THBT social disgust is legitimate grounds for restriction of artistic expression

Sometimes artists go too far in a bid to get their message across. Simply grabbing the headlines with shock tactics does not constitute art of the sort that should be receiving either public support or attention. It is important to recognise that public displays and funding of art are limited commodities, so every time one piece is chosen for an exhibition, or an artist is given money, this comes at the cost of other possible pieces of art. It is surely better to support those artists who have chosen to express their ideas and messages in a way that does not rely on simple attention-grabbing horror: it is surely more artistically meritorious to create a work that conveys its message in a way that rewards close attention and careful study, with layers of meaning and technique. 

Who determines whether something is too disgusting? It is also hard to separate a piece of work’s artistic merit from its impact. It is perfectly possible for a work of art to display great technical competence, and yet fail to have an emotional impact on its audience, and so as a consequence it seems most sensible to allow, display and fund as wide a display of art as possible.

Limiting the forms of art that we display or give funding to those considered ‘artistically meritorious’ will result in the loss of innovation in the art world: if we only encourage those pieces that are ‘good’ under present-day metrics, we lose those pieces of art that, though considered controversial, or ‘not art’ now, may in the future be considered masterpieces (e.g. Picasso’s Guernica). 

Those who see the artwork, or hear of it, must be considered. Often, social disgust stems from the violation of those values that are most central to an individual.

An individual’s right not to have their most central values abused or ridiculed is surely of more importance than the desire of an artist to be entirely unrestricted in their work: the harm caused to individuals by the continuing acceptance by society, (and consequent exposure) of art they find disgusting, can be great, and the reasonable modern society recognises such harms and does not impose them unnecessarily.

For example, the case of the Chapman brothers’ repeated use of Hitler and Nazi imagery: for the Chapmans the horror of WW2 might be distant and historical, and therefore for them the time may have come for Hitler to simply be mocked; however, for others that horror is altogether more current. Other people may feel a greater connection, for example, because of the impact on their close family, which cannot simply be ignored. In a situation like this, clearly the impact  is infinitely more negative for that individual whose trauma is, in effect, being highlighted as now acceptable for comic material, than the positive gain is for the Chapmans: if restricted, they are simply caused to move on to other subjects. 

Whilst it is the case in individual instances that, if one piece of art is censored, another on a different topic may be produced, when looked at in a wider context this is not the case. If we restrict artists in all cases where someone is disgusted, an enormous quantity of subjects will be off limits. This will have, not only a negative impact on that artist, but a deleterious effect on whole branches of art.

Further, restricting any art that could cause social disgust is an unreasonable restriction to place upon society (or gallery curators, or grant allocation committees). It is difficult to know at what point a piece will cross the line from simply ‘provocative’ to ‘disgusting’. Consequently, people will be forced to err on the side of caution, leading to an excessive caution and restriction: overcensorship.

When weighed against these harms, it is far from clear that individual disgust can be elevated to this extent! 

Art differs from other forms of media with regard to the expression of ideas. Unlike other methods of conveying ideas, art has a visceral impact that is instant and has a lasting effect.

In a discussion, for example, there are often clues that ideas that might make people feel uncomfortable are about to arise. Thus, people are in a better position to consent to the sorts of challenges controversy within a conversation may pose (similarly, we tend to look more positively on taboo subjects raised within a conversational context than we do when they are, for example, shouted about in the street).

In the case of art, particularly that which is displayed in public spaces (like squares, parks and museums) people are unable to consent in this way, but rather, may be confronted suddenly by something that they find disgusting, because it has forced them to confront something they find horrific or traumatic, in a manner which has a great impact, and that, because of the power of the visual, they find difficult to forget. 

We are no less able to consent to art than we are to every other manifestation of individuality in society. We are similarly unable to consent to, but strongly impacted by, all sorts of things, from music videos and adverts to people dressed strangely on the street.

However, as a society we accept that people’s core values ought to be robust enough to survive challenges in the public sphere: we allow debate, art and music on many topics that have enormous personal ramifications, from euthanasia to deportation.

As a consequence, it is only legitimate to restrict the worst excesses, whose impact can be measured objectively, before display: we set rules in this regard restricting the worst instances of, for example, exploitation and pornography.

