and thus be compelled by necessity to develop their own weapons. This will lead to arms races in some cases, and generally harm diplomacy.
[1] Sartori, Anne. 2005. Deterrence By Diplomacy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
COUNTERPOINT
It is true that most states will not develop nuclear weapons, whether they are recognized as a rightful possession of states or not. The important thing is that those states that do want nuclear weapons can have them, which will likely be only a handful. As to arms races, it is unlikely that they will occur, as the defence pacts between many states, such as NATO defend non-nuclear states without requiring them to possess such weapons themselves.[1]Furthermore, if a state feels vulnerable due to the nuclear armament of its neighbours, it should absolutely have the right to defend itself.
[1] Sagan, Scott D. 1993. The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
The threat of a state developing nuclear weapons could instigate pre-emptive strikes from its neighbours and rivals to prevent the acquisition of such weapons
The threat represented by potential nuclear powers will instigate pre-emptive strikes by countries fearing the future behaviour of the budding nuclear powers. Until a state develops a nuclear capacity that its rivals believe they cannot destroy in a first strike, nuclear weapons increase the risk of war. For example, Israel will have a very real incentive to attack Iran before it can complete its development of nuclear weapons, lest it become an existential threat to Israel’s survival. The United States military even considered attempting to destroy the USSR’s capability before they had second strike capability General Orvil Anderson publicly declared: “Give me the order to do it and I can break up Russia’s five A-bomb nests in a week…And when I went up to Christ—I think I could explain to Him that I had saved civilization.”[1] The development of nuclear weapons can thus destabilize regions before they are ever operational, as it is in no country’s interest that its rivals become capable of using nuclear force against it. Clearly, it is best that such states do not develop nuclear weapons in the first place so as to prevent such instability and conflict.
[1] Stevens, Austin “General Removed over War Speech,” New York Times, September 2, 1950, p. 8
COUNTERPOINT
If a country is surrounded by hostile neighbours that are likely to attempt a pre-emptive strike upon it, then nuclear weapons are all the more desirable. With nuclear weapons a country cannot be pushed around by regional bullies. It seems perfectly fair that Iran would covet the ability to resist Israeli might in the Middle East and defend itself from aggression by it or the United States.
COUNTERPOINT
The threat represented by potential nuclear powers will instigate pre-emptive strikes by countries fearing the future behaviour of the budding nuclear powers. Until a state develops a nuclear capacity that its rivals believe they cannot destroy in a first strike, nuclear weapons increase the risk of war. For example, Israel will have a very real incentive to attack Iran before it can complete its development of nuclear weapons, lest it become an existential threat to Israel’s survival. The United States military even considered attempting to destroy the USSR’s capability before they had second strike capability General Orvil Anderson publicly declared: “Give me the order to do it and I can break up Russia’s five A-bomb nests in a week…And when I went up to Christ—I think I could explain to Him that I had saved civilization.”[1] The development of nuclear weapons can thus destabilize regions before they are ever operational, as it is in no country’s interest that its rivals become capable of using nuclear force against it. Clearly, it is best that such states do not develop nuclear weapons in the first place so as to prevent such instability and conflict.
[1] Stevens, Austin “General Removed over War Speech,” New York Times, September 2, 1950, p. 8
If a country is surrounded by hostile neighbours that are likely to attempt a pre-emptive strike upon it, then nuclear weapons are all the more desirable. With nuclear weapons a country cannot be pushed around by regional bullies. It seems perfectly fair that Iran would covet the ability to resist Israeli might in the Middle East and defend itself from aggression by it or the United States.
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