Further, those who are worst affected can self-limit their exposure: it is rare that people are entirely unaware of the existence of a controversial piece of art, and as such people can choose not to view it, or to view it only briefly. They should not have the right to prevent everyone else from seeing such a piece.

Sometimes artists go too far in a bid to get their message across. Simply grabbing the headlines with shock tactics does not constitute art of the sort that should be receiving either public support or attention. It is important to recognise that public displays and funding of art are limited commodities, so every time one piece is chosen for an exhibition, or an artist is given money, this comes at the cost of other possible pieces of art. It is surely better to support those artists who have chosen to express their ideas and messages in a way that does not rely on simple attention-grabbing horror: it is surely more artistically meritorious to create a work that conveys its message in a way that rewards close attention and careful study, with layers of meaning and technique. 

Who determines whether something is too disgusting? It is also hard to separate a piece of work’s artistic merit from its impact. It is perfectly possible for a work of art to display great technical competence, and yet fail to have an emotional impact on its audience, and so as a consequence it seems most sensible to allow, display and fund as wide a display of art as possible.

Limiting the forms of art that we display or give funding to those considered ‘artistically meritorious’ will result in the loss of innovation in the art world: if we only encourage those pieces that are ‘good’ under present-day metrics, we lose those pieces of art that, though considered controversial, or ‘not art’ now, may in the future be considered masterpieces (e.g. Picasso’s Guernica). 

Those who see the artwork, or hear of it, must be considered. Often, social disgust stems from the violation of those values that are most central to an individual.

An individual’s right not to have their most central values abused or ridiculed is surely of more importance than the desire of an artist to be entirely unrestricted in their work: the harm caused to individuals by the continuing acceptance by society, (and consequent exposure) of art they find disgusting, can be great, and the reasonable modern society recognises such harms and does not impose them unnecessarily.

For example, the case of the Chapman brothers’ repeated use of Hitler and Nazi imagery: for the Chapmans the horror of WW2 might be distant and historical, and therefore for them the time may have come for Hitler to simply be mocked; however, for others that horror is altogether more current. Other people may feel a greater connection, for example, because of the impact on their close family, which cannot simply be ignored. In a situation like this, clearly the impact  is infinitely more negative for that individual whose trauma is, in effect, being highlighted as now acceptable for comic material, than the positive gain is for the Chapmans: if restricted, they are simply caused to move on to other subjects. 

Whilst it is the case in individual instances that, if one piece of art is censored, another on a different topic may be produced, when looked at in a wider context this is not the case. If we restrict artists in all cases where someone is disgusted, an enormous quantity of subjects will be off limits. This will have, not only a negative impact on that artist, but a deleterious effect on whole branches of art.

Further, restricting any art that could cause social disgust is an unreasonable restriction to place upon society (or gallery curators, or grant allocation committees). It is difficult to know at what point a piece will cross the line from simply ‘provocative’ to ‘disgusting’. Consequently, people will be forced to err on the side of caution, leading to an excessive caution and restriction: overcensorship.

When weighed against these harms, it is far from clear that individual disgust can be elevated to this extent! 

Art differs from other forms of media with regard to the expression of ideas. Unlike other methods of conveying ideas, art has a visceral impact that is instant and has a lasting effect.

In a discussion, for example, there are often clues that ideas that might make people feel uncomfortable are about to arise. Thus, people are in a better position to consent to the sorts of challenges controversy within a conversation may pose (similarly, we tend to look more positively on taboo subjects raised within a conversational context than we do when they are, for example, shouted about in the street).

In the case of art, particularly that which is displayed in public spaces (like squares, parks and museums) people are unable to consent in this way, but rather, may be confronted suddenly by something that they find disgusting, because it has forced them to confront something they find horrific or traumatic, in a manner which has a great impact, and that, because of the power of the visual, they find difficult to forget. 

We are no less able to consent to art than we are to every other manifestation of individuality in society. We are similarly unable to consent to, but strongly impacted by, all sorts of things, from music videos and adverts to people dressed strangely on the street.

However, as a society we accept that people’s core values ought to be robust enough to survive challenges in the public sphere: we allow debate, art and music on many topics that have enormous personal ramifications, from euthanasia to deportation.

As a consequence, it is only legitimate to restrict the worst excesses, whose impact can be measured objectively, before display: we set rules in this regard restricting the worst instances of, for example, exploitation and pornography.

Further, those who are worst affected can self-limit their exposure: it is rare that people are entirely unaware of the existence of a controversial piece of art, and as such people can choose not to view it, or to view it only briefly. They should not have the right to prevent everyone else from seeing such a piece.

Some forms of art rely strongly on the provocation of disgust or other strong reactions. For example, conceptual artists often rely heavily upon the provocation of strong emotions in the viewer as a way of drawing attention to important, taboo areas (e.g. death, religion and sexuality). If they are banned from doing this, then we lose an entire branch of art: we are left instead with forms of art that choose not to engage with these areas at all.

Particularly in cases where people want to draw attention to what they see as unnecessary taboos, shock is integral. For example, the work of Sarah Lucas explored taboos surrounding sexuality and gender: her work drew attention to stereotyping and taboo in a way that (necessarily) many people found disgusting. Further, it is possible to critically engage with that disgust. It is wrong to assume that the end point of a provocative piece of art is “oh, I’ve been provoked”. Rather, this emotional first response is only the beginning when it comes to the contemplation of that work. Thinking about the reasons for your disgust, and its context, allows us a greater insight into the work, which if you believe ideas are central to pieces of art (which conceptual artists do) is vital.

First, it seems implausible that there are ideas that can only be conveyed by instant, emotional responses. It must surely be possible to convey these ideas in other ways.

Second, it is unclear why it is so important that these reactions are provoked: surely if something is incredibly shocking it is that way for a reason? Something cannot provoke social disgust without taking a clear stride over the line of what we consider to be acceptable in society.

The taboos that exist in society are not meaningless: rather, they express inviolable values that are present throughout time, and in many different societies. 

Artists ought to be allowed to express themselves, and display the world they see, as they see it.

Freedom of speech is considered integral to the modern democracy, and with good reason! Free speech makes a vital contribution to a plurality of ideas. It is only when a great number of ideas are expressed and challenged, such that people’s beliefs remain fluid, and can be formed and reformed, that we are able to arrive at such a point where we are likely to progress. This ‘marketplace of ideas’ prevents us from stagnating; from continuing harmful practices and modes of thought simply because they are traditional.

The more free speech is limited, the less able we are to access this plurality of ideas, and thus the less able we are to truly challenge harmful habits.

Freedom of speech is evidently not an absolute right: it is not something that we consider to be inviolable and able to ‘trump’ all other rights. Note, for instance, that many countries have restrictions on freedom of speech preventing hate speech and other transgressions.

We can, therefore, limit freedom of speech in instances where the benefits outweigh the harm: the benefit  in this instance being the prevention of harm to individuals as a result of the art.

Great, socially liberal movements have always been controversial, and always been supported, encouraged and propagated by art. Art is a realm wherein an artist’s expression is less limited by social structures (like the necessity of pleasing your box; of being ‘commercially viable’). Subsequently it has easily, and often, been utilised as a means of changing public opinion.

Some of these movements, for example, the breaking down of stereotypes and norms surrounding sexuality (in particular female sexuality) and gender that Sarah Lucas, Tracey Emin and others contributed to in the liberalising 80s and 90s, attract social disgust. In any situation where a taboo is being attacked, this will happen. The converse however, is not the case: it is almost impossible to provoke social disgust by maintaining the status quo.

As a result, restriction of art that provokes social disgust will disproportionately attack the socially liberal, and thus help to maintain the status quo, regardless of whether it is worthy of such protection. 

Social change does not come from pieces of art. It comes from real, concrete political action and struggles, over time. It is unclear, therefore, why it should not be the case that we ought first to campaign for changes to society, and then display (newly) acceptable art reflecting upon the changes we have made. To do otherwise is to suggest that artists should be allowed special dispensation to run ‘ahead’ of the norms the rest of us feel bound by: note that it is not always the case that disgusting art later becomes acceptable. Not all transgressions are for the sake of future changes to society; some simply remain transgressions